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Abstract 
 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) is the largest and oldest business support scheme 
currently operating in Scotland. It provides grants to firms undertaking capital investment 
projects in economically deprived EU designated ‘Assisted Areas’. As a component of 
regional policy, the scheme is principally designed to safeguard and generate employment 
in the Assisted Areas. Many of the grants are given to help foreign firms to set up in 
Scotland. The aim of this thesis is to estimate the impact of receipt of these grants on plant 
performance as measured by productivity and survival. 
 
The main econometric problem to be confronted when estimating the impact of grants is 
self-selection bias. Because plants self-select into the treated group, the treated group will 
have different characteristics from the untreated group which would lead to differences in 
performance had neither group received treatment. This creates difficulties in estimating 
the impact of treatment as a simple comparison of a variable across treated and untreated 
groups will not measure the causal impact of treatment. This problem was dealt with using 
propensity score matching and instrumental variables. 
 
The dataset was created by linking a register of plants that received an RSA grant into the 
longitudinal ARD which contains the necessary range of financial variables for empirical 
analysis. This part of the thesis was crucial as failure to identify a high percentage of plants 
that received a grant in the ARD would seriously undermine the empirical analyses. In the 
end, a higher proportion of plants that received a grant were linked with the ARD than has 
been previously achieved using these databases. 
 
In the first empirical chapter, the growth of labour productivity and TFP between 1994 and 
2004 in Scottish manufacturing plants was decomposed to reveal the contribution of plants 
that receive an RSA grant. This showed that RSA-assisted plants made a small but positive 
contribution to both measures of productivity growth. 
 
The latter two empirical chapters showed that receipt of an RSA grant had no statistically 
significant impact on either the TFP or the survival probability of Scottish manufacturing 
plants between 1984 and 2004 in any of the industries considered. This is a major concern 
as it casts doubt on whether the jobs created and safeguarded by an RSA grant will endure.3 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) is the largest and oldest business support scheme 
currently operating in Scotland. It provides grants to firms undertaking capital investment 
projects in economically deprived European Union (EU) designated ‘Assisted Areas’. As a 
component of regional policy, the scheme is principally designed to safeguard and generate 
employment in the Assisted Areas. As such, many of the grants are given to help foreign 
firms to set up in Scotland. The amount that can be offered is determined by a number of 
factors including the location and size of the project and the number of jobs it will create or 
safeguard. In order to receive an RSA grant, an additionality criterion must be satisfied 
which requires that awards will only be made if the project could not have proceeded in the 
same form without the grant. A displacement criterion must also be met which demands 
that the jobs created by the project must not be offset by job losses in other parts of the 
Assisted Areas. The aim of this thesis is to estimate the impact of receipt of these grants on 
plant performance. 
 
This chapter is an introduction to the thesis. The next section provides a motivation for the 
thesis. The third section justifies the choice of variables upon which the impact of RSA 
will be analyzed in the chapters 7 and 8. The fourth section will describe the contents of 
each chapter. The final section concludes. 
 
1.2. Motivation 
 
Figure  1.1  shows  the  number  and  value  of  grants  offered  and  accepted  by  plants  in 
Scotland over the last six years. These figures are taken from the Scottish Government’s 
annual reports on RSA. 
 14 
 
Figure 1.1: Number and Value of Grants Accepted in Scotland (2003 prices), 2002/3-
2008/9 
 
Source: Scottish Government (2003-2007a, 2008-2009a) 
 
The number of grants accepted fell between 2002/3 and 2006/7 from over 180 to less than 
140 before rising to over 170 in 2007/8. However, in 2008/9, only 90 grants were accepted. 
The value of grants accepted does not generally mirror the number of grants accepted as 
the  value  of  grants  accepted  rose  between  2002/3  and  2006/7  from  slightly  over  £60 
million  to  around  £85  million.  This  implies  that  the  average  value  of  grant  rose 
significantly during this period. However, in 2007/8, the value of grants fell to under £80 
million before falling precipitously to just over £45 million in 2008/9. It remains to be seen 
whether these recent falls in both the number and value of grants are the start of serious 
cut-backs in funding for the RSA scheme or merely a short-term fluctuation caused by 
difficult budgetary circumstances. Regardless of which is the case, it is clear that large 
amounts of public money are currently spent on the RSA scheme. The size of the amount 
spent is emphasised by comparison with the other business support schemes that currently 
operate in Scotland. In 2008/9, less than £5 million was awarded under the Small Firm 
Merit  Awards  for  Research  and  Technology  (SMART):  Scotland  scheme  (Scottish 
Government, 2009b) while less than £13.5 million was awarded under the R&D grants 
scheme  (Scottish  Enterprise,  2009).  Data  from  the  Selective  Assistance  Managements 
Information System (SAMIS) showing the extent to which expenditure on RSA dwarfed 15 
 
that of other schemes between 1972 and 2003 is presented in chapter 5.1. Research into the 
impact of receipt of an RSA grant on plant performance is therefore essential to allow 
policy-makers to understand whether this money is being well-spent. 
 
However,  the  results  obtained  in  this  thesis  concerning  the  effectiveness  of  the  RSA 
scheme will be of interest throughout Europe. Figure 1.2 provides a breakdown of the 
various types of state aid that are provided in each country of the EU-15.
1 
 
Figure 1.2: State Aid by Type as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
EU-15, Annual Average 2006-2008 
Source: EU (2010) 
Crisis measures and coal sector are excluded. 
‘Other’ consists of equity participations, soft loans, tax deferrals and guarantees. 
 
As is shown in figure 1.2, in most countries of the EU-15, the largest component of state 
aid  takes  the  form  of  grants.  Unfortunately,  disaggregated  data  is  not  available  which 
shows how much is spent on different types of grants. It is therefore not possible to state 
how much of the money that is spent on grants are spent on investment grant schemes of 
the  type  embodied  by  the  RSA  scheme.  Nevertheless,  the  website  of  the  European 
                                                 
1 The EU defined state aid as ‘a form of state intervention used to promote a certain economic activity’ (EU, 
2009). 16 
 
Commission shows that most European countries operate some form of investment grant 
scheme, some of which are discussed due to their being the subject of empirical analysis in 
chapter 4, so the analysis contained in this thesis may be of interest not only to Scottish 
policy-makers but to policy-makers throughout Europe.
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1.3. Choice of Dependent Variables for Econometric Chapters 
 
The dataset that will be used in the empirical analysis allows the impact of receipt of an 
RSA grant on numerous measures of plant performance to be analysed. Perhaps the most 
obvious measure to choose is employment or labour demand given that the main objective 
of the RSA scheme is to promote and safeguard employment and the important role of 
employment  in  determining  living  standards.  This  was  not  done  here  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly,  the  impact  of  receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  on  employment  has  been  examined 
extensively in the past and a statistically significant and positive impact has invariably 
been found (see, for example, Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen, 2007; Hart, 
Driffield, Roper and Mole, 2008a). It can therefore be regarded as an established fact that 
RSA has a positive impact on employment. Secondly, as a ‘clawback’ clause requires that 
RSA  grants  are  repaid  if  a  specific  job  target  is  not  achieved,  a  positive  impact  on 
employment is hardly surprising as firms are unlikely to apply for RSA grants unless they 
fully intend to meet the jobs target (see chapter 2.6 for a description of the eligibility 
criteria for the RSA scheme). For these reasons, the impact of receipt of an RSA grant on 
employment was not analysed in this thesis. 
 
Another  obvious  measure  of  plant  performance  that  could  have  used  for  analysis  is 
investment.  This  was  recently  done  by  Criscuolo,  Martin,  Overman  and  Van  Reenen 
(2007) who found that receipt of an RSA grant had a positive and statistically significant 
impact  on  investment.  However,  given  the  existence  of  the  additionality  criterion 
mentioned above and the fact that payment of the grant is only made after the plant has 
actually purchased the capital, a positive impact of receipt of an RSA grant on investment 
ought to be ensured. Analysis of the impact of receipt of an RSA grant on investment or 
the capital stock is therefore not particularly interesting. 
 
                                                 
2 The European Commission website provides a description of the various types of financial support that are 
available in each of the member states (European Commission, 2009).  17 
 
The impact of receipt of an RSA grant on output could also be analysed. However, given 
what has been said concerning the likely impact of receipt of a grant on employment and 
the capital stock, it is very unlikely that receipt of a grant will not also have a positive 
impact on output. For no impact to be found would require either that the larger stocks of 
employment and capital that result from receipt of a grant do not increase the productive 
capacity  of  the  plant  or,  if  there  is  an  increase  in  productive  capacity,  there  to  be  no 
demand for the greater output that can be produced by the plant. The former is unlikely 
because more labour and capital will generally  increase the productive  capacity of the 
plant. The latter will only occur if the demand curve is sufficiently inelastic that the firm 
does not profit maximise by lowering its price and producing more output. However, this is 
also  unlikely  as  a  firm  would  not  choose  to  undertake  a  project  which  enhanced  its 
productive capacity if it did not intend to increase its output. Output is therefore not a 
particularly interesting aspect of firm performance upon which to estimate the impact of 
receipt of an RSA grant. 
 
Instead,  the  impact  of  receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  on  productivity  will  be  analysed.  The 
importance of productivity in determining living standards is well documented. According 
to Krugman (1997), in the determination of living standards, ‘productivity isn’t everything 
but in the long run, it is almost everything’. Similarly, Baumol (1984) states that ‘it can be 
said  without  exaggeration  that  in  the  long  run  probably  nothing  is  as  important  for 
economic welfare as the rate of productivity growth’. Empirical evidence showing the truth 
of these statements is provided by the OECD (2003). 
 
The  size  of  the  contribution  to  the  growth  of  GDP  per  capita  made  by  a  firm  which 
experiences an increase in productivity as a result of receiving an RSA grant will depend 
upon the shape of the demand curve it faces. With a sufficiently elastic demand curve, a 
grant-induced  increase  in  productivity  will  allow  the  firm  to  increase  revenues  and 
therefore  make  greater  profits  or  pay  higher  wages  to  its  employees.  An  increase  in 
productivity may also boost GDP per capita by inducing the firm to employ additional 
workers over and above the levels that the firm is obliged to employ under the terms of the 
grant. On the other hand, a sufficiently inelastic demand curve raises the possibility that the 
firm responds to the higher productivity by increasing profits and reducing employment. 
However, this should not happen because the rules of the RSA scheme stipulate that the 
grant must be used to safeguard or promote employment. Regardless of the shape of the 18 
 
demand curve, an increase in productivity will help firms to survive that may otherwise 
close. This is of particular relevance here because the rules of the RSA scheme stipulate 
that grants cannot be provided in cases where the necessary finance for the project could 
have  been  obtained  from  the  private  sector  and  that,  for  those  projects  which  seek  to 
safeguard  rather  than  create  employment,  the  applicant  firm  would  have  had  to  make 
redundancies  without  a  grant.  It  is  therefore  reasonable  to  suggest  that  RSA  grant 
recipients  are  a  poor  subset  of  firms  which  may  be  at  higher  risk  of  closure  than  the 
average. 
 
In light of the potential impact on GDP per capita of productivity improvements caused by 
receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  and  also  the  inclusion  of  a  target  to  improve  productivity 
performance  in  the  Government  Economic  Strategy  (Scottish  Government,  2007b), 
productivity is an obvious measure that can be used to analyse the impact of receipt of an 
RSA grant. A positive impact would arise if grants are used to acquire capital which allows 
the plant to produce existing products more efficiently or to produce new products that can 
be produced more efficiently than older products. As will be discussed in the literature 
review in chapter 4.4, there is no clear consensus as to what impact receipt of an RSA 
grant has on productivity. Furthermore, those studies that have analysed the existence of a 
causal relationship between receipt of an RSA grant and productivity have used inferior 
datasets to that which will be employed here and have employed different methodologies. 
For these reasons, further research into this relationship is required. 
 
The impact of receipt of an RSA grant on survival probability will also be analysed. Only 
Harris and Robinson (2005) have performed such an analysis. They found that receipt of 
an RSA grant increased the probability of survival. The lack of studies into this subject is 
surprising given the close relationship between plant survival and the security of the jobs 
created and safeguarded by RSA. In addition to using an inferior dataset to that employed 
in chapter 8, their study made no allowance for the consequences of self-selection into the 
group  of  plants  that  receive  a  grant.  For  this  reason,  further  analysis  of  the  causal 
relationship between receipt of an RSA grant and survival is needed. 
 19 
 
1.4. Chapter Summaries 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters in addition to this introduction. The next chapter 
begins by providing an explanation for why governments attempt to reduce disparities in 
unemployment rates across regions. It then proceeds to discuss various theories to explain 
regional variations in unemployment rates which imply different forms of intervention to 
support firms in poorly performing regions. These are the neoclassical theory, the dynamic 
capabilities  theory  and  the  evolutionary  theory.  Although  not  supported  by  all  of  the 
theories considered, the most frequently used type of support has been labour and, more 
often,  capital  subsidies.  Given  that  the  main  aim  of  regional  policy  is  to  promote 
employment, it might appear strange that capital subsidies have been used more frequently 
than labour subsidies. An explanation for this apparent paradox is provided. A description 
of the evolution of regional policy since its origins during the depression is then given. 
This section will focus in particular on the 1960s and 1970s as this was the time when the 
largest  amounts  of  money  were  spent  on  regional  policy.  It  will  also  describe  the 
development  of  the  RSA  scheme  in  detail.  The  final  section  will  describe  the  grant 
schemes that currently operate in Scotland with an emphasis on the RSA scheme. 
 
Chapter 3 will describe the econometric problems that arise when trying to analyse the 
impact of assistance because plants that receive a grant are a self-selected sample of the 
population of plants with different characteristics to those plants that did not receive a 
grant. It will then proceed to discuss four estimators that purport to allow the researcher to 
obtain  consistent  estimates  of  the  impact  of  receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  under  these 
circumstances: the fixed effects, matching, instrumental variables and control functions 
estimators. Having described these estimators, a motivation for the choice of the matching 
and instrumental variables estimators rather than the fixed effects and  control function 
estimators in chapter 7 and 8 is given. 
 
Chapter 4 will review the theoretical and empirical literature that offers predictions as to 
what results may be expected from the empirical analyses of chapters 6, 7 and 8. This 
chapter  is  heavily  weighted  towards  the  empirical  literature  because  the  theory  which 
explains why RSA should have an impact on total factor productivity (TFP) and survival is 
straightforward and relatively few papers have been written on the macroeconomic impact 
of business support programmes such as RSA. The empirical literature, by contrast, is 20 
 
voluminous and the review will be organized according to the nature of the data and the 
method employed to overcome the problems caused by self-selection into the group of 
plants  that  receive  assistance.  Although  the  results  are  diverse,  receipt  of  a  business 
support  grant  is  generally  found  not  to  lead  to  a  statistically  significant  increase  in 
productivity. Of those papers that analyse the impact of receipt of an RSA grant, Harris 
and Robinson (2004) find a positive and statistically significant effect while Criscuolo, 
Martin, Overman and Van Reenen (2007) and Hart, Driffield, Roper and Mole (2008a) do 
not. Only two papers (Girma, Görg and Strobl, 2007b; Harris and Trainor, 2007) have been 
written on the impact of receipt of business support grants on the probability of survival 
and both find that receipt of a grant has a positive impact. However, these papers do not 
satisfactorily deal with the consequences of self-selection into the treatment group. 
 
Chapter 5 begins by providing descriptive statistics on the schemes that currently operate 
in  Scotland  using  data  from  the  SAMIS  database  which  is  the  register  of  plants  that 
received support under the various grant schemes that operate in Scotland. This showed 
that the RSA scheme offers the largest number of and the most generous grants of all the 
business support schemes operating in Scotland. It then proceeds to describe how plants 
that received an RSA grant were identified in the dataset to be used for the empirical 
analysis. This involved linking the SAMIS database to the Annual Respondents Database 
(ARD) which contains the necessary information on inputs and outputs for econometric 
analysis. This process managed to link a higher proportion of plants that received a grant 
than  has  been  managed  before  in  analyses  of  RSA  using  these  datasets  (Harris  and 
Robinson, 2004; Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen, 2007) which allows greater 
confidence in the empirical results. A description of the variables in the created dataset 
which will be used in the empirical analyses is then given. Finally, the chapter provides a 
comparison of the characteristics of plants that received an RSA grant with those that did 
not. This shows that RSA recipients possess different characteristics to those plants that do 
not receive a grant and therefore that self-selection bias will be an issue in the econometric 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 decomposes the growth of aggregate labour productivity and aggregate TFP in 
Scottish manufacturing plants between 1994 and 2004 in order to reveal whether plants 
that  received  an  RSA  grant  during  this  period  contributed  positively  or  negatively  to 
aggregate productivity growth and the channels through which this contribution was made. 21 
 
This is accomplished using the Haltiwanger decomposition. This shows that RSA-assisted 
plants  made  a  small  positive  contribution  to  both  measures  of  aggregate  productivity 
growth, primarily because RSA-assisted plants that existed in both 1994 and 2004 tended 
to increase both their productivity and their market share. However, the decomposition also 
suggested  a  far  greater  contribution  could  be  made  if  entrants  were  more  and  better 
targeted. 
 
Chapter 7 will examine whether receipt of an RSA grant has a causal impact on plant TFP. 
In  order  to  do  so,  two  sources  of  bias  must  be  overcome:  the  first  arises  due  to  the 
aforementioned self-selection into the group of plants that receive an RSA grant and the 
second arises due to the endogeneity of the factor inputs in the production function. The 
consequences of self-selection are tackled by creating a matched sample using propensity 
score matching and by using the instrumental variables estimator. The endogeneity of the 
factor  inputs  is  dealt  with  using  the  system  generalised  methods  of  moments  (GMM) 
estimator. The results using both the matched sample and instrumental variables shows that 
receipt of an RSA grant had no statistically significant impact on TFP. 
 
Chapter 8 will investigate whether a causal relationship exists between receipt of an RSA 
grant and the probability of survival. This is done using a Cox proportional hazard model. 
The  problems  that  arise  due  to  self-selection  into  the  treatment  group  are  tackled  by 
estimating the model on a matched sample created by  propensity score matching. The 
results obtained using the matched sample showed that receipt of an RSA grant had no 
statistically significant impact on the probability of survival. It is worth noting that when 
no control for the consequences of self-selection into the treatment group was employed, 
the results implied that receipt of an RSA grant led to a statistically significant reduction in 
the probability of closure for some industries. This demonstrates that self-selection into the 
treatment group, when ignored, can generate biased estimates of the treatment effect. 
 
The final chapter is a conclusion. This will begin by setting out the contribution to the 
literature  made  by  this  thesis.  It  will  then  summarise  the  results  from  the  empirical 
chapters. Some policy recommendations will then be made on the basis of these results. 
These are essentially ways of changing the scheme so that it becomes more focused on 
improving  the  productivity  of  plants  that  receive  grants.  Finally,  some  suggestions  for 
future work will be provided. 22 
 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a motivation for this thesis on the grounds of the levels of public 
resources  put  into  the  RSA  scheme.  Evidence  was  also  provided  to  show  that  many 
European  countries  also  spend  large  sums  of  money  on  grant  schemes  so  the  results 
obtained  in  this  thesis  should  be  of  wider  interest  than  merely  to  policy-makers  in 
Scotland. The next section justified the choice of productivity and survival as the variables 
upon which the impact of receipt of an RSA grant will be estimated in the chapter 7 and 8. 
This was on the basis that gaining an understanding of the impact of receipt of an RSA 
grant on these variables is interesting and important and the literature has yet to reach a 
consensus on these questions. The last section gave an outline of each of the chapters of 
the thesis. 23 
 
 
2. Regional Industrial Assistance and its Rationale 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Regional industrial assistance is primarily aimed at reducing disparities in unemployment 
across regions. However, different theories provide different explanations for the existence 
of such disparities. For instance, the neoclassical model suggests that externalities lead to 
differences in economic performance across regions. By contrast, the evolutionary model 
would emphasise a lack of innovation as the cause of relative underperformance. These 
differences are important because different understandings of the cause of the problem 
imply different solutions. This chapter will therefore discuss three theories which offer 
different explanations of the existence of disparities in unemployment across regions and 
support different types of government intervention. 
 
Although not necessarily supported by the theories considered, the most popular form of 
intervention has historically been capital subsidies in the United Kingdom (UK). Given 
that  the  main  aim  of  regional  policy  is  to  reduce  disparities  in  unemployment  across 
regions, it may seem strange that capital subsidies have been used more frequently than 
labour subsidies given that the standard analysis shows that, because capital subsidies lead 
to a substitution of capital for labour, employment subsidies should be more effective in 
boosting employment. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the standard analysis is 
static  and  consequently  does  not  take  account  of  improvements  in  the  technology 
embedded in capital over time and the fact that capital provides a stream of productive 
services over many periods. A proper consideration of the nature of capital explains the 
favouring of capital over labour subsidies. 
 
Regional  industrial  assistance  has  been  provided  in  some  form  in  the  UK  since  the 
depression. However, the 1960s and 1970s were the heyday of regional policy. This was 
also the time at which the RSA scheme was born. In the course of giving a history of 
regional industrial assistance, and in particular the grant schemes on which the largest 
amounts of money have been spent, this chapter will also provide a description of the 
evolution of the RSA scheme.  Industrial assistance in Scotland now takes the form of 
investment or innovation grants. Investment grants are provided under the RSA scheme 24 
 
while innovation grants are provided under the SMART: Scotland and the Research and 
Development (R&D) Grants schemes. A detailed description of the current operation of 
these schemes will be given below. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section will describe why reducing regional 
disparities in employment is important; the third section will look at different explanations 
of  why  unemployment  rates  differ  across  regions  and  the  policies  implied  by  these 
different explanations; the fourth section will provide a comparison of capital and labour 
subsidies in order to determine which is best suited to increasing employment; the fifth will 
look at the history of regional policy in the UK and the sixth section will give a detailed 
description of the RSA scheme and the innovation grants schemes that currently operate in 
Scotland; the final section concludes. 
 
2.2. Justification for Intervention 
 
The main objective of regional industrial policy is to create employment in areas with 
persistently high unemployment. As such there are, according to Taylor and Wren (1997), 
four  main  arguments  which  support  the  use  of  regional  industrial  policy.  The  first 
argument contends that the reduction of unemployment in areas of high unemployment has 
direct social and economic benefits. The latter includes higher income for the unemployed, 
higher  income  for  others  through  multiplier  effects,  lower  expenditure  on  transfer 
payments, higher tax revenues and better prospects for areas with high unemployment due 
to the association between unemployment and poor educational attainment, a poorly skilled 
workforce  and  competitiveness.  The  social  benefits  accrue  to  those  that  would  be 
unemployed  from the avoidance of the  demoralisation and poor health associated with 
unemployment. Others would also benefit from the lower crime rates and the improved 
physical and social environment that are associated with lower rates of unemployment. 
 
The second advantage of reducing disparities in unemployment across regions is that it 
should  ease  inflationary  pressures  in  the  economy.  This  is  based  upon  the  notion  that 
national inflation can be generated when only one region is experiencing excess demand 
for labour. The resultant wage inflation is transmitted to other labour markets even if they 
have  high  unemployment  rates  through  national  industry-wide  wage  agreements,  inter-
plant wage-setting in multi-plant firms and wage-setting on the principle that workers in 25 
 
similar occupations ought to be paid a similar amount. This wage inflation then leads to 
price inflation. 
 
Creating employment in areas of higher unemployment is also desirable on the grounds 
that unbalanced economic growth leads to the persistence and intensification of economic 
problems.  This  occurs  because  disparities  in  economic  performance  will  lead  to  the 
migration  of  workers  from  areas  with  high  unemployment  to  areas  with  low 
unemployment. As the workers that migrate tend to be more skilled than those that remain, 
this  will  improve  the  skills  of  low  unemployment  regions  at  the  expense  of  high 
unemployment  regions  and  thereby  exacerbate  differences  in  regional  economic 
performance. 
 
Finally, reducing unemployment in areas of high unemployment is politically necessary. 
This is the result of the feeling of unfairness created by persistent differences in economic 
performance across regions. 
 
2.3. Sources of Regional Variations in Unemployment 
 
The  previous  section  has  explained  why  the  reduction  of  regional  variations  in 
unemployment is thought to be desirable. This section will discuss different explanations 
of  why  differences  in  unemployment  rates  arise  across  regions.  This  is  necessary  as 
different understandings of the source of disparities in regional unemployment rates imply 
different types of government intervention to counteract it. The explanation provided by 
the government for the RSA scheme is based on the notion of market failure that arises 
from the neoclassical model. This section will therefore begin by discussing the notion of 
market failure. The next sections will discuss the dynamic capabilities and evolutionary 
theories of the firm which provide more nuanced explanations of why some firms succeed 
and therefore how firms in areas of high unemployment should be supported. The policies 
that could be employed to remove the source of variations in regional unemployment will 
be discussed and the extent to which capital grants schemes such as RSA could perform 
this role will be discussed. The other main type of support offered in Scotland is grants to 
support innovation and the extent to which these theories support this type of grants will 
also be considered. 
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Neoclassical Theory 
 
In accordance with standard textbook theory (see, for example, Myles, 1995), the Green 
Book of HM Treasury  (2003) states that  government intervention is normally justified 
either by market failure or equity considerations. Market failure refers to a situation in 
which the unregulated market fails to deliver an efficient outcome. An efficient outcome 
exists when nobody can be made better off without someone else being made worse off. 
Intervention on the grounds of equity arises from government and (and to the extent that 
government represents society) societal preferences for equity. It is noted in the Green 
Book that intervention can incur costs and economic distortions which have to be taken 
into account when determining whether intervention is desirable. 
 
As our interest here is primarily in a grant scheme which seeks to reduce disparities in 
unemployment  across  regions,  it  is  clear  that  equity  considerations  play  a  role  in 
motivating the use of these grants. However, because disparities in economic performance 
can also be argued to represent an inefficient outcome caused by market failures that are 
present to different extents across regions, such intervention can also be justified on the 
grounds  of  efficiency.  The  following  discussion  will  therefore  be  framed  in  terms  of 
market failure. The advantage of this approach is that specific types of market failure call 
for specific types of policy whereas equity considerations can be used to justify any form 
of intervention which aims to secure a more equitable outcome. 
 
Annex 1 of the Green Book gives four situations in which the market fails: when goods 
have the characteristics of public goods; when externalities arise from some activity; when 
agents have imperfect information and when firms have market power. The first of these 
calls for the provision of public goods; the third demands laws to alleviate the information 
asymmetry while the last requires stronger competition policy. They therefore do not offer 
a justification for the existence of grant schemes. It is also not clear why any of these 
sources  of  market  failure  would  explain  differences  in  economic  performance  across 
regions and, as a result, they do not offer a justification for regional industrial assistance in 
general. The existence of externalities can however be regarded as a justification for the 
existence of such support. 
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An externality exists ‘whenever some economic agent’s welfare (utility or profit) includes 
real variables whose values are chosen by others without particular attention to the effect 
upon the welfare of the other agents they affect’ (Myles, 1995: 313). In other words, the 
agent’s welfare is partly determined by the actions of other agents who do not consider the 
impact of their own behaviour on the welfare of other agents. In this case, either the costs 
incurred by the agent of taking a particular action do not equal the social costs of the action 
or the private benefits from taking the action do not equal the social benefits. This leads to 
a socially inefficient outcome as private agents undertake a socially inefficient level of the 
action. When externalities are positive, too little of the activity is undertaken and when 
externalities are negative, too much of the activity is undertaken. 
 
There  are  many  types  of  externalities  but  the  most  relevant  when  seeking  to  explain 
disparities in economic performance is agglomeration externalities. These exist when there 
are cost reductions that accrue to firms that are situated in the vicinity of other firms. Such 
externalities  may  arise  in  many  forms.  According  to  Hart,  Driffield,  Roper  and  Mole 
(2008a),  they  include  ‘collaboration  and  networking  opportunities,  technological 
externalities  (e.g.  spillovers,  linkages),  information  transfer,  the  freeing  up  of  internal 
human and financial capital (which can then be utilised in other innovative actions within 
the  firm),  the  leverage  of  additional  private  sector  financial  support,  or  the  range  of 
perceived or actual benefits associated with large urban labour markets (e.g. skill sets)’. 
Agglomeration  externalities  will  arise  to  different  extents  across  regions  because  of 
differences in the concentration and behaviour of firms. Regional subsidies to capital and 
labour will remove the cost advantage to the richer areas which benefit from agglomeration 
externalities and thereby attract more firms to the disadvantaged areas. This should in turn 
generate the externalities, the lack of which caused the cost disadvantage in the first place. 
However, this is not automatic as firms must behave in certain ways to create and benefit 
from externalities. For instance, they must be involved in technological development if 
there are to be technological externalities. Therefore, this source of market failure implies 
support  for  schemes  that  specifically  aim  to  support  activities  which  give  rise  to 
externalities rather than merely trying to attract more firms to a given area. This provides 
support  for  innovation  grant  schemes  that  encourage  R&D  rather  than  capital  grants 
schemes as this is an activity commonly thought to create externalities (see, for example, 
Gertler, 2003). 
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Another  type  of  externality  which  would  seem  to  offer  a  strong  justification  for  the 
existence of capital grant schemes is that generated by capital investment. According to De 
Long and Summers (1991), equipment investment ‘is a natural place to expect external 
economies and linkages to be important’. They provide empirical evidence supporting the 
existence of such an externality but do not specify precisely how it may arise. The idea is 
formalised by Keuschnigg (1998). The features of his model are monopolistic competition, 
product differentiation and free entry. These create an equilibrium in which the level of 
capital accumulation is lower than the socially optimum level. This occurs because each 
agent takes the investment level of other agents, and therefore the number and price of 
capital goods, as given when making decisions concerning whether to make an investment. 
However, each investment creates new firms which increases product diversity and leads 
to greater specialisation in production. This lowers the price of capital goods and, by doing 
so,  increases  the  profitability  of  investment  projects  for  all  agents.  Although  it  is  not 
profitable  for  one  agent  to  make  the  marginal  investment,  a  coordinated  increase  in 
investment from all agents increases social welfare. Such an externality appears to provide 
a strong basis for capital grants schemes as, by reducing the price of capital, these should 
improve upon the socially inefficient level of investment that occurs in the absence of 
intervention. However, it should be noted that, for this externality to arise requires that 
capital  investment  creates  new  firms  and  products.  The  extent  to  which  capital  grant 
schemes create new firms and products depends upon the type of capital that is bought 
using the grant. If capital grants are used simply to fund replacement investment, this will 
not enhance product diversity. Furthermore, because the market for capital goods is likely 
to be quite integrated across the country, it is not obvious why this externality would arise 
differentially  across  regions.  This  externality  would  therefore  appear  to  support  a 
nationwide capital grant scheme rather than a regional grant scheme such as RSA. 
 
A market failure not considered in the Green Book but suggested by Hart, Driffield, Roper 
and Mole (2008a) is that of incomplete markets. When markets are complete, firms are 
able to borrow the money they require at an interest rate reflecting the lenders’ perceptions 
of the riskiness of the loan. However, financial markets may not be complete. As a result, 
the private sector may not provide loans to start-up firms or firms seeking to expand their 
operations because they regard them as too risky. This prevents such firms from obtaining 
private sector finance and prevents the achievement of an efficient outcome. Because the 
private sector will perceive that loans to firms in poorly performing regions carry a greater 29 
 
risk, firms in these areas will find it more difficult to obtain loans than firms in richer 
areas.  Overcoming  this  externality  requires  the  provision  of  finance  to  such  firms.  As 
regional capital grant schemes can be viewed as doing precisely this, the RSA scheme 
would appear to be well justified by this market failure. Innovation grant schemes can also 
be viewed in this way although the inherent riskiness of R&D projects, the lengthy period 
of time that it may take for returns to materialise and frequently large amount of finance 
required suggests that the difficulties involved in obtained private sector finance for this 
sort of project will be greater than those encountered when obtaining finance for other 
projects (Scottish Government, 2009b). Therefore, this market failure provides a stronger 
rationale for innovation grant schemes than capital grant schemes. 
 
The rationale provided by the government for intervention is based on the notion of market 
failure which arises from the neoclassical model of the economy. Of the various different 
types of market failure, regional capital grant and innovation grant schemes can be justified 
by the existence of externalities and incomplete markets. These rationales for intervention 
are however stronger for innovation grant schemes than capital grant schemes. However, 
the neoclassical model from which the notion of market failure arises is a static model that 
depends on assumptions such as perfect information and complete mobility of factors of 
production which do not hold in reality (Harris and Robinson, 2001a). More importantly, 
the theory of the firm contained in this model abstracts from many aspects of the firm 
which are important when considering why disparities in economic performance may exist 
between regions and how the government could act to reduce them. What follows in the 
next two sections is a discussion of two theories of the firm which provide further insight 
into how the government may act to reduce disparities in economic performance across 
regions. The following draws heavily from Harris and Robinson (2001b). 
 
Dynamic Capabilities Theory 
 
The notion of dynamic capabilities, which has been developed in a series of papers by 
Teece (see, for example, Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece, 1996) is a means of explaining 
how firms acquire and sustain a competitive advantage in a rapidly changing business 
environment. According to this view, the strategic dimensions of a firm are its managerial 
and  organisational  processes,  its  present  position  and  the  paths  available  to  it.  These 
dimensions cover the firm’s capabilities or competencies. When it is difficult to replicate 30 
 
or  imitate  these  capabilities  or  competencies,  they  can  be  thought  of  as  distinctive 
competencies. Another characteristic of such competencies is that they cannot be bought 
on the market. If they could be bought on the market, they would only provide a transitory 
competitive  advantage  as  competitors  could  simply  buy  them,  thereby  removing  the 
competitive  advantage  from  the  firm  that  was  the  first  to  develop  that  competence. 
Dynamic capabilities are the ‘subset of the competences/capabilities which allow the firm 
to create new products  and processes,  and respond to changing market circumstances’ 
(Teece  and  Pisano,  1994:  541).  In  other  words,  dynamic  capabilities  are  the  driver  of 
innovation which is, in turn, the driver of technological change. As such, it is reasonable to 
suppose that firms in poorly performing areas lack such dynamic capabilities and their 
development should therefore be the focus of policy. The following section will provide a 
description of different types of dynamic capabilities. It will be structured by the strategic 
dimensions mentioned above. 
 
Managerial  and  organisational  processes  (henceforth  referred  to  simply  as  processes) 
simply refer to the manner in which things are done in the firm. They encompass the state 
of three aspects of the firm which, depending on their condition, may constitute a dynamic 
capability. Firstly, processes determine the efficiency with which activity is coordinated by 
managers  both  internally  and  externally.  Examples  of  external  coordination  include 
strategic alliances, buyer-supplier relations and technological collaboration. Another part 
of the firm’s processes which may constitute a dynamic capability is the way in which the 
employees of the firm learn. This is an important source of competitive advantage as fast 
learning will allow a firm to be flexible and employ new processes quickly. In addition to 
improving  individual  skills,  learning  improves  organisational  skills  which  lead  to 
improved processes so the relationship between learning and processes is bidirectional. 
Finally, the firm’s ability to recognise the need to reconfigure its asset structure and then to 
accomplish  the  requisite  reorganisation  is  another  key  part  of  its  processes  and  an 
important  dynamic  capability.  This  requires  an  awareness  of  the  market  and  the 
technological environment and a willingness and ability to change. 
 
The second dimension of the firm and potential source of dynamic capabilities is the firm’s 
position. This refers to its current stock of business assets. One type of asset that cannot be 
regarded as a dynamic capability is generic plant and equipment which can be bought on 
the  market.  By  contrast,  technological  assets  can  be  a  source  of  dynamic  capabilities. 31 
 
Although some technological assets can be traded on the market, much technology cannot 
be bought because the owner is unwilling to sell or because of difficulties in transactions 
involving  technology.  Another  source  of  dynamic  capabilities  is  the  firm’s  stock  of 
complimentary assets. These assist in the production and delivery of new products. In the 
presence of liquidity constraints, a firm’s financial assets are another potential source of 
dynamic  capabilities.  However,  the  importance  of  liquidity  constraints  should  not  be 
overstated as they are unlikely to be a long-term hindrance. Locational assets can also be a 
dynamic capability because, although property markets are well established, building and 
environmental  restrictions  can  prevent  trade  in  such  assets.  Such  restrictions  provide 
durable advantages in the form of lower transport costs and market access. 
 
The final part of the firm’s dimensions, its paths, refers to the strategic options available to 
the firm and are therefore an obvious determinant of its ability to react to changing market 
conditions. The inclusion of this dimension indicates an acceptance of the notion of path 
dependency whereby the options available to a firm is a function of its past decisions (key 
papers in the development of this theory are David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). Path dependency 
is particularly important in determining the technological opportunities available to the 
firm. These are a lagged function of scientific activity external to the firm and also of 
innovative activity commissioned, either internally or externally, by the firm itself. The 
implication of the latter is that technological opportunities are unique to a firm that has 
undertaken innovative activities in the past. 
 
In  terms  of  policy,  this  theory  implies  that  government  policy  should  be  aimed  at 
improving the dynamic capabilities of firms in areas of high unemployment. Assistance 
should  be  provided  directly  to  the  firm  instead  of  trying  to  build  up  the  technology 
infrastructure of the region since the latter will merely facilitate the sharing of generic 
knowledge. Since this type of knowledge is easy to obtain, the latter type of policy will not 
provide  firms  with  a  source  of  competitive  advantage.  However,  due  to  their  nature, 
helping firms to develop dynamic capabilities is not easy. Capital or labour subsidies will 
help only to the extent that they help to overcome liquidity constraints, as generic plant and 
equipment are not a source of dynamic capability due to their being purchasable on the 
market. Policies aimed at encouraging innovation, such as innovation grant schemes, could 
lead to the development of dynamic capabilities as these will create new technological 32 
 
assets  and  opportunities.  They  should  therefore  be  regarded  more  favourably  by 
proponents of this theory. 
 
Evolutionary Theory 
 
The evolutionary theory, which offers rather different policy conclusions to the dynamic 
capabilities theory, takes much from the work of Schumpeter and thereby represents a 
radical  break  from  standard  approaches  based  on  the  notion  of  equilibrium.  Standard 
theory shows that, with a fixed set of products and technologies, a competitive market 
structure  will  result  in  the  lowest  price  to  consumers  whereas  a  monopolistic  market 
structure will lead to higher prices and lower output. It is competition based on price which 
produces this superior outcome under a competitive market structure. Schumpeter regarded 
this analysis as missing the point because, due to its holding of products and processes 
constant, it places too much emphasis on price competition (Diamond, 2004). Schumpeter 
argued that, in reality, competition occurs primarily through the innovation process, rather 
than through prices, as entrepreneurs seek to develop new products or technologies which 
provide them with a cost or quality advantage over their rivals. This allows them to survive 
and make large profits but reduces the profits of or destroys their rivals. The innovation 
process can therefore be summarised as a process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 
1943).  As  this  innovation  process  occurs  continuously,  the  notion  of  equilibrium  is 
incompatible  with  the  capitalist  economy  because  the  economy  never  reaches  an 
equilibrium state but remains in a constant state of flux. 
 
Although  debate  surrounds  whether  Schumpeter  can  properly  be  classified  as  an 
evolutionary  economist,  it  is  undeniable  that  his  thinking  has  deeply  influenced  the 
development of evolutionary economics (Metcalfe, 2000). The following summary of the 
evolutionary theory of technical change borrows heavily from Metcalfe and Georghiou 
(1997). The model involves three distinct stages, each of which will be described in turn. 
 
The first is the innovation stage which generates diversity. As with the resource-based 
theory,  innovations  are  understood  to  be  a  function  of  the  characteristics  of  the  firm. 
However, it is also emphasised that innovations are ‘guided and constrained by cognitive 
frameworks and the embedding of those frameworks in institutional rules and practices’ 
(Metcalfe  and  Georghiou,  1997:  78).  In  other  words,  external  factors  are  important  as 33 
 
innovations  are  developed  using  information  gleaned  from  outside  sources.  Radical 
innovations  are  rare  because  the  direction  of  innovation  is  driven  and  constrained  by 
existing intellectual and institutional capital built for research in a particular area. Ex post, 
the innovation process appears to be wasteful as innovations are usually the consequence 
of trial and error experimentation. ‘Errors’ however provide valuable information on where 
not to direct research effort in the future and are an unavoidable element of the innovation 
process. 
 
From  the  diversity  created  by  innovation,  the  selection  of  which  technologies  will  be 
diffused  throughout  the  economy  occurs.  This  is  the  second  stage  in  the  evolutionary 
model  and  is  accomplished  primarily  by  the  market,  where  suppliers  and  users  of 
innovations  meet.  The  market  fulfils  this  role  by  co-ordinating  ‘the  development  of 
demand, investment and the growth of productive capacity together with the processes of 
learning which take place jointly between users and suppliers’ (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 
1997:  79).  Diffusion  may  also  occur  outside  the  market  through  imitation  of  existing 
practice. The extent of imitation will depend, among other factors, upon the stringency and 
coverage of intellectual property laws. 
 
The final stage is feedback of knowledge from the selection to the innovation process. This 
stage  generates  path  dependencies  in  the  innovation  process  as  the  selection  of 
technologies in one period influences the nature of innovations in the next. This raises the 
possibility  that  firms  and  markets  could  go  down  technology  trajectories  that  are  not 
optimal in the long-run (see Altman, 2000 for a model showing how this can happen).  
 
The  importance  of  innovation  is  made  clear  by  considering  what  would  happen  in  its 
absence. Without the first stage in the model, each firm would adopt the existing best 
technology,  the  market  would  be  homogenised  and  the  economy  would  not  grow. 
Innovation is therefore crucial as it replenishes the system with the new innovations which 
lead to technological progress and growth. 
 
Due to its importance in this theory, the model would appear to regard a lack of innovation 
as the source of differences in economic performance across regions and therefore provides 
support for government intervention that bolsters innovation in the poorer regions. Policy 
is advocated that encourages innovative activities from all firms. This is preferable to the 34 
 
more  targeted  approach  supported  by  the  dynamic  capabilities  theory  because  the 
outcomes from the innovation process are too unpredictable for policymakers to identify 
which  firms  to  support.  The  evolutionary  theory  does  not  support  capital  or  labour 
subsidies because they do not directly aim to bolster the innovation stage of technological 
development.  Indeed  by  supporting  plants  that  would  otherwise  be  forced  to  make 
redundancies,  these  subsidies  may  impede  the  Schumpeterian  process  of  ‘creative 
destruction’ that creates growth in the economy. Discretionary schemes, in general, are 
regarded unfavourably as, by providing support for individual plants, such schemes try to 
‘pick winners’ and this is seen as difficult due to the uncertainty of innovation outcomes. 
Innovation grant schemes are better founded with regards to the evolutionary theory of the 
firm  as  these  do  aim  to  bolster  the  innovation  stage.  However,  as  they  are  also 
discretionary grant programmes, they can also be criticised on the grounds that they try to 
‘pick winners’. 
 
2.4. Capital or Labour Subsidies? 
 
The previous section has offered a number of different explanations for the existence of 
disparities  in  regional  unemployment.  Each  explanation  implies  a  particular  policy  to 
remove the source of the disparities in unemployment. Although the existence of market 
failure caused by incomplete markets or the existence of externalities can be regarded as 
providing  support  for  subsidies  to  the  factors  of  production,  neither  the  dynamic 
capabilities or the evolutionary theories imply support for such subsidies as a first-best 
policy.  Nevertheless,  although  they  may  not  directly  tackle  the  suggested  causes  of 
disparities in unemployment across regions, capital and labour subsidies may still perform 
a function in reducing them. Indeed, they have been the most frequently used instrument of 
regional industrial assistance, as will be shown in the next section. Capital grants have 
been used more frequently than labour subsidies which may seem surprising given that the 
main aim of regional policy is to reduce disparities in unemployment rates across regions. 
The following analysis will discuss the impact of both types of subsidy and thereby explain 
whether labour or capital subsidies are superior in terms of creating employment. 
 
According to a standard static analysis, the impact of a capital or labour subsidy on the 
employment level of the recipient firm depends upon the induced substitution and output 
effects. As a capital (labour) subsidy lowers the price of capital (labour), the substitution 35 
 
effect  on  employment  will  be  negative  (positive).  For  a  fixed  level  of  subsidy,  its 
magnitude will depend upon two factors. The first is the supply elasticities of labour and 
capital which determine the extent to which changes in demand for factors of production 
translate into changes in inputs. The second is the shape of the firm’s isoquant as this 
governs the size of the induced change in demand for each factor of production. 
 
Both capital and labour subsidies will lead to a reduction in the cost of producing a unit of 
output. Assuming the recipient firm responds to this induced reduction in costs by cutting 
prices, there will be an increase in demand for its output. In order to satisfy this increased 
demand, firms will employ more inputs of both capital and labour. The output effect on 
labour of both capital and labour subsidies is therefore positive. For labour subsidies, the 
impact on employment is unambiguously positive but for capital subsidies, only when the 
induced output effect of the subsidy is larger than the substitution effect will the subsidy 
have  a  positive  impact  on  employment.  The  magnitude  of  the  output  effect  will  be 
determined  by  a  number  of  factors:  the  size  of  the  reduction  in  production  costs 
precipitated by the subsidy; the extent to which firms lower their prices in response to the 
subsidy;  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  output  with  respect  to  price;  and  the  technical 
conditions of production. 
 
The analysis above implies that the firm is capable of continuing in operation with or 
without the subsidy. However, some firms may have costs that are so high that they cannot 
operate without some form of subsidy. For such firms, both capital and labour subsidies of 
sufficient  size  will  allow  it  to  continue  trading  which  will  save  jobs.  However,  in 
accordance with the analysis above, the capital subsidy will lead to a substitution from 
labour to capital while a labour subsidy will lead to a substitution of capital for labour. 
There will, of course, also be an output effect which will increase the levels of both capital 
and labour. However, it is clear that the analysis implies that the number of jobs saved 
would be larger with labour subsidies. 
 
A serious problem with the simple analysis presented above is that it does not take account 
of the general equilibrium effects of subsidies. Both capital and labour subsidies will create 
multiplier effects which will increase employment in other sectors in the surrounding area 
and beyond. As workers will tend to spend a high proportion of their wages in the region, 
this would imply that the multiplier from labour subsidies will be large. By contrast, the 36 
 
capital that is bought using the subsidy is likely to be purchased from outside the region 
which implies that the capital subsidy multiplier may be lower than the labour subsidy 
multiplier. 
 
The analysis has so far presented a strong case for labour rather than capital subsidies as 
the best form of grants for reducing unemployment. However, taking account of dynamics 
calls this conclusion into question. The analysis has thus far been static and therefore has 
had nothing to say on the fact that the technology embodied in capital improves over time. 
This means that, when new capital is purchased, it will be more productive than older 
capital. Furthermore, the standard analysis does not properly capture the nature of capital. 
Capital, once bought, provides productive services over many years unlike labour which 
must be paid in each period in order to procure productive services. When making the 
decision as to the quantity of inputs to buy, firms will therefore have a stock of existing 
capital to take into consideration. 
 
Holding the level of output constant, a capital subsidy leads a firm to buy more capital than 
it would otherwise have bought. As the new capital will be more modern than the existing 
capital, this will increase the productivity of the firm. The costs of producing a unit of 
output will therefore fall for two reasons: because the cost of capital is subsidised and 
because the more modern capital is more productive. Holding output constant, a labour 
subsidy would lead to the employment of more labour and less of the more technologically 
advanced capital. The impact of a labour subsidy on the costs of producing a unit of output 
is  therefore  ambiguous:  by  reducing  the  cost  of  employing  labour,  the  labour  subsidy 
generates  a  reduction  in  the  cost  of  producing  a  unit  of  output  but  this  effect  is 
counterbalanced to some extent by the lower levels of the more technologically advanced 
capital that is bought. Therefore, the capital grant is more effective in reducing the costs of 
producing a unit of output and is consequently more likely to assist in securing the viability 
of the firm in the long-run. It will therefore also generate a larger output effect. This is the 
main reason why capital subsidies are preferred over labour subsidies. 
 
The advantage of discretionary capital subsidies over automatic capital subsidies in terms 
of generating employment is clear. As the analysis above has shown, it is not obvious 
whether the provision of a capital grant will lead to an increase in employment in the 
recipient firm. To avoid the danger that grants are provided to firms which use them to cut 37 
 
employment, scheme administrators can ensure that discretionary capital subsidies are only 
provided  to  firms  that  promise  to  increase  their  employment.  This  allows  scheme 
administrators to ensure that maximum cost-per-job conditions are satisfied (see Swales, 
1997 for a discussion of the UK government’s cost-per-job ceilings that are applied to the 
RSA scheme). 
 
2.5. History of Regional Policy in the UK 
 
This section will provide a description of the evolution of regional policy in the UK. The 
focus  will  be  on  regional  policy  conducted  by  the  national  government  which  has 
traditionally been the main actor in this sphere. This is because the RSA scheme began and 
remained until recently part of national regional policy. It should be noted though that, in 
recent years, local government and the EU has taken on a greater role in the provision of 
regional industrial assistance. The section will begin by giving a general description of 
regional policy before focusing on three specific components of regional policy on which 
expenditure has been  greatest: automatic  capital assistance,  employment premiums and 
discretionary  assistance.  The  following  general  description  of  the  early  evolution  of 
regional policy is based upon Armstrong and Taylor (2000). 
 
Regional industrial policy began in the late 1920s when, in response to high unemployment 
in areas dependent on staple export industries, money was provided to workers to allow 
them to migrate from high to low unemployment regions. By 1938, more than 200,000 
workers had received financial assistance to move under this scheme. However, given that 
unemployment  reached  three  million  in  1933,  the  impact  of  this  scheme  on  aggregate 
unemployment was small. Further aid was provided under the Special Areas Acts of 1934 
and 1937. Unlike the earlier policy, this aid attempted to create employment in areas of 
high unemployment rather than encouraging workers in high unemployment areas to move 
to  areas  of  low  unemployment.  The  impact  of  the  aid  provided  under  these  acts  was, 
however, also small due to the low level of expenditure. 
 
The  1944  White  Paper  on  Employment  Policy  signalled  a  shift  towards  a  greater 
commitment  to  regional  policy.  This  committed  the  post-war  government  to  reducing 
unemployment in the depressed regions of the country. To achieve this, the Distribution of 
Industry Act of 1945 introduced many measures including loans and grants to firms, the 38 
 
power to build factories and the power to provide services to industries in the deprived 
areas. The most powerful instrument, however, was the imposition of a system of controls 
on the location of industry. But this enthusiasm for regional policy did not last and these 
measures were little used during the 1950s. 
 
However,  by  the  1960s,  serious  concern  was  being  expressed  about  the  relative 
performance of Britain compared to other industrialised nations. It was recognised that the 
underperforming  regions  contained  large  supplies  of  labour  which,  if  productively 
employed,  could  contribute  significantly  to  the  improvement  of  national  economic 
performance. Secondly, there were worries about the negative externalities generated by 
the relative growth of the Greater London area. Therefore the amount spent on regional 
policy increased sharply as a number of measures were introduced to encourage firms to 
locate  in  poorly  performing  areas.  Figure  2.1  shows  expenditure  on  different  types  of 
regional assistance between 1960 and 2003. It includes assistance provided in the form of 
grants, loans and investment tax allowances. The figures are ‘grant equivalents’ which is 
the grant  amount that has equal net present value to the subsidy.  If  a  similar national 
scheme exists, the extra value provided to the recipient firm by virtue of its being located 
in the Assisted Areas is given. 
 
Figure 2.1: Expenditure on Regional Industrial Assistance in the UK, 1960-2003 
Source: Wren (2005) 
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As shown in figure 2.1, the total amount spent on regional assistance rose dramatically 
from  the  middle  of  the  1960s.  The  increase  in  expenditure  was  achieved  through  the 
introduction of employment premiums and automatic investment support, which will be 
discussed below. Partly in response to recession, expenditure on regional industrial policy 
rose again in 1972. However, this increased level of expenditure did not last as the amount 
of investment eligible for automatic assistance fell as a result of the recession of the late 
1970s. Expenditure continued to decline in the early 1980s as the government attempted to 
increase the cost-effectiveness of regional policy. As part of this, the proportion of the 
country with assisted area status was severely cut back. Location controls, which had been 
used  frequently  during  the  1960s,  were  also  abolished  in  1982.  The  reduction  in 
expenditure on regional industrial assistance was to some extent counteracted by increased 
expenditure on regional policy by the EU which is not included in figure 2.1. 
 
The role of regional policy was radically changed in 1988. The government now regarded 
the poor performance of the regions as the effect of ‘economic inefficiency due to supply-
side rigidities and a deficiency of entrepreneurial activities’ (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000: 
219). Regional policy therefore became focused upon the removal of these supply-side 
rigidities  and  the  stimulation  of  indigenous  entrepreneurship  in  a  bid  to  promote 
indigenous growth. This differed from previous regional industrial policy which aimed to 
attract inward investment to the assisted areas rather than promoting development from 
within the regions. Automatic capital grants provided to all firms in the assisted areas were 
ended with the abolition of the Regional Development Grants scheme. These changes in 
the  focus  of  regional  policy  dovetailed  with  the  government’s  increasing  focus  on 
improving the competitiveness of British industry. 
 
So far, a very general history of regional policy has been provided. The following will 
discuss  the  evolution  of  employment  premiums,  automatic  investment  support  and 
discretionary support on which the largest amounts of money have been spent. The latter 
includes the RSA scheme, the evolution of which will be described in detail. Information 
on the older schemes and the evolution of the RSA scheme is primarily taken from Wren 
(1996) and Wren (2005). 
 
The largest component of regional industrial assistance in this period was automatic or 
nondiscretionary capital support on which £18.8 billion (1995 prices) was spent between 40 
 
1963 and 1997. This was introduced through regionally differentiated tax allowances and 
the grant equivalent reached almost £500 million by 1965. Due to the erosion of the real 
value of these allowances caused by the introduction of corporation tax, these allowances 
were  replaced  by  Investment  Grants  in  1966.  However,  Investment  Grants  were  then 
replaced in 1970 by regionally differentiated first-year writing down allowances before 
being  reintroduced  again  in  1972  under  the  guise  of  Regional  Development  Grants. 
Expenditure on Regional Development Grants rose to over £1.2 billion by 1976 so, in an 
effort to reduce the cost of the scheme, construction and mining were made ineligible for 
Regional Development Grants in 1977. Expenditure on Regional Development Grants fell 
during the recession because of a drop in investment but rose again afterwards until 1982. 
The entire scheme was revised in 1984 so that the amount received was linked to the 
number  of  jobs  created  by  the  capital  investment  project.  The  amount  spent  then  fall 
steadily until the scheme was replaced by the Regional Enterprise Grants scheme in 1988. 
 
Regional Enterprise Grants took the form of either investment or innovation grants. The 
former  was  a  simple  capital  subsidy  while  the  latter  were  provided  to  assist  firms  to 
introduce a new product or production process using the latest technology. However, the 
Regional  Enterprise  Grants  scheme  only  provided  support  to  small  firms  and  the 
expenditure was consequently comparatively small compared to what had gone before. The 
scheme was abolished in 1997, ending automatic investment support in the UK. 
 
The second largest component of regional industrial assistance was employment premiums 
on which £7.8 billion was spent between 1960 and 2003. These were introduced by the 
Selective  Employment  Tax  in  1966.  This  was  a  surcharge  on  the  National  Insurance 
contributions which was refunded to firms outside of the construction and services sector 
in  a  bid  to  shift  the  structure  of  the  economy  more  towards  exporting  industries.  A 
Selective  Employment  Premium  was  also  created  at  this  time  for  firms  outside  of 
construction and services. In 1967, this was made available only to firms in the Assisted 
Areas. The Regional Employment Premium was also introduced in 1967 which paid a 
given  amount  for  each  employee  eligible  for  the  Selective  Employment  Premium. 
Spending on employment premiums had reached over £1 billion by 1968. However, the 
real value of the premiums declined in real terms from 1967 to 1974 when they were 
doubled to restore their value. However, in 1976, employment premiums were abolished 
altogether as part of expenditure cuts. 41 
 
 
Prior to the introduction of the RSA scheme, discretionary loans and grants were provided 
under various Local Employment Acts. In 1972, they were replaced by the RSA scheme 
which was introduced alongside the Regional Development Grants scheme under the 1972 
Industry Act. At first, RSA projects were divided into two categories. Category A projects 
included new projects and expansions that generated additional employment. Assistance 
was provided to such projects in the form of cheap loans, interest-relief grants and grants 
that helped to pay the costs of moving to an Assisted Area. Firms in the service sector that 
did  not  primarily  serve  local  markets  were  eligible  to  apply  for  assistance  under  this 
category.  Category  B  contained  projects  that  maintained  or  safeguarded  existing 
employment.   For these projects, assistance was offered as  a loan at  commercial rates 
although funding was only provided in cases where it could not be obtained on reasonable 
terms from the private sector. For both types of project, the level of assistance provided 
was  related  to  the  number  of  jobs  created  or  safeguarded.  Furthermore,  applicants  for 
either category of assistance had to demonstrate that the firm was viable and that the bulk 
of funding would come from the private sector. Assistance could also be given in any 
form, including the provision of guarantees or the buying of share capital, to firms that 
were about to shed large numbers of jobs. However, this was only done in exceptional 
circumstances and the amount of finance provided was related to the number of jobs at 
risk. As is clear from figure 2.1, expenditure on RSA was small throughout the 1970s 
compared with the expenditure on employment premiums and automatic capital grants. 
From 1972 to 1976, most of the money spent under the RSA scheme took the form of loans 
and equity rather than grants. However, from 1977, the amount spent on loans and grant 
decreased and grants became the predominant source of funding. 
 
In an effort to reduce its cost and improve its effectiveness, the newly elected Conservative 
Government undertook a review of industrial aid in July 1979 which led to the tightening 
of  the  eligibility  requirements  for  the  RSA  scheme.  A  ‘Proof  of  Need’  condition  was 
introduced which stated that assistance could only be given where funding could not be 
obtained elsewhere on the required terms. The provision of RSA must therefore lead to a 
major alteration in the nature or scale of a project, an advance in timing or a change in 
location to an Assisted Area. This condition had previously existed for Category B projects 
but was now extended to Category A projects, of which there were far more. Another 
significant  change  was  the  imposition  of  a  ‘Regional  and  National  Benefit’  condition 42 
 
which required that assisted projects strengthen the regional and national economy. As a 
result of this condition, possible job displacement caused by the provision of assistance 
was now taken into account when determining whether applications were successful. This 
gave RSA a bias towards firms operating in international markets whose competitors are 
located outside of the UK. Projects were also now asked to provide more ‘productive and 
secure  jobs’  (Wren,  2005:  253)  indicating  that  productivity  enhancement  had  joined 
employment promotion as an aim of the scheme. Furthermore, in an effort to reduce the 
administration costs of the scheme, loans were made only in exceptional circumstances so 
assistance was, from 1980, provided almost exclusively in the form of capital grants. From 
1983 onwards, no loans were provided and RSA became purely a grant scheme with the 
amount provided determined by the fixed and working capital involved in the project and 
the number of jobs created or maintained. 
 
Further changes to the scheme were made in 1984. Firstly, relocation projects that did not 
lead to a net increase in employment were made ineligible for the scheme. Secondly, a 
limit  on  the  size  of  grants  that  could  be  offered  per  job  created  or  safeguarded  was 
introduced. Lastly, a ‘clawback’ clause was introduced which dictated that the grant was 
repayable if the capital assets bought using the RSA grant were not retained for three years 
or if the jobs created or safeguarded by the grant did not last for 18 months. 
 
Responsibility  for  administration  of  the  RSA  scheme  shifted  to  the  newly  devolved 
Scottish Parliament and the Welsh assembly in 1999. This heralded the end of the uniform 
provision of regional grants across the assisted areas of Great Britain (GB).
3 In 2000, RSA 
in Scotland was made unavailable to projects which involved capital expenditure of less 
than  £500,000.  For  such  projects,  the  Invest  for  Growth  (IFG)  scheme  was  created 
although  this  only  provided  support  to  small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs).  The 
Enterprise Grants and the Assembly Investment Grant were the equivalent schemes created 
at this time in England and Wales respectively. All of these schemes  have since been 
abolished. In Scotland, the IFG scheme was disbanded and RSA grants are once more 
available to businesses of all sizes. In England, both the RSA scheme and the Enterprise 
Grants scheme were replaced by the Selective Finance for Investment in England scheme 
in 2004. This scheme included in its eligibility criteria an explicit requirement that projects 
                                                 
3 Northern Ireland has always had its own version of the RSA scheme called Selective Financial Assistance 
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should create high productivity jobs which does not exist for the equivalent schemes in 
Scotland and Wales. According to the latest evaluation, the ‘new scheme was designed to 
be more in line with BERR’s (the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform’s) overall objectives on regional policy which sought to develop the competitive 
strengths of the region through more sustainable forms of industrial development’ (Hart, 
Driffield, Roper and Mole, 2008b: 11). The Selective Finance for Investment in England 
scheme was in turn replaced in 2008 by the Grant for Business Investment scheme which 
retained the productivity requirement. In Wales, both the RSA scheme and the Assembly 
Investment Grants were replaced in 2008 by the Single Investment Fund. Although there 
are slight differences across Scotland, England and Wales in the schemes that currently 
exist, the essence of the schemes remain the same in that they aim to promote employment 
in the assisted areas through the provision of capital grants. 
 
2.6. Current Grant Schemes in Scotland 
 
Having provided a history of regional policy since the 1960s, this section will describe the 
grant schemes currently operating in Scotland. The first part will discuss the RSA scheme. 
The second section will describe the innovation grant schemes which currently operate in 
Scotland. It should be noted that the innovation grants schemes are not a part of regional 
policy as firms throughout Scotland can receive these grants. Descriptive statistics on the 
RSA scheme and other discretionary grant schemes are provided in chapter 5.2. 
 
RSA 
 
According to the latest annual report, 88 RSA grants worth a total of £52.1 million (current 
prices) were offered and accepted in Scotland in 2008/09 (Scottish Government, 2009a). 
As noted in the introduction, this represents a large fall on the value of grants accepted in 
recent previous years. These offers were provided to support capital investment of £518.4 
million and to safeguard or create more than 5,000 jobs. 11 of these offers were larger than 
£1  million  and  the  largest  was  £10  million.  The  extent  to  which  RSA  is  used  as  an 
instrument to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) is also clear from the annual report. 20 
of the offers of RSA accepted in Scotland in 2008/9 were made to foreign owned firms but 
the total value of these offers was over £20 million. This implies that the average size of 
offer accepted by foreign owned firms was considerably larger than the average size of 44 
 
offer  accepted  by  UK-owned  firms.  This  is  unsurprising  since  the  size  of  the  planned 
capital expenditure associated with offers accepted by foreign owned firms was almost 
£260 million - over half of the planned capital expenditure associated with all the offers of 
RSA accepted in the year. The average number of planned jobs associated with accepted 
offers of RSA is also far larger for foreign-owned than UK-owned firms (see Harris, 2010: 
section 2 for some descriptive statistics on the use of RSA to attract FDI). 
 
There  are  currently  seven  criteria  that  must  be  satisfied  for  a  project  to  be  eligible  to 
receive an RSA grant (Scottish Government, 2009b). Most of these have already been 
discussed above but greater detail on them will now be provided. 
 
The first is that the project must take place in an assisted area. The assisted areas are 
divided into three tiers which have different EC specified limits concerning the maximum 
proportion  of  the  project  costs  that  can  be  covered  by  grants  (the  current  map  of  the 
Assisted Areas in Scotland is shown in the Appendix A2.1). Tier 1 is the area where the 
highest proportion of the costs of the project can be covered by an RSA grant. The area 
covered by this tier is currently the Highlands and Islands of Scotland and, as such, the 
scheme  is  administered  by  Highlands  and  Islands  Enterprise.  Their  website  does  not 
provide specific details on the limits of funding available to businesses of different sizes 
(Highlands and Islands Enterprise, 2009). Tiers 2 and 3 are administered by the Scottish 
government. Large businesses in tier 2 may receive a maximum of 15% of their project 
costs from an RSA grant; medium sized businesses may receive up to 25% of project costs 
while small businesses can receive a maximum of 35% of their project costs.
4 In tier 3, 
only small or medium sized businesses can receive RSA grants. Medium sized businesses 
may receive a maximum of 10% of their project costs covered by an RSA grant while 
small businesses can receive up to 20% of the costs of the project. 
 
The second criterion is that the project must directly create or safeguard jobs within the 
recipient  firm.  The  jobs  can  be  either  full  or  part-time  but  must  be  permanent  posts. 
Furthermore, the jobs created or safeguarded must not be offset by jobs losses in some 
                                                 
4 Small businesses are defined as businesses that employ fewer than 50 people and have turnover of less than 
£6.7 million or a balance sheet total of less than £6.7 million. Medium sized businesses are businesses that 
employ fewer than 250 people and have turnover of less than £34 million or net assets of less than £29 
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other part of the assisted areas. This is the displacement criterion. This desire for gains in 
net employment in Scotland leads to a preference for businesses that sell to markets outside 
of Scotland and whose competitors are mainly situated outside the assisted areas. 
 
The fourth requirement is that projects must involve an element of capital investment. This 
includes expenditure on land, buildings, plant, machinery, software and the acquisition of 
intellectual property. 
 
The next criterion is that the project and applicant business has to be financially viable and 
that projects must also receive most of their funding from the private sector. Finally, the 
project must require a grant for it to proceed. This is the so-called additionality criterion. 
Grants can be awarded in cases where the grant increases the size of the project, improves 
the project in some way or accelerates the project; they cannot be awarded if the project 
would go ahead in the same form regardless of whether a grant is provided. Grants should 
also not be provided if the business has already committed to carrying out the project. 
 
Although the rules of the scheme stipulate that all projects must be additional, studies have 
shown that this criterion is not always satisfied. This is an important issue when estimating 
the impact of receiving an RSA grant because projects supported by an RSA grant may 
have an impact on aspects of plant performance but, if the project would have gone ahead 
in  exactly  the  same  form  without  the  RSA  grant,  attributing  the  change  in  plant 
performance to receiving an RSA grant is problematic. 
 
For Scotland, Hart, Driffield, Roper and Mole (2008a) report that only 1.9% of firms say 
that their project would have gone ahead in exactly the same form without an RSA grant 
over the period from 2000 to 2004. This suggests that additionality may not be much of a 
problem.  However,  19.7%  of  firms  report  that  receiving  an  RSA  grant  had  no  effects 
beyond speeding up the project. 21% of firms report that, without the grant, they would 
have achieved only some of the business outcomes and 28.7% report that they probably 
would not have achieved the business outcomes. 28.7% report that they would definitely 
not have achieved the same business outcomes had they not received an RSA grant. 
 
Given that it is not possible to identify in SAMIS which projects were non-additional, little 
can  be  done  to  tackle  the  problems  posed  by  non-additionality.  It  must  therefore  be 46 
 
recognised that if there is a differential impact of additional and non-additional projects, 
the  existence  of  non-additional  projects  will  lead  to  biased  estimates  of  the  impact  of 
receiving an RSA grant. Fortunately, the magnitude of the problem is not as great as in 
other parts of the UK. In Northern Ireland between 1998 and 2004, almost 10% of firms 
report  that  their  projects  were  entirely  non-additional  while  around  38%  report  that 
receiving an SFA grant had no effect apart from speeding up the project (Hart, Driffield, 
Roper  and  Mole,  2008c).  In  England  for  the  period  between  2000  and  2004,  the 
corresponding figures for the RSA scheme are 5% and 26.3% while, for the SFIE scheme, 
the corresponding figures are 4.9% and 22.8% (Hart, Driffield, Roper and Mole, 2008b). 
This  shows  that  the  RSA  scheme  in  Scotland  has  comparatively  high  levels  of 
additionality. 
 
There are two eligibility criteria for the Grant for Business Investment scheme in England 
not used by the RSA scheme in Scotland (House of Commons, 2009). The first of these is 
that supported projects have to generate an improvement in productivity. Whether a project 
satisfies this criterion is determined by a comparison of gross value added (GVA) per 
employee for the jobs associated with the project with the industry and national averages. 
Secondly, the majority of jobs associated with applicant projects for the Grant for Business 
Investment (GBI) scheme must be at National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) 2 level or 
above. There is therefore a clearer focus on productivity enhancement for the GBI scheme 
than for the RSA scheme. 
 
The size of grant that the Scottish Government can offer depends upon the location of the 
project and the size of the applicant business. Other factors taken into consideration when 
determining the size of grant awarded is the size of the project, the number of jobs created 
or  safeguarded,  their  quality,  type  and  how  much  the  Scottish  government  believes  is 
required for the project to go ahead. Payments are made once previously agreed levels of 
capital expenditure and employment have been met. 
 
Innovation Grants 
 
There are two types of innovation grant offered by the Scottish Government. The first that 
will be discussed is the SMART: Scotland scheme. The SMART scheme began throughout 
the UK as a pilot in 1986 and two years later the full scheme was launched. Unlike RSA 47 
 
which is available only in the assisted areas, SMART: Scotland is available throughout 
Scotland. It is a programme which provides discretionary grants to individuals planning to 
start a business or SMEs for projects which ‘represent a significant technological advance 
for  the  UK  sector  or  industry  concerned’  (Scottish  Government,  2009b).  In  particular, 
grants can be provided for technological and commercial feasibility studies which involve 
early  stage  R&D  or  R&D  projects  that  are  attempting  to  develop  a  ‘pre-production 
prototype  of  a  new  product  or  process’  (Scottish  Government,  2009b).  Successful 
applicants for support for feasibility studies will receive 75% of the costs of the project, 
which must last between 6 and 18 months, as long as this does not exceed the maximum 
grant of £70,000. Successful candidates for grants for R&D projects receive 35% of the 
costs of the project up to a maximum of £600,000. Such projects must last between 6 and 
36 months and involve costs of at least £75,000. Grants for R&D Projects were previously 
provided  by  the  Support  for  Products  under  Research  (SPUR)  scheme  which  has 
effectively been subsumed into the SMART: Scotland scheme. 
 
A separate scheme is the R&D Grants scheme. This began in 2008 and replaced the R&D 
Plus,  the  Small  Company  Innovation  Scheme  and  the  SME  Collaborative  Research 
schemes. R&D grants are given to support ‘businesses developing new products, processes 
and services to improve company competitiveness and to benefit the Scottish economy’ 
(Scottish  Government,  2009b).  Unlike  the  SMART:  Scotland  scheme,  R&D  grants  are 
available to firms of all sizes. There are two types of project which are eligible for R&D 
grants: industrial research and experimental development. The former type of project is 
defined as ‘the planned research or critical investigation aimed at the acquisition of new 
knowledge and skills for developing new products, processes or services or for bringing 
about  a  significant  improvement  in  existing  products,  processes  or  services’  (Scottish 
Government,  2009b).  The  latter  type  of  project  involves  ‘the  acquiring,  combining, 
shaping and using existing scientific, technological, business and other relevant knowledge 
and skills for the purpose of producing plans and arrangements or designs for new, altered 
or significantly improved products, processes or services’ (Scottish Government, 2009b). 
R&D grants can be provided to SMEs at a maximum rate of 35% of project costs for grants 
up to £40,000 and at a maximum rate of 25% of project costs for grants above £40,000. For 
larger firms, 25% is the maximum rate at which grants can be provided. To be eligible for 
grants larger than £40,000, applicants must prove that the project will raise the number of 
R&D jobs in Scotland. Projects are expected to last between 6 and 36 months. 48 
 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by providing an explanation of why the government attempts to reduce 
disparities in unemployment across regions using regional policy. It then sought to assess 
the extent to which capital grants schemes such as RSA and innovation grants schemes are 
supported by different theories of the firm. It was found that while capital and innovation 
grant schemes can be justified on the basis of market failure, the latter type of support is 
better justified as liquidity constraints will be more severe for firms seeking to undertake 
R&D due to the riskiness of this activity and because innovation grants specifically attempt 
to encourage an externality generating behaviour rather than merely encouraging firms to 
locate together in the hope that these firms will generate externalities. It has been difficult 
to  reconcile  capital  grants  schemes  with  the  dynamic  capabilities  or  the  evolutionary 
theories  of  the  firm.  The  former  supports  policies  that  create  dynamic  capabilities  but 
capital  grant  schemes  merely  provide  financial  support  to  buy  capital  which  does  not 
constitute a dynamic capability. The evolutionary theory of the firm supports policies to 
strengthen innovation but capital grants schemes are not designed to do this. Innovation 
grants schemes are better justified in relation to these theories of the firm as these should 
help to create dynamic capabilities by creating technological assets and are direct attempts 
to support the innovation stage. 
 
The following section offered a comparison of capital and labour subsidies in an effort to 
explain  the  apparent  paradox  that,  although  the  aim  of  regional  policy  is  to  promote 
employment in areas of high unemployment, capital subsidies have been more popular 
than labour subsidies. 
 
The  next  section  provided  a  description  of  the  evolution  of  regional  policy  since  its 
introduction during the depression. The focus was on the grant support schemes introduced 
during the 1960s and 1970s as this was the time at which the largest sums of money were 
spent  on  regional  policy  and  this  was  also  the  time  at  which  the  RSA  scheme  was 
introduced. The development of the RSA scheme was then described in detail. The chapter 
finished with a description of the grants schemes that currently operate in Scotland. This 
set out the present eligibility criteria for receipt of an RSA grant. An interesting detail that 
emerged was that the equivalent scheme to RSA in England now has an eligibility criterion 49 
 
that projects must enhance productivity but no such criterion exists for the RSA scheme in 
Scotland. 50 
 
A2.1. Assisted Areas Map 
 
Figure A2.1 shows the current map of assisted areas in Scotland. 
 
Figure A2.1: Assisted Areas in Scotland, 2007-2013 
Source: Scottish Government 51 
 
 
3. Methodological Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This  chapter  will  set  out  the  econometric  problem  of  self-selection  which  arises  when 
estimating the impact of receiving an RSA grant on an outcome variable such as TFP or 
survival probability. It will then proceed to discuss four different estimation methods that 
can be employed to overcome this problem. The structure and notation are the same as in 
the review of the methods available to analyse the impact of education on earnings by 
Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005). 
 
The parameter of interest is the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). Other 
measures that are discussed in the literature are the average treatment effect (ATE), the 
average  effect  of  treatment  on  the  non-treated  (ATNT),  the  marginal  treatment  effect 
(MTE) and the local average treatment effect (LATE) (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008: 
10-11 for a more detailed discussion of different estimands). The ATE is the effect of 
treatment on a randomly assigned group of plants. The ATNT measures what the impact of 
treatment would be on plants that did not receive treatment. The MTE is the effect of 
treatment on plants at the margin of receiving treatment (key papers in the development of 
the MTE are Bjorklund and Moffitt, 1987; Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999). The LATE is the 
ATE for a specific subpopulation of the treatment group and will be discussed in greater 
detail later. The ATT is the most relevant when assessing the effectiveness of a voluntary 
programme which is what will be done in chapters 7 and 8. The other treatment effects 
become of interest when considering whether or not a programme ought to be extended. 
Clearly,  when returns to treatment are homogenous, all four parameters of interest are 
identical but, in the presence of heterogeneous returns, the distinction is no longer trivial. 
 
The next section of this chapter will describe the problem of self-selection. The third will 
discuss  the  four  main  estimators  that  purport  to  overcome  this  problem:  fixed  effects, 
matching,  instrumental  variables  and  control  functions.  The  final  section  concludes  by 
stating which estimators will be employed in the empirical analyses of chapters 7 and 8 
and explaining why these were chosen. 
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3.2. The Self-Selection Problem 
 
The group of observations that received treatment
5 are said to be self-selected when the 
decision of whether or not to receive treatment is taken by the plant. In such a situation, the 
treatment group is not a random sample of the population and will have characteristics that 
would  lead  to  better  or  worse  performance  (in  terms  of  the  outcome  variable)  than 
observations in the untreated group, in the event that neither group received treatment. This 
is because the decision to seek treatment will be taken on the basis of an assessment of the 
benefit that will accrue to the plant from treatment and this benefit will itself be a function 
of the characteristics of the plant. A comparison of the mean of an outcome variable across 
the treated and untreated groups will then not provide an unbiased estimate of the ATT 
because  the  estimate  will  be  contaminated  by  the  difference  in  performance  between 
treated and untreated groups that arises due to the differences in characteristics across the 
two groups that are unrelated to treatment status.
6 
 
The  self-selection  problem  will  now  be  shown  more  formally  using  two  approaches: 
Rubin’s potential outcomes approach (developed in a series of papers such as Rubin, 1973; 
Rubin, 1974; Rubin, 1977) and the standard econometric approach. 
 
Using potential outcomes, the ATT is given by: 
  [ ] . 1 |
0 1 = - = it it it ATT D y y E b   (3.1) 
where
1
it y is the outcome variable for plant i at time t in the event that it received treatment; 
0
it y is the outcome variable for plant i at time t in the event that it did not receive treatment 
                                                 
5 In what follows, observations that received treatment are referred to as comprising the treatment or treated 
group while observations that did not receive treatment comprise the untreated group. The control group is a 
sub-set of the untreated group that is created for the difference-in-difference and matching estimators. The 
conditions it must satisfy will be discussed later. 
6 Note that the decision of whether or not a grant application is successful is taken by a governmental body. 
However, this does not alter the fact that the treated and untreated group will have different characteristics. 
Indeed, if the government tries to choose ‘winners’, it will increase the likelihood of treated and untreated 
groups having different characteristics. 53 
 
and Dit is a dummy variable taking the value of one if plant i receives treatment at time t 
and zero otherwise.
7 
 
Equation  (3.1)  says  that  the  ATT  is  the  difference  between  the  mean  of  the  outcome 
variable  for  those  observations  in  the  treatment  group  and  the  mean  of  the  outcome 
variable for the same group of observations, had they not received treatment. As the value 
of the outcome variable for observations that received treatment, in the event that they did 
not receive treatment,
0
it y , is unobserved, the problem is one of missing information. 
0
it y  is 
often referred to as the missing counterfactual (see, for example, Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2008: 31). 
 
To  solve  this  problem, consider  trying  to  estimate  the  ATT  by  using  the  mean  of  the 
outcome variable for observations that did not receive treatment in place of the unobserved 
mean of the outcome variable for observations in the treatment group, in the event that they 
did not receive treatment, as follows: 
  [ ] [ ]. 0 | 1 | ˆ 0 1 = - = = it it it it ATT D y E D y E b   (3.2) 
This approach would give an unbiased estimate of the ATT if the following assumption 
holds: 
  [ ] [ ]. 0 | 1 |
0 0 = = = it it it it D y E D y E   (3.3) 
This assumption simply states that the mean of the outcome variable for those observations 
that received treatment, in the event that they did not receive treatment, is equal to the 
mean of the outcome variable in the untreated group. 
 
Equation (3.2) can be rewritten as: 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] ( ). 0 | 1 | 1 | ˆ 0 0 0 1 = - = + = - = it it it it it it it ATT D y E D y E D y y E b   (3.4) 
The first term is the ATT. The second term (after the addition sign) is a bias term that 
arises when the expected value of the outcome variable for observations in the treatment 
group, had they not received treatment, differs from the expected value of the outcome 
variable for observations in the untreated group (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 
1998 for a decomposition of this bias). 
 
                                                 
7 In the empirical analysis of later chapters, plants are regarded as receiving treatment from the time at which 
they receive an RSA grant. 54 
 
If the treatment group are a random sample from the population of observations, as in 
properly designed social experiments, this bias term will equal zero as assumption (3.3) 
will hold (see, for example, Angrist, Imbens and Krueger, 1999). Unfortunately, social 
experiments are rare in economics primarily due to the expense of conducting them (see, 
for  example,  Lalonde,  1986  or  Card  and  Robins,  1998  for  evaluations  of  social 
experiments).  In  non-experimental  settings  such  as  the  analysis  of  a  business  support 
scheme, the bias term will not equal zero because of differences in the characteristics of 
observations in the treatment and untreated groups. As discussed above, this is the result of 
treatment status being determined by non-random decisions on behalf of the plant, which 
are based upon an assessment of the benefit which will arise from treatment. This estimate 
of the benefit will itself be influenced by the characteristics of the plant and, as a result, the 
characteristics of the observations in the treated and untreated groups, which determine the 
outcome variable, will differ. 
 
It  is  possible  to  speculate  on  the  direction  of  the  bias  from  estimating  equation  (3.2). 
According  to  the  rules  governing  the  distribution  of  RSA  grants,  they  should  only  be 
provided to plants that cannot receive funding for their project from other sources. It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that these plants may possess characteristics that would 
lead  to  relatively  poor  performance,  in  terms  of  the  outcome  variable,  had  they  not 
received treatment so it would be expected that: 
  [ ] [ ]. 0 | 1 |
0 0 = < = it it it it D y E D y E    (3.5) 
When this holds, the estimate of the ATT will be biased downwards. 
 
The problem of self-selection will now be set  out in the usual econometric way. This 
exposition follows Angrist and Pischke (2009). Consider employing the following simple 
model, directly analogous to equation (3.2), to estimate the ATT: 
  . it it ATT it D y e b a + + =   (3.6) 
In this model, yit represents the value of the outcome variable for plant i at time t; α is an 
intercept term that equals the mean of the outcome variable for plants that did not receive 
treatment, [ ] 0 |
0 = it it D y E ; βATT is intended to measure the ATT as set out in (3.1) and εit is 
an error term. 
 
If the following assumption holds, estimation of equation (3.6) using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) will give an unbiased estimate of the ATT: 55 
 
  ( ) . 0 , = it it D Cov e   (3.7) 
This assumption is the analogue of assumption (3.3) and states that there is no correlation 
between the treatment variable and the error term. 
 
The problem with estimating equation (3.6) is essentially one of omitted variables (see, for 
example,  Heckman  (1979);  Angrist  and  Krueger,  2001).  Variables  that  determine  both 
treatment  status  and  the  outcome  variable  are  omitted  and  this  generates  a  correlation 
between the treatment variable and the error term. It is therefore desirable to include all 
variables of this type that are observed so that, instead of estimating equation (3.6), the 
following is estimated: 
  ( ) , it it ATT it it D X m y e b + + =   (3.8) 
where ( ) it X m is assumed to be the correct specification for the observed variables, Xit, that 
determine both treatment status and the outcome variable.
8 Assuming all variables with 
these properties are observed, assumption (3.7) will hold and equation (3.8) will yield an 
unbiased estimate of the ATT. 
 
However, finding the correct specification for the observed variables, Xit, is not easy as 
there is no way of knowing beforehand what this will be. Generally, a linear specification 
for  the  Xit  variables  is  assumed.  But  if  this  is  not  the  correct  specification  for  the  Xit 
variables, this will lead to biased estimates of the ATT as a result of the differences in the 
distribution of the Xit variables across treated and untreated groups that arise due to self-
selection into the treatment group. This sensitivity to the specification of the Xit variables 
arises because, for those observations in the treated group for which there is no observation 
in the untreated group with the same value of the Xit variables, the OLS regression depends 
entirely  on  the  specification  of  the  Xit  variables  for  its  estimate  of  what  the  outcome 
variable would have been in the event that they did not receive treatment (see Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009). Misspecification will therefore lead to a biased estimate of the ATT. 
 
Another problem arises with the estimation of equation (3.8) if unobservable variables that 
determine  both  treatment  status  and  the  outcome  variable  exist.  This  will  mean  that 
                                                 
8 The Xit can, of course, also be correlated with the error term and this also generates a bias in the estimate of 
the ATT. See Frölich (2008) for a discussion of the implications of such a correlation. Assume for now that 
Xit are exogenous. 56 
 
assumption (3.7) does not hold and equation (3.8) will then fail to provide an unbiased 
estimate of the ATT. 
 
Implicit in equation (3.8) is the assumption that the impact of treatment on the outcome 
variable  is  the  same  across  observations;  in  other  words,  that  returns  to  treatment  are 
homogenous.  When  the  impact  of  treatment  on  the  outcome  variable  differs  across 
observations,  returns  to  treatment  are  said  to  be  heterogeneous  (Heckman,  Smith  and 
Clements, 1997 present evidence showing that heterogeneity in returns to treatment can be 
empirically important), and equation (3.8) becomes: 
 
( ) [ ] ( )
[ ] ( ) , 1 , |
, 1 , |
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it
D D X b E b
D X b D D X b E X m y
= - + =
+ + = + =
a e
e
  (3.9) 
where bit is the observation specific returns to treatment, ( ) it X b , consists of interactions 
between  Xit  and  the  treatment  variable  to  capture  observable  heterogeneous  returns  to 
treatment and αit is the observation specific error. The ATT is given by: 
  ( ) [ ]. 1 | = + º it it it ATT D b X b E b   (3.10) 
Equation (3.10) shows that returns to treatment are heterogeneous as they depend upon Xit 
which  vary  across  plants  and  time  and  upon  bit,  the  observation  specific  returns  to 
treatment. 
 
OLS estimation of equation (3.9) will give unbiased estimates of the ATT when: 
  ( ) . 0 , = it it D Cov a   (3.11) 
This  simply  states  that  there  is  no  correlation  between  the  treatment  variable  and  the 
observation specific error. No assumption need be specified concerning the unobservable 
returns to treatment as [ ] ( ) it it it it it D D X b E b 1 , | = - cannot be correlated with the treatment 
variable. This is only the case when parameter of interest is the ATT. When the parameter 
of interest is the ATE, MTE or the ATNT, heterogeneous returns to treatment present 
greater difficulties and further assumptions must be specified for OLS to provide unbiased 
estimates (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008 give the further assumptions that are required for 
estimation  of  the  alternative  treatment  effects).  For  the  remainder  of  the  chapter,  the 
heterogeneous  returns  model  will  only  be  set  out  in  situations  where  the  estimated 
parameters have different interpretations under homogeneous and heterogeneous returns. 
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The next section discusses estimation methods that purport to allow unbiased estimation of 
the ATT when the treatment group is self-selected. 
 
3.3. Estimation Methods 
 
A number of approaches have been used to estimate the ATT. Here, discussion is limited 
to  the  following  estimators:  fixed  effects;  matching;  instrumental  variables  and  control 
functions. A review of applications of these methods is provided in chapter 4.4. 
 
The other method that is frequently used in the literature but is not discussed below is the 
discontinuity design estimator (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Van Der Klaauw, 2008 for 
a detailed discussion of this estimator). This estimator requires a discontinuous change in 
treatment probability at a threshold of a continuous variable. As the eligibility rules for 
receipt of an RSA grant do not create such a discontinuity, this estimator could not be 
implemented in the empirical analyses and this explains why it is not discussed here. 
 
Difference-in-Difference/Fixed Effects Estimator 
 
The  simplest  method  that  is  used  to  estimate  the  ATT  is  the  difference-in-difference 
estimator which can be used when a natural experiment is identified. It has a long history 
having been first used in 1855 by the physician John Snow (1855) to show that cholera was 
a water-borne rather than an air-borne disease. As will be shown below, it is a special case 
of the fixed effects estimator. It is estimated by subtracting the difference in the mean of 
the outcome variable between a start year and an end year for a control group from the 
difference in the mean of the outcome variable between the start and end year for the 
treatment group. The validity of the difference-in-difference estimator depends upon the 
assumption that those plants that received treatment would have performed in exactly the 
same way as the control group, had they not received treatment. If this does not hold, the 
estimated treatment effect will be contaminated by the difference in performance which is 
unrelated to treatment status. 
 
In  terms  of  conditional  outcomes,  the  following  assumption  must  be  satisfied  (Harris, 
2005b): 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ], 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
0
'
0 0
'
0 = - = = = - = it it it it it it it it D y E D y E D y E D y E   (3.12) 58 
 
where t is a period of time later than ' t . Assumption (3.12) says that the difference between 
the mean of the outcome variable between period t and ' t for the treatment group, in the 
event that they did not receive treatment, is equal to the difference in the mean of the 
outcome variable between t and  ' t  for the control group. In other words, the treatment and 
control groups would have had the same increase or decrease in the outcome variable, had 
the treatment group not been treated. 
 
Having found a control group that satisfies assumption (3.12), the proxy for the outcome 
variable for those observations in the treatment group, in the event that they did not receive 
treatment, is obtained by rearranging assumption (3.12) as follows: 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
0
'
0 0
'
0 = - = + = = = it it it it it it it it D y E D y E D y E D y E   (3.13) 
The proxy is the mean of the outcome variable for the treatment group in the initial period 
plus the difference between the mean of the outcome variable for the control group at time 
t and ' t . 
 
The ATT can then be estimated using the formula: 
  [ ] [ ] { } [ ] [ ] { } . 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
0
'
0 0
'
0 = - = - = - = = it it it it it it it it ATT D y E D y E D y E D y E b   (3.14)   
It is the difference between the growth of the outcome variable for plants in the treatment 
group between periods t and  ' t and the growth of the outcome variable for plants in the 
control group between periods t and ' t . 
 
The difference-in-difference estimate of the ATT can also be obtained from the following 
econometric model (see, for example, Blundell and MaCurdy, 1998): 
  , it t i it ATT it t D y u h b + + + =   (3.15) 
where ηi is a time-invariant fixed effect, tt is a time effect common to each plant in time t, 
and εit is an error term. 
 
The econometric analogue to assumption (3.12) is then: 
  ( ) . 0 , | , = t i i it t D Cov h u   (3.16) 
Assumption (3.16) says that there is no correlation between the treatment variable and the 
error term, having controlled for the time-invariant effects and the time effects. 
 59 
 
The difficulty with this estimator is finding a control group that satisfies assumption (3.12). 
To guarantee that equation (3.14) gives an unbiased estimate of the ATT, the treatment and 
control group must perform in exactly the same way in terms of the outcome variable, had 
neither  group  received  treatment,  so  that  the  estimated  parameter  does  not  capture 
influences on the outcome variable that are unrelated to treatment. However, observations 
in the treatment group apply for treatment because they calculate that they will benefit 
from it sufficiently for it to be worthwhile applying while observations in the control group 
calculate that the benefit is not sufficiently large for it to be worthwhile applying. It is 
reasonable to expect that the estimate of the benefit from treatment is a function of the 
characteristics of the observation. As these characteristics also determine the performance 
of  the  observation,  the  performance  of  plants  in  the  treatment  and  control  group  are 
expected to differ and this violates assumption (3.12) (see Harris, 2005b). 
 
The general fixed effects estimator does not rely upon such demanding assumptions as the 
difference-in-difference estimator. When returns to treatment are homogeneous, it can be 
written as follows: 
  ( ) . it i it ATT it it D X m y u h b + + + =   (3.17) 
The difference between equations (3.15) and (3.17) is that the former must contain time 
effects  while  the  latter  does  not  necessarily,  although  these  could  easily  and  often  are 
contained in Xit. More importantly, equation (3.17) includes observable variables, Xit, that 
determine both treatment status and the outcome variable. According to assumption (3.12), 
having controlled for time-invariant or ‘fixed’ effects and time effects, no correlation exists 
between the error term and the treatment variable and Xit does not exist. As this assumption 
will generally not hold for the reasons set out in the previous paragraph, the fixed effects 
estimator is more broadly applicable than the difference-in-difference estimator. 
 
It is necessary to give a brief description of how parameters of the fixed effects model are 
estimated. In both equations (3.15) and (3.17), the treatment variable may be correlated 
with the time-invariant effects but uncorrelated with the error term as follows: 
  ( ) , 0 | , ¹ it i it X D Cov h   (3.18) 
  ( ) . 0 | , = it it it X D Cov u   (3.19) 
Intuitively, the most obvious way to estimate equation (3.17) is by including a dummy 
variable for each plant to control for these time-invariant effects. However, this creates a 
large number of parameters and dramatically reduces degrees of freedom. Furthermore, 60 
 
when the number of plants is large and the number of time periods small, there is the 
problem of incidental parameters (Neyman and Scott, 1948). This is that when the number 
of time periods for which plants are observed is fixed and the number of plants goes to 
infinity, the coefficients on the dummy variables are inconsistent because the number of 
parameters rises as the number of plants rises (see, for example, Baltagi, 2005). 
 
Instead, the time-invariant effects are removed by the within-transformation. Demeaning 
the variables in equation (3.17) eliminates the time-invariant effects (along with any time-
invariant variables) so that estimation of the following model by OLS provides unbiased 
estimates of the ATT: 
 
( )
, ~
,
~
,
~
, ~
, ~ ~ ~ ~
i it it
i it it
i it it
i it it
it it ATT it it
D D D
X X X
y y y
D X m y
u u u
u b
- =
- =
- =
- =
+ + =
  (3.20) 
where a bar is used to denote the mean calculated over time (see, for example, Wooldridge, 
2007; Baltagi, 2005 for more detail on the fixed effects estimator). In addition to removing 
the time-invariant effects, this transformation also removes any variables that are constant 
over time. In some applications, this may be a considerable disadvantage. 
 
When  the  treatment  variable  is  a  dummy  variable  taking  the  value  of  one  when  the 
observation  receives  treatment  and  zero  otherwise,  the  same  benefit  of  eliminating 
correlation between the error term and time-invariant effects can be gained in a simpler 
way. This is the approach taken by Harris and Robinson (2004) and Harris and Trainor 
(2005).  Rather  than  eliminating  the  time-invariant  effects  through  the  within-
transformation,  this  approach  involves  adding  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  one 
throughout time for plants that receive treatment at any time to equation (3.8) or (3.9). 
When the treatment variable is a dummy, correlation between the time-invariant effects 
and the error term is removed because the larger or smaller time-invariant effects for those 
treatment group observations are controlled for by the dummy variable, and having done 
this, the treatment dummy, cannot be correlated with the time-invariant effects. But when 
the treatment variable is continuous, this approach is inadequate to guarantee the removal 
of correlation between the treatment variable and the time-invariant effects as these effects 61 
 
may be correlated with the ‘amount’ of treatment. The main advantage of this strategy is 
that it does not necessitate the within-transformation. 
 
The major problem with this approach and the fixed effects estimator is that, while dealing 
with  the  problem  of  correlation  between  the  treatment  variable  and  the  time-invariant 
effects, it requires the error term to be uncorrelated with the treatment variable, as shown 
by assumption (3.19). If plants tend to receive treatment when they are performing either 
better or worse than normal due to unobserved characteristics, there will be a correlation 
between the treatment variable and the error term in (3.20). This is likely if, as with RSA, 
grants are given to promote or safeguard employment. This is because plants may seek 
grants  when  they  are  performing  relatively  well  due  to  unobserved  factors  in  order  to 
expand or seek grants to safeguard employment when they are performing relatively poorly 
due to unobserved factors (Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen, 2007). 
 
Matching Estimator 
 
The early development of the matching estimator owes much to Rubin (see, for example, 
Rubin, 1973; Rubin, 1979). Essentially, it involves the construction of a control group 
which is as similar as possible, in terms of observed characteristics, to the treatment group. 
Differences in the mean of the outcome variable between the treatment and control groups 
are then attributed to treatment. It can therefore be regarded as an attempt to recreate the 
conditions of a social experiment. Its main weakness is that it simply assumes that there are 
no  differences  in  unobserved  characteristics  that  determine  treatment  status  and  the 
outcome variable. If this assumption is not satisfied, the estimates of the ATT obtained 
using this method will be biased. 
 
The first part of this section will look at the assumptions that must be satisfied for the 
matching estimator to provide unbiased estimates of the ATT. The second will discuss the 
various  ways  of  implementing  the  matching  estimator.  The  final  part  will  discuss  its 
limitations. 
 
The  first  step  involves  constructing  a  control  group  of  observations  from  amongst  the 
untreated  observations  such  that  the  selected  group  of  observations  is  as  similar  as 
possible, in terms of observed characteristics, to observations in the treatment group. The 62 
 
conditional independence or unconfoundedness assumption which underpins the matching 
estimator is given by (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983): 
  . |
0 X D y ^   (3.21) 
Assumption (3.21) states that having created y
0 conditional upon X, the distribution of the 
outcome  variable  across  treatment  and  control  groups,  in  the  absence  of  treatment,  is 
independent of treatment status. One way of conditioning upon X is to create a matched 
sample using X. Therefore, assumption (3.21) states that, within the matched sample, the 
distribution of the outcome variable, in the event that neither group received treatment, is 
the same for those observations in the treatment group as for those observations in the 
constructed control group. When this assumption holds, the difference in the mean value of 
the  outcome  variable  across  treatment  and  control  groups  is  entirely  attributable  to 
treatment and so is an unbiased estimate of the ATT.
9 Judgement on whether assumption 
(3.21) will hold should be made with reference to the availability in the dataset of variables 
that determine both treatment status and the outcome variable. 
 
It is worth noting that another way of conditioning upon X is to estimate equation (3.8) 
because  if  the  conditional  independence  assumption  holds,  then  OLS  estimation  of 
equation (3.8) will provide unbiased estimates of the ATT. This is because it has been 
assumed  that  equation  (3.8)  contains  the  correct  specification  for  those  variables  that 
determine  both  treatment  and  outcome  variable.  However,  as  discussed  earlier,  it  is 
difficult to find the correct specification for these variables and the wrong specification 
will lead to biased estimates of the ATT because the estimate of the ATT is sensitive to the 
choice  of  specification  when  the  Xit  variables  are  not  balanced  across  treatment  and 
untreated groups.  
 
The matching estimator avoids this problem as it balances the Xit variables across treatment 
and control groups by removing from the sample those observations that cannot be well 
matched  to  an  observation  with  similar  characteristics  but  a  different  treatment  status. 
When the Xit are balanced satisfactorily, it is no longer necessary to include Xit variables in 
an outcome regression so the problem of specification is sidestepped. As will be discussed 
later, when the matched sample is not perfectly balanced, it is advisable to include the Xit 
variables in the outcome regression to control for remaining differences in these variables 
                                                 
9 This is true regardless of whether returns to treatment are homogeneous or heterogeneous. 63 
 
across treated and untreated groups. The problem of misspecification will then not be as 
severe as when an unmatched sample is employed because the distribution of Xit will be 
better balanced across treatment and control groups. 
 
It is important to consider whether assumption (3.21) will hold when variables that are 
determined by treatment status are used to create the matched sample such that: 
  .
1 0 X X ¹   (3.22) 
where X
0 is the X variables in the absence of treatment and X
1 is the X variables when the 
observation is treated. 
 
Observation it would be matched to observation ju if: 
  ( ) ( ), 0 | 1 |
0 1 = = = ju ju it it D X F D X F   (3.23) 
where F denotes any function. However, because X is a function of treatment, Xit and Xju 
would differ, had neither group received treatment: 
  ( ) ( ). 1 | 1 |
1 0 = ¹ = ju ju it it D X F D X F   (3.24) 
The implication of equation (3.24) is that a matched sample created using X will consist of 
a  treatment  group  that  is  different  from  the  control  group  in  terms  of  observed 
characteristics, if both groups were in the same state of not receiving treatment. As shown 
by  Lechner  (2008),  because  the  determinants  of  the  outcome  variable  are  distributed 
differently, the outcome variable will also be distributed differently across treatment and 
control groups, if neither group received treatment, which is a violation of assumption 
(3.21). In practice, this means lagging variables that determine treatment status and the 
outcome variable and that are influenced by treatment before using them to create the 
matched sample. In what follows, it is assumed that X only consists of variables that are 
not determined by treatment status. 
 
A second assumption needed to ensure that the matching estimator is feasible is:
10 
  ( ) . 1 | 1 < = X D P it   (3.25) 
Assumption (3.25) says that X cannot be a perfect predictor of treatment. By implication, 
this means that for all values of X, there are both treated and untreated observations. This is 
                                                 
10 Matching assumptions (3.21) and (3.25) are sufficient for estimation of the ATT but not for estimation of 
the  ATNT or MTE. Stronger assumptions that achieve this are given by Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 
(2004): 32. 64 
 
necessary because if for some values of X, there were only treated units, it would not be 
possible to find matches for such plants in the untreated group. When this is the case, 
matching can only be performed for observations that satisfy assumption (3.25) and the 
estimated treatment effect must be defined as the ATT for those observations only. Clearly, 
this is only an issue when the impact of treatment is heterogeneous. 
 
Having  created  the  matched  sample,  the  ATT  can  be  estimated  using  the  following 
equation: 
  , ˆ 1 ˆ
* ∑ - = ju it ATT y y
N
b   (3.26) 
where
* N is the number of treated observations in the matched sample. Equation (3.26) 
states that the ATT is estimated simply as the average difference between the outcome 
variable for observations in the treatment and control group. 
 
The value of the outcome variable for the control group is given by: 
  , ˆ ∑ = ju itju ju y W y   (3.27) 
where Witju is the weight attached to observation yju in the control group.  
 
There  are  many  ways  of  generating  Witju  and  hence ju y ˆ .  The  simplest  way  is  nearest 
neighbour matching whereby each observation in the treatment group is matched to the 
single  observation  in  the  untreated  group  with  the  most  similar  value  of  X.  The  only 
difference  with  caliper  matching  is  that  the  ‘caliper’  excludes  treated  observations  for 
which there are no close matches in order to ensure that the treated and control groups are 
not too dissimilar (see Cochran and Rubin, 1973). These two approaches are examples of 
one-to-one  matching  where 1 = ju W .
11  One-to-many  matching  can  also  be  performed 
whereby each treated observation is matched to many untreated group observations with a 
higher weight assigned to those untreated group observations with more similar values of X 
(see, for example, kernel based matching as proposed by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 
1997). A description and comparison of different matching estimators is provided by Zhao 
(2004). 
 
                                                 
11 Note that, when one-to-one matching is employed, equation (3.6) provides the same estimate of the ATT as 
equation (3.26). 65 
 
When many variables are being used to create the matched sample, it becomes difficult to 
find well matched observations. This is the ‘curse of dimensionality’ (Zhao, 2004: 91). The 
most  popular  means  of  avoiding  the  problem  of  dimensionality  is  to  use  a  balancing 
score.
12 A balancing score is defined as a function of the observables that guarantees the 
following condition is satisfied: 
  ( ). | X q D X ^   (3.28) 
This states that having created a sample that is matched upon the balancing score, ( ) X q , 
the distribution of the observables that determine both treatment status and the outcome 
variable  is  independent  of  treatment  status.  The  propensity  score  is  a  frequently  used 
balancing  score.  It  measures  the  probability  of  being  in  the  treatment  group  given  the 
values of Xit and is usually estimated using either a logit or a probit model regression: 
  ( ) ( ). | 1 it it it X D P X p = º   (3.29) 
Equation (3.29) shows that propensity score is equal to the probability of being in the 
treatment group given observed characteristics. 
 
Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  have  shown  that  condition  (3.28)  allows  the  conditional 
independence assumption, (3.21), to be rewritten as (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983): 
  ( ). |
0 X p D y ^   (3.30) 
This states that the distribution of the outcome variable in the absence of treatment is 
independent  of  treatment  status,  having  matched  upon  the  propensity  score.  The 
significance of assumption (3.30) is that the conditional independence assumption holds 
even when the matching procedure is performed using the scalar variable ( ) X p instead of 
using X. The propensity score can then be used in place of X to construct the matched 
sample  (Dehejia  and  Wahba,  2002  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  propensity  score 
matching by comparing their results with those obtained in an experimental setting). 
 
The  most  obvious  criticism  of  matching  is  the  fact  that  the  conditional  independence 
assumption (3.21), which underpins its ability to provide unbiased estimates of the ATT, is 
very demanding. It requires that every variable that determines both treatment status and 
the outcome variable is observed. As a result, its plausibility depends crucially upon the 
richness of the available dataset in relation to such variables (Harris, 2005b). If relatively 
few  of  these  variables  are  contained  in  the  dataset,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  conditional 
                                                 
12 Another means is by employing a metric such as that proposed by Mahalanobis (1936). 66 
 
independence assumption will hold and the matching estimator will therefore be unable to 
provide unbiased estimates of the ATT. 
 
One approach often taken in the literature is to create a matched sample and then employ 
the difference-in-difference estimator discussed above (see Pellegrini and Centra, 2006; 
Ankarhem, Daunfeldt, Quoreshi and Rudholm, 2009). The idea behind such an approach is 
that the matching process creates the conditions under which assumption (3.12) will be 
satisfied. While this approach is preferable to the simple difference-in-difference estimator, 
a matched treatment and control group may still experience differences in performance 
(had neither group received treatment) for two reasons. Firstly, the treatment and control 
group  may  differ  in  terms  of  unobserved  characteristics  that  cause  them  to  perform 
differently.  Secondly,  matching  on  observed  characteristics  in  the  period  before  the 
treatment group receives treatment does not mean that these observed characteristics are 
also matched across treatment and control groups in the period in which the treatment 
group receives treatment. This is therefore another potential source of bias. 
 
A better approach is instead to construct a matched sample and use it to estimate equation 
(3.8). Unlike the approach just described, such an approach will control for differences in 
observed  characteristics  at  the  time  at  which  treatment  occurs.  The  advantage  over 
estimating equation (3.26) is that estimating equation (3.8) will control for differences in 
the  distribution  of  variables  that  determine  the  treatment  and  outcome  variable  across 
treatment and control groups in the matched sample. While these differences will be much 
reduced in the matched sample compared to the full sample, depending on the type of 
matching  used  and  the  number  of  the  X  variables,  such  differences  may  still  be 
significant.
13 
 
Instrumental Variables Estimator 
 
While the matching method assumes that all variables that determine both treatment status 
and the outcome variable are observed in the dataset, the instrumental variables provides a 
means of obtaining consistent estimates of the treatment effect when variables of this type 
are  unobserved.  In  other  words,  treatment  status  is  allowed  to  be  determined  by 
                                                 
13 This approach is recommended by Imbens & Wooldridge (2009) 67 
 
unobserved determinants of the outcome variable. An instrumental variable is correlated 
with the treatment variable but uncorrelated with the error term. When such a variable can 
be identified, it can be used to purge the treatment variable of its correlation with the error 
term and hence provide consistent estimates of the treatment effect. 
 
The  first  application  of  instrumental  variables  was  by  Wright  (1928)  in  an  attempt  to 
overcome the endogeneity that arises when estimating simultaneous equations. The two-
stage-least squares method, which allows more efficient estimation when more than one 
instrument  is  available,  was  developed  by  Theil  (1953).  Angrist  and  Krueger  (2001) 
provide a good overview of the origins and the uses of instrumental variables. 
 
Because the nature of the instrumental variables estimator differs for homogeneous and 
heterogeneous returns to treatment, the discussion will address each in turn. 
 
Suppose that the following model is estimated: 
  ( ) , it it ATT it it D X m y e b + + =   (3.31) 
where ( ) it X m is  the  correct  specification  for  the  observed  variables  that  determine  both 
treatment  status  and  the  outcome  variable  so  there  is  no  bias  from  differences  in  the 
distribution of observed characteristics across treated and untreated groups. 
 
Assume  that  differences  exist  in  the  distribution  of  unobservable  characteristics  that 
determine  the  outcome  variable  such  that  there  is  correlation  between  the  treatment 
variable and the error term: 
  ( ) . 0 | , ¹ it it it X D Cov e   (3.32) 
Under these circumstances, instrumental variables are the standard method of recovering 
consistent estimates of the ATT.
14 For a variable to qualify as a valid instrumental variable 
it must be a non-trivial determinant of treatment status and must not determine the outcome 
variable directly. Formally, an instrument, Zit, must satisfy the following assumptions: 
  ( ) , 0 | , = it it it X Z Cov e   (3.33) 
  ( ) . 0 | , ¹ it it it X D Z Cov   (3.34) 
                                                 
14 Instrumental variables estimates are consistent but not unbiased because they involve a ratio of random 
quantities. It is therefore advisable to use large samples when using this method.  68 
 
When such an instrument is available, consistent estimates of the ATT can be obtained 
using  two-stage-least-squares  estimation.  This  is  performed  by  substituting  the  fitted 
values from a regression of treatment status on variables that satisfy assumptions (3.33) 
and (3.34) in place of the treatment variable in equation (3.9) (see Angrist and Pischke, 
2009: 121-127 for a more detailed discussion of how the two stage least squares estimator 
is implemented). Intuitively, the instrument removes from the treatment status variable that 
part  which  is  correlated  with  the  error  term.  In  the  case  of  heterogeneous  returns,  the 
situation is more complex. 
 
It should be noted that the error term may take the form of the error term in equation 
(3.17). An obvious solution is therefore to employ the fixed effects estimator to remove the 
time-invariant effects, ηi. However, it is assumed here that assumption (3.19) does not hold 
so that there is also correlation between the treatment dummy and υit. In this case, the fixed 
effects estimator is insufficient to provide unbiased estimates of the ATT. Nevertheless, it 
can  be  useful  in  removing  the  time-invariant  effects  so  that  prospective  instrumental 
variables  need  only  be  uncorrelated  with  υit  rather  than  with  both  ηi  and  vit.  This 
combination  of  fixed  effects  estimation  and  instrumental  variables  is  often  used  (see 
Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen, 2007 for an example). 
 
Suppose now that there are heterogeneous returns to receiving treatment so that equation 
(3.31) becomes: 
 
( ) [ ] ( )
[ ] ( ) , 1 , |
, 1 , |
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it
D D X b E b
D X b D D X b E X m y
= - + =
+ + = + =
a e
e
  (3.35) 
where ( ) it X b captures observable heterogeneous returns to treatment, bit is the unobserved 
observation  specific  return  to  treatment  and  αit  represents  the  unobserved  no-treatment 
component. The ATT is given by equation (3.10). 
 
In addition to satisfying assumption (3.34), when returns to treatment are heterogeneous, 
an  instrument  must  satisfy  the  following  assumption  of  not  being  correlated  with  the 
observation specific error which is the equivalent of assumption (3.33): 
  ( ) , 0 | , = it it it X Z Cov a   (3.36) 
Equation (3.36) is, however, insufficient to recover consistent estimates of the ATT when 
returns  to  treatment  are  heterogeneous  due  to  the  existence  of 
the [ ] ( ) it it it it it D D X b E b 1 , | = - term. 69 
 
 
One solution to this problem is to assume the following: 
  ( ) . 0 1 , | , = = it it it it D X b Z Cov   (3.37) 
This  states  that,  having  conditioned  upon  Xit,  Zit  is  uncorrelated  with  the  unobserved 
observation specific return to treatment for those observations in the treatment group. If 
this holds, consistent estimates of the ATT can be obtained. However, since assumption 
(3.34) demands that the treatment variable is determined by the instrument, assumption 
(3.37) does not allow plants to be influenced by their returns to treatment when making 
their choice of treatment status because this would mean that the instrument is correlated 
with the error term which violates assumption (3.33). This implies either that plants are 
irrational or that they are ignorant about their unobserved return to treatment. It is therefore 
an unattractive assumption to make. 
 
Without invoking this assumption, it is not possible to estimate the ATT using instrumental 
variables  estimation.  However,  Imbens  and  Angrist  (1994)  show  that  it  is  possible  to 
estimate a LATE (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995 for an application). The LATE is the ATE 
for those observations that would change their treatment status in response to a change in 
the value of the instrumental variable. 
 
In the following exposition, assume that the instrument is a dummy variable. The dummy 
takes the value of 1 for observations for which, because of government policy, it is more 
attractive  to  receive  a  treatment  than  for  other  observations,  and  zero  for  all  other 
observations. Observations can react in four different ways to the instrument changing in 
value from zero to one and can be disaggregated into groups accordingly. The first group 
of observations will be in the treatment group regardless of the value of the instrument and 
can be called the always-takers. For this group, the change in the value of the instrument 
makes no difference to their treatment status. By contrast, the second group of observations 
will be in the untreated group regardless of the value of the instrument. This group cannot 
be induced to receive treatment by a change in the value of the instrument and are the 
never-takers. The third group of observations are induced to enter the treatment group by 
the dummy variable taking the value of one but would not receive treatment otherwise. 
This group is the compliers. The final group act in a perverse way and leave the treatment 
group when the dummy is equal to one but are part of it when the dummy equals zero. This 
final group are the defiers. Define the events: 70 
 
  { }
{ }, 0 |
1 |
0
1
= º
= º
it it it
it it it
Z D E
Z D E
  (3.38) 
and, in addition to assumptions (3.34) and (3.36), assume that: 
  either[ ] it it E E 0 1 ³ or[ ] it it E E 0 1 £  for all it.  (3.39) 
This is known as the ‘monotonicity’ assumption. This requires that the change in treatment 
status  in  response  to  a  change  in  the  value  of  the  instrument  from  zero  to  one  is 
unidirectional throughout the sample. In other words, if there are some observations that 
belong in the group of compliers, there are no defiers. This assumption is important as it 
precludes the possibility that the treatment effect would be positive for all observations but 
that the size of the groups of compliers and defiers is such that the estimated treatment 
effect  is  zero  or  even  negative.  Note  also  that  assumption  (3.39)  guarantees  that  the 
instrument actually alters the treatment status of at least some observations and thus strict 
inequality holds for some it. 
 
If (3.39) holds, Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that the following parameter is obtained 
using two stage least squares: 
  ( ) [ ] [ ]. , | , | 0 1
0 1
0 1 it it it it it it it it it it E E X y y E E E X b E X b > - = > +   (3.40) 
Equation (3.40) shows that the LATE is the average returns to treatment amongst those 
observations that are induced to receive the treatment by the change in the value of the 
instrument. Intuitively, the only group of observations identified above that is observed in 
both the treated and untreated group is the compliers. The always-takers are never in the 
untreated  group  while  the  never-takers  are  never  in  the  treated  group.  The  defiers  are 
assumed not to exist. As a result, the data is only informative about the compliers so it is 
only possible to estimate a treatment effect for this group (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009 for a more formal exposition). 
 
So far, it has been assumed that there is only one instrument and that it is continuous. 
When more than one variable is included in the instrument set, the estimated coefficient is 
simply  a  weighted  average  of  the  individual  LATE  coefficients  with  the  weights 
determined by the size of the effect that each instrument has upon the treatment dummy. 
When  the  instrument  is  a  continuous  variable,  the  LATE  measures  the  impact  on  the 
outcome  variable  for  those  observations  that  are  induced  to  change  their  participation 
status as a result of variation in the instrument within a specified range. 
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The  main  difficulty  with  the  instrumental  variables  approach  in  general  is  finding  an 
instrument that satisfies the criterion of being correlated with the treatment variable but 
which can be legitimately excluded from the outcome equation.  Almost all of the variables 
that have been used as instrumental variables are open to criticism because it is difficult to 
justify fully the restriction that the instrument does not directly determine the outcome 
variable. If a variable is used that is correlated with the error term in the outcome equation, 
the estimated treatment effect can be more biased than the OLS coefficient so it is essential 
that any instrument truly  satisfies the orthogonality assumptions (Angrist and Krueger, 
2001). 
 
Furthermore if an instrument is used that is only  weakly correlated with the treatment 
variable, the two stage least squares estimates tend to be centred on the corresponding 
biased OLS estimate (Bound, Jaeger & Baker, 1995). The instrument must therefore be a 
strong determinant of whether or not an observation is in the treatment group whilst still 
being legitimately excluded from the outcome equation. 
 
The  fact  that  observations  are  likely  to  experience  heterogeneous  returns  to  treatment 
introduces  another  layer  of  complexity.  As  discussed,  under  these  circumstances,  the 
instrumental variables model estimates the ATE among those observations that are induced 
to change their participation status by a change in the value of the instrument - the LATE. 
The LATE estimate will vary depending on which instrument (or instruments) is used. As 
a  result,  great  care  must  be  taken  when  interpreting  the  estimates  obtained  using 
instrumental variables.
15 
 
Control Functions 
 
The  control  functions  approach  is  a  generalisation  of  the  Heckman  selection  model 
(Heckman, 1979). It is the most sophisticated means of obtaining unbiased estimates of the 
ATT  when  the  treatment  group  is  self-selected  as  it  incorporates  information  from  a 
treatment status model into the outcome variable regression. When there are differences in 
the distributions of the unobservable variables that determine the outcome variable across 
treated and untreated groups, there is correlation between the treatment variable and the 
                                                 
15 The instrument employed in chapter 7 is such that all treated observations are compliers. Therefore, this 
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error term. Self-selection bias can therefore be seen as a form of omitted variables bias. 
The control function approach removes this bias by including additional terms, estimated 
from a treatment status model, in the outcome regression which removes from the error 
term that part that is correlated with treated status and so permits consistent estimates of 
the ATT (see Maddala, 1993: 257-290 for a broader discussion of the control function 
approach). 
 
Consider the homogeneous returns to treatment model: 
  ( ) , it it ATT it it D X m y e b + + =   (3.41) 
Once more, assume that  ( ) it X m is the correct specification for the observed variables that 
determine both treatment status and the outcome variable. However, there are unobserved 
variables  that  determine  both  treatment  status  and  the  outcome  variable  so  there  is  a 
correlation between the treatment status dummy and the error term. 
 
Treatment status is assumed to be determined by the following binary response model: 
  ( ) { }, 0 , 1 1 ³ + = it it it D it X Z m E n   (3.42) 
where Zit is a vector of variables that determine treatment status but are not included in the 
outcome equation and νit is an error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with both Zit 
and  Xit.  Equation  (3.42)  shows  that  when ( ) it it D it X Z m v , - ³ ,  the  observation  receives 
treatment. 
 
The idea that underpins the control function method is that νit is correlated with the error 
term in the outcome equation εit. The intuition for this is that the unobserved component 
that determines treatment may also have explanatory power for the outcome variable if 
these  unobservable  factors  that  determine  treatment  status  also  determine  the  outcome 
variable. 
 
Taking expectations of equation (3.41), the following equation is obtained: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]. , |
, | 1 , , |
it it D it it it
it it D it it it it ATT it it it it it
X Z m v E D
X Z m v E D D X m Z X D y E
- ³ +
- < - + + =
e
e b
  (3.43) 
The terms ( ) [ ] it it D it it X Z m v E , | - < e and ( ) [ ] it it D it it X Z m v E , | - ³ e are the expected values of 
the error term when the observation is in the untreated and treatment group respectively. 
This illustrates well the problem of self-selection as when the treated and untreated groups 73 
 
have different characteristics that determine the outcome variable, these terms differ and, 
as a result, equation (3.41) will not produce consistent estimates of the ATT. When the 
form of  ( ) [ ] it it D it it X Z m v E , | - < e and ( ) [ ] it it D it it X Z m v E , | - ³ e  are known, equation (3.43) 
can be estimated using OLS. 
 
The key assumption in the control function approach is the following: 
  ( ) . | , it it it it v Z D ^ e   (3.44) 
This states that the error term in equation (3.41) is uncorrelated with the treatment status 
dummy, having conditioned upon the error term from equation (3.42). It also states that, 
having conditioned upon νit, the Zit variables included in the treatment status equation are 
uncorrelated with εit. The implication of this is that the impact of the Zit variables on the 
outcome  variables  is  channelled  entirely  through  the  treatment  status  dummy  or  is 
controlled for by νit. It is therefore similar to assumption (3.32) for instrumental variables 
which states that the entire impact of the instrumental variable is through its impact on the 
treatment  status  dummy  (Blundell  and  Costa  Dias,  2008).  Such  an  assumption  is  not 
necessary for the Xit variables included in the treatment status equation as these are also 
included in the outcome regression and are therefore controlled for. 
 
The conditional means of the error term in equation (3.43) can be written as: 
  ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) [ ] ( ), , , |
, , , |
0
1
it it it it it D it it
it it it it it D it it
Z X r X Z m v E
Z X r X Z m v E
l e
l e
= - <
= - ³
  (3.45) 
where λ0it and λ1it are control functions, the form of which are determined by ( ) it it D X Z m ,  
and the distribution of the error terms in the outcome and treatment equation. Both of these 
are unknown. 
 
Assuming  joint  normality  of  the  error  terms  in  equations  (3.41)  and  (3.42)  as  in  the 
Heckman selection model, the control functions are inverse Mills ratios: 
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(3.46) 
wheref denotes  the  standard  normal  density  function  and  Φ  is  the  standard  normal 
cumulative distribution function. The ( ) it it D X Z m , terms can be calculated from the fitted 
values from a logit or probit model of the treatment equation. 74 
 
 
These control functions therefore, λ0it and λ1it, allow consistent estimation of the ATT using 
the following equation: 
  ( ) ( ) , 1 1 0 0 it it it i it it ATT it it rD D r D X m y w l l b a + + - + + + =   (3.47) 
where ωit is an error term.  The inclusion of the control functions removes from the error 
term, εit, that part that is correlated with the treatment dummy so that ωit is uncorrelated 
with  the  treatment  variable.  Under  these  assumptions,  the  coefficient  on  the  control 
functions in equation (3.47), r, can be written as v r e er s = , which states that r is equal to 
the  standard  deviation  of  εit  multiplied  by  the  correlation  between  the  error  terms  in 
equations (3.41) and (3.42). 
 
An  attractive  feature  of  the  control  function  approach  is  that  a  test  of  the  statistical 
significance of the coefficient on the control functions, r, is a test of whether there is 
potentially any self-selection bias. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on λ1it 
indicates that observations that receive treatment would perform better due to unobserved 
characteristics  than  observations  in  the  untreated  group,  in  the  event  that  they  did  not 
receive treatment. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on λ0it indicates that 
observations in the untreated group would have performed better than treated observations 
in terms of unobserved characteristics, had the treated observations not been treated. 
 
There are a number of drawbacks to the control function approach (see Puhani, 2000 for a 
detailed  critique  of  the  control  function  approach).  Unlike  the  instrumental  variables 
estimator,  it  is  not  straightforward  to  control  for  time-invariant  effects  in  the  control 
function model. While the outcome equation can be estimated as a fixed effects model, the 
probit model that is estimated to give the inverse Mills ratios cannot be estimated as a fixed 
effects  model  due  to  the  incidental  parameters  problem.  As  estimating  the  outcome 
equation as a fixed effects model but the treatment status equation as a random effects 
model  is  inappropriate  (Zabel,  1992),  other  approaches  have  been  developed  but  these 
sacrifice  some  of  the  simplicity  of  the  control  function  approach  (see,  for  example, 
Wooldridge, 1995). 
 
Another problem is that the Heckman selection model, which is the most common version 
of the control function method, generally requires a variable in the equation determining 
treatment  status  that  can  be  legitimately  excluded  from  the  outcome  equation  (an 75 
 
instrument) because the inverse Mills ratio is approximately linear over wide ranges of its 
argument. Without these variables, there will be collinearity between the regressors and the 
control function in the outcome equation so the estimated parameters will tend not to be 
efficiently estimated (Little and Rubin, 1987). As discussed in section 3.2, this instrument 
will typically be difficult to find. 
 
Also  problematic  is  that  the  estimated  coefficients  are  sensitive  to  the  assumed 
distributions of the error terms in both the outcome and treatment equations (Little and 
Rubin, 1987). Conventionally, normality is assumed (as above) but if this does not hold, 
the estimated parameters may not be consistent. 
 
Finally, the control function method demands a full specification of the treatment equation 
while the instrumental variables approach only requires the identification of one variable 
that determines treatment status but that does not belong in the outcome equation (Blundell 
and Costa Dias, 2008). In view of this requirement, this approach compares unfavourably 
to the instrumental variables estimator outlined above. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the four main methods that are used to estimate the ATT in non-
experimental  settings.  The  two  that  will  be  employed  in  the  empirical  analysis  are 
propensity  score  matching  combined  with  multivariate  regression  and  the  instrumental 
variables estimator. The fixed effects estimator will not be used because assumption (3.19), 
which  requires  that  having  controlled  for  the  fixed  effects  and  the  observable 
characteristics  that  determine  treatment  status  and  the  outcome  variable,  there  is  no 
correlation between the treatment variable and the error term, will not hold if plants tend to 
apply for grant when they are doing relatively badly or relatively well as this is likely to be 
the  case  with  RSA.  The  control  function  approach  will  also  not  be  used  because  it 
possesses  the  greatest  problem  of  the  instrumental  variables  estimator  -  finding  an 
instrument – in addition to the need for a full specification of the treatment equation. 76 
 
 
4. Literature Review 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will review the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of capital 
subsidies in order to build expectations of what will be found in the empirical analyses of 
chapters 6, 7 and 8. The part of the chapter which discusses the theoretical papers is far 
shorter  than  the  part  that  describes  the  empirical  papers  simply  because  far  fewer 
theoretical papers on the impacts of capital subsidies have been written. 
 
This next section will set out what the theoretical literature suggests may be expected from 
the  empirical  analyses  of  chapters  6,  7  and  8.  Chapter  6  decomposes  the  growth  of 
aggregate  productivity  to  calculate  the  contribution  of  RSA-assisted  plants  and  the 
channels through which this contribution is made. A handful of theoretical models have 
been developed which provide predictions as to what the impact of schemes such as RSA 
may be at the macroeconomic level and these will be reviewed. The empirical analyses of 
chapters 7 and 8 test microeconomic predictions concerning whether receipt of an RSA 
grant has an impact on TFP and survival respectively. This section will review what impact 
the literature predicts will be found. 
 
Unlike  the  theoretical  literature,  the  empirical  literature  on  the  impact  of  government 
grants upon firm performance is voluminous. Many different methodologies and datasets 
have been employed and the conclusions regarding their effectiveness are diverse. The 
third and fourth sections of this chapter will review empirical papers that have analysed 
business support programmes using macroeconomic and microeconomic data respectively. 
 
4.2. Theoretical Literature Review 
 
This section will begin by reviewing theoretical papers which suggest what the impact of 
RSA at a macroeconomic level will be. This will provide guidance as to what may be 
expected from the productivity decomposition of chapter 6. It will then discuss the impacts 
of receipt of capital subsidies at the microeconomic level. This will be useful in giving a 77 
 
priori expectations for those chapters that investigate the impact of RSA on TFP and on 
survival probability. 
 
Macroeconomic Impact of RSA 
 
Fuest and Huber (2000) seek to explain why governments tend to use investment rather 
than employment subsidies in regions with high unemployment. They do so using a model 
in  which  firms  are  heterogeneous  in  the  sense  that  they  have  different  exogenously 
determined, random output or productivity shocks.
16 Bargaining between trade unions and 
firms  raises  the  wage  rate  which  leads  to  the  closure  of  low  productivity  firms  and  a 
consequent inefficiently low level of employment.
17 There is also an inefficient low level 
of  capital  as  plants  realise  that  trade  unions  capture  part  of  the  benefit  from  capital 
investment through the bargaining process. The impact of an unfunded capital subsidy is 
that firms demand more capital and profits rise. This rise in profits attracts more firms to 
enter and this increases aggregate employment. That more firms operate in the market 
means however that the average level of the productivity shock is lower. However, when a 
tax  is  imposed  on  labour  to  fund  the  subsidy,  this  tax  reduces  capital  investment  and 
employment. However, the benefits of the capital subsidy outweigh the costs of the labour 
tax so the overall impact is an increase in the capital stock. The number of firms operating 
is higher than when there is no funded subsidy which means that the average level of 
productivity is lower. 
 
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) investigate the impact on aggregate output and TFP of 
policy induced heterogeneity in the price of inputs faced by heterogeneous plants. This is 
relevant as the RSA scheme can be regarded as a scheme which reduces the price of capital 
(chapter 2.6 gives a detailed description of the RSA scheme). They do so using a version of 
the neoclassical growth model in which half of the plants are subsidised and half are taxed. 
Again, plants are heterogeneous only in their level of TFP which is constant throughout 
time.  The  size  of  the  subsidy  is  set  so  that  the  net  effect  on  steady  state  capital 
accumulation of the distortion in prices is zero. The model is calibrated using US data and 
                                                 
16 The output of firm i is given by: Y(Ki, Li) + zìi, where Ki and Li are capital and labour respectively, z is a 
positive constant and ìi is the random output or productivity shock. Y(Ki, Li) is a production function common 
to all firms. 
17 Note that no explanation is given for why this should happen in only some regions. 78 
 
the implications of various policy-induced changes in the price of inputs are then studied. 
In the case where the probability of being subsidised or taxed is unrelated to productivity, a 
50%  tax  on  capital  requires  a  10%  subsidy  to  keep  steady  state  capital  accumulation 
unchanged and this leads to a fall in aggregate output and TFP of 3% from the state in 
which there are no price distortions. When lower productivity plants are more likely to 
receive the subsidy than be taxed, a 50% tax in capital requires a 44% subsidy to keep 
steady state capital accumulation unchanged and leads to a fall in output and TFP of 11%. 
 
A major problem with these models is that they do not allow firm technology to vary over 
time. A model that does is by Samaniego (2006). He seeks to understand the quantitative 
impact  of  industrial  subsidies  to  failing  firms  using  a  general  equilibrium  model  of 
establishment dynamics. As plants that apply for an RSA grant may do so in order to avoid 
redundancies, the notion of a failing plant is relevant here. 
 
In his model, the firm’s production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, consisting of an 
exogenous  productivity  growth  factor,  an  idiosyncratic  productivity  shock,  capital  and 
labour. The idiosyncratic productivity shock is assumed to follow a random walk. The 
vintage of technology is embodied in capital rather than directly entering the production 
function. Entry is costly with the cost an increasing function of the vintage of technology 
acquired. Entrants draw their initial idiosyncratic productivity shock from a distribution 
that is distributed entirely to the left of the distribution of productivity shocks for existing 
firms.
18 As firms age, they fall behind the technological frontier. In each period existing 
firms have the option of upgrading their vintage of technology at a cost (with the cost an 
increasing  function  of  the  vintage  of  technology  purchased),  falling  further  behind  the 
technological frontier or closing. Firms close when their continuation value is less than 
their random draw from a cumulatively distributed continuation shock. The provision of a 
subsidy  will  cause  a  firm  to  stay  open  that  would  otherwise  close  if  the  value  of  the 
subsidy  is  greater  than  the  gap  between  the  continuation  value  of  the  firm  and  the 
continuation shock. Subsidies are funded by a tax on firm profits and a balanced budget 
condition is assumed to apply. Timing in the model is as follows: at the start of the period, 
plants draw a continuation shock and choose whether or not to stay in operation; assuming 
they choose to remain in operation, they decide whether or not to update their vintage of 
                                                 
18 The significance of this specification of the productivity shocks is that it ensures that entrants are smaller 
than existing plants. 79 
 
technology; finally, they observe the value of their idiosyncratic productivity shock and 
produce output. 
 
Simulations  calibrated  using  US  data  show  that,  for  empirically  reasonable  levels  of 
subsidy, the introduction of a subsidy leads to lower employment and lower consumption. 
This is the result of a fall in aggregate labour productivity. However, firm productivity 
actually rises because of two factors. Firstly, subsidies allow firms to reach a point where 
upgrading their vintage of technology becomes the optimal choice. Secondly, the average 
idiosyncratic shock is higher when subsidies are provided because the proportion of new 
plants in the economy falls and these have lower levels of the idiosyncratic shock. The fall 
in aggregate labour productivity is the result of a rise in the average plant size. This, in 
turn, is the consequence of fewer plants entering because of the tax on profits used to fund 
the subsidy because entrants are typically small. 
 
Microeconomic Impact of RSA 
 
The impact of receipt of a capital grant on the employment and capital stock of the firm 
has been discussed in chapter 2.4. This showed that the impact of receipt of a capital grant 
on  the  capital  stock  will  be  positive  while  the  impact  on  employment  depends  upon 
whether the induced substitution effect is outweighed by the output effect. If the latter 
predominates, there will be a positive impact on the employment of the recipient firm. This 
is more likely to happen when the capital that is bought with the subsidy is relatively 
modern compared to the existing stock of capital because of the larger reduction in costs 
generated by the larger amount of new capital bought by the firm. Given that the primary 
purpose of the RSA scheme is to create and safeguard employment and that the scheme is 
discretionary, grants should only be provided in cases where the output effect is larger than 
the substitution effect. Furthermore, the RSA scheme has a ‘clawback’ clause that requires 
that the grant is repaid if agreed employment targets are not met. It is therefore expected 
that receipt of an RSA grant will have a positive impact on employment. 
 
The relationship between receipt of an RSA grant and TFP is less clear. Although many 
papers test the prediction that business support programmes have an impact on TFP, they 
tend not to provide a clear explanation of the channels through which such an impact may 
be  expected  to  occur  (see,  for  example,  Girma,  Görg  and  Strobl,  2007a;  Harris  and 80 
 
Robinson, 2004). The clearest explanation of how such an impact may arise comes from 
Harris (1991a). He argues that capital subsidies such as the RSA scheme are expected to 
have a positive impact on TFP through two main channels. The first is through replacing 
older capital with more modern capital which requires the plant to reorganise production 
along more efficient lines. This implies that the impact will be greater when the capital that 
is being replaced is older. The second is through net investment which allows the plant to 
create new products that can be produced with greater efficiency than older products.
19 
 
The prediction from the literature concerning the impact of government grants on survival 
is  relatively  straightforward.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that,  once  again,  papers  that 
investigate  this  issue  tend  not  to  spell  out  precisely  why  it  may  be  expected  that 
government grants are expected to have an impact on survival (see, for example, Girma, 
Görg and Strobl, 2007b; Harris and Trainor, 2007). The decision of a firm to close depends 
fundamentally on expectations of future profits and the liquidation value of the firm. When 
the discounted expected profits over future periods are less than the liquidation value of the 
firm, the firm will optimally choose to cease  production (see,  for example, Jovanovic, 
1982; Hopenhayn, 1992). As shown by Samaniego (2006), a subsidy increases discounted 
expected profits so that plants, that would otherwise close, choose to remain in operation. 
 
4.3. Empirical Papers Using Macroeconomic Data 
 
This  section  will  discuss  some  of  the  empirical  evaluations  of  business  support 
programmes  that  have  been  conducted  using  macroeconomic  data.  The  first  part  will 
describe  the  only  previous  productivity  growth  decomposition  that  has  analysed  the 
contribution of plants that have been supported by a business support programme. The 
second part will discuss two papers that have used shift-share analysis; the third section 
will  review  one  paper  that  employed  simulation  and  the  final  section  will  discuss  an 
application of multivariate regression. 
 
                                                 
19 It should be noted that the paper by Samaniego (2006) does not suggest a causal relationship between 
receipt of a grant and productivity. In his model, a grant allows a plant to avoid closure and then, at a 
specified time, it becomes optimal for the plant to update its technology. 81 
 
Productivity Decomposition 
 
The only paper that has examined the contribution of plants that received business support 
grants  to  aggregate  productivity  growth  is  by  Harris  and  Robinson  (2005).
20  Using  a 
dataset created by merging SAMIS into the ARD, they employ the Haltiwanger method to 
decompose the growth of labour productivity and TFP between 1990 and 1998 in UK 
manufacturing plants. This allows them to identify the share of the growth of aggregate 
productivity attributable to plants that received an RSA grant and the channels through 
which this contribution is made. Their results show that plants that received an RSA grant 
made a large positive contribution to the growth of labour productivity but a negative 
contribution  to  the  growth  of  TFP.  The  contribution  to  aggregate  labour  productivity 
comes primarily from RSA grant recipients that improve their productivity between 1990 
and 1998 also increasing their market share while the negative contribution to the growth 
of aggregate TFP is mostly due to RSA grant recipients with low TFP in 1990 increasing 
their market share. While the contribution from entry and exit is large for plants that did 
not receive a grant, it is far smaller from entering and exiting plants that received an RSA 
grant.
21 
 
This paper reveals the proportion of aggregate productivity growth accounted for by plants 
that  received  support.  It  does  not  attempt  to  estimate  the  causal  impact  of  a  business 
support programme at the macroeconomic level. It therefore does not sit very comfortably 
alongside the rest of the papers in this section which attempt to estimate a causal impact of 
a business support programme. 
 
                                                 
20  It  is  arguable  that  this  paper  belongs  more  properly  under  the  heading  of  ‘Empirical  Papers  using 
Microeconomic  Data’  as  the  aggregates  used  in  the  productivity  decomposition  are  calculated  from  the 
microeconomic data of the ARD. However, as the decomposition is performed using aggregate data, it is 
placed in this section. 
21 This is the paper, referred to in chapter 1.3, which gives results from an analysis of the impact of receipt of 
an RSA grant on survival. However, only a paragraph is devoted to this so it is impossible to critically review 
this aspect of the paper in any depth. Instead, this is done briefly in chapter 8.1. 82 
 
Shift-Share Analysis 
 
In a seminal paper, Moore and Rhodes (1973) employ shift-share analysis to estimate the 
impact on manufacturing employment and investment of the moves made between 1960 
and 1963 towards a more active regional policy in the UK (see chapter 2.5 for a history of 
regional policy in the UK). They address the problem of the missing counterfactual by 
constructing a series which purports to show what employment and investment would have 
been after 1963 in the Development Areas had there been no change in policy. This is 
achieved by applying the UK industry growth rates to the employment and investment 
levels of each industry in the Development Areas. The calculated figures are then summed 
to  yield  aggregate  ‘expected’  estimates  for  employment  and  investment  in  the 
Development Areas for each year. These are then compared to the actual figures to give an 
estimate of the impact of policy. This approach is supposed to isolate the effects of policy 
on  the  outcome  variable  by  controlling  for  the  impact  of  industrial  structure.  Their 
estimates are that in 1971, employment was 12% higher in the Development Areas than it 
would  have  been  had  there  been  no  move  towards  a  more  active  regional  policy.  For 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, actual investment was found to be 30% higher in 
1970 than expected investment. 
 
In essence, this approach relies upon the same assumption that underpins the difference-in-
difference estimator. What is being assumed is that the growth rate of each industry in the 
development areas would have been the same as the growth rate of the same industry 
outside the development areas, had those industries in the development areas not benefited 
from a more active regional policy. However, it may be hypothesised that those industries 
in  the  development  areas  would  have  performed  differently  without  the  more  active 
regional policy than those industries outside the development area. This would be the case 
if the decision to introduce a more active regional policy is taken due to the characteristics 
of the industries in the development areas and these characteristics make them prone to 
relatively poor performance. In this case, the difference-in-difference assumption would 
not hold and the estimates obtained would be a biased estimate of the impact of the more 
active regional policy. 
 
A more advanced version of the shift-share estimator is employed by Canning, Moore and 
Rhodes  (1987).  This  version  attempts  to  control  for  the  fact  that  those  industries  that 83 
 
benefited from the change in policy may perform differently to those that did not benefit, 
had there been no change in policy, by making use of data that is available from before the 
change in policy to calculate the difference in trend growth rates across industries inside 
and outside the development areas. More specifically, the difference between actual and 
expected values of the variable of interest, calculated as above, is regressed on time using 
data from before the change in policy. The coefficient on time is then used to extrapolate 
this  difference  forward  from  the  time  of  the  change  in  policy.  The  gap  between  the 
difference  between  the  actual  and  expected  values  and  the  extrapolated  values  of  this 
difference is the estimate of the policy effect. Using this methodology, Canning, Moore 
and Rhodes find that between 1959 and 1971, regional policy in Northern Ireland created 
an extra 33,000 manufacturing jobs. 
 
However, the estimates rely upon the assumption that the difference between the actual and 
expected values of the series would have continued to grow at the same rate over time, had 
there been no change in policy. This may not be the case if, for instance, the industries that 
were to benefit from the change in policy would have performed relatively worse than in 
previous periods if there was no change in policy. This would be likely if the government 
had changed policy because they had anticipated such relatively poor performance in the 
development areas and wanted to prevent it. 
 
Furthermore, estimates obtained using this method are sensitive to the time period used to 
estimate the coefficient on the time trend which is then used to extrapolate the difference 
between actual and expected values of the variable of interest. This is a serious problem as 
it is impossible to know which time period will provide the most similar trend in the 
difference between the actual and expected series as that which would be observed after 
the change in policy, had there been no change in policy. Therefore, while this version of 
the shift-share estimator is superior to the basic version used in Moore and Rhodes (1973), 
it remains open to criticism. 
 
Multivariate Regression 
 
Beason and Weinstein (1996) use a panel of Japanese sectoral data that starts in 1955 and 
ends in 1990 to consider which industries benefit from government assistance in the form 
of tax relief, low interest rate loans, subsidies, tariffs and import quotas. They find that the 84 
 
targeted industries tended to be low-growth and have decreasing returns to scale. They then 
look at the impact of this assistance. Using fixed effects estimation, they find that these 
measures increased investment and growth in the targeted industries but they cannot find 
strong evidence of a major impact on TFP growth.
22 
 
The econometrics of this paper can be criticised on the grounds that, even though fixed 
effects are included in the model, there may be a correlation between the treatment variable 
and the error term that will bias the estimate of the treatment effect. This would arise if 
industries tended to receive more assistance in years when they are performing better or 
worse than average because of unobserved variables. 
 
A similar paper by Lee (1996) uses a panel of sectoral data to investigate the impact of 
industrial and trade policy on GVA, capital growth and TFP in South Korea between 1963 
and 1983. His empirical model for output is derived from the neoclassical growth model, 
allows for fixed and time effects and is estimated using both weighted least squares to 
correct for cross-equation heteroskedasticity and three-stage-least-squares to control for the 
possible endogeneity of the treatment variables. His results show that tax incentives had a 
positive and statistically significant impact on GVA and capital growth but no effect on 
TFP  while  low  interest  bank  loans  had  no  impact  on  any  of  the  dependent  variables 
considered.  Trade  protection  was  found  to  reduce  the  growth  rates  of  both  labour 
productivity and TFP. 
 
Although each equation is estimated by three-stage-least-squares, and the possibility of 
correlation between the error term and the policy variables is thereby acknowledged, the 
way in which it was implemented does not guarantee an unbiased estimate of the impact of 
policy. This is because the instruments employed are the once-lagged policy variables. If 
the error term is autoregressive, these instruments are invalid as they will be correlated 
with the error term (Bond, 2002). It is therefore better to adopt a dynamic version of the 
equation so that the error term is serially uncorrelated and lags may be used as instruments. 
 
Another  criticism  that  can  be  levelled  at  this  approach  is  that  no  effort  is  made  to 
understand the interrelationships between the parameter estimates obtained using different 
                                                 
22 Some estimates suggest that sectors that received a high proportion of low interest loans enjoyed higher 
TFP growth rates, ceteris paribus, but this effect is not found to be robust. 85 
 
dependent variables. For instance, the estimate of the impact of policy on GVA growth will 
clearly be a function of the estimate of the impact of policy on the growth of both capital 
and TFP. On the other hand, the impact on the growth of capital will be partly determined 
by  the  impact  on  GVA  as  the  demand  for  capital  is  a  derived  demand.  Failure  to 
acknowledge  these  interrelationships  creates  difficulties  in  understanding  the  channels 
through which policy has an impact. 
 
Simulation 
 
A more sophisticated means of policy evaluation that avoids this criticism is to estimate a 
structural model and use this to estimate the impact of policy. This is the method employed 
by Harris (1991b) to investigate the impact of automatic capital subsidies on employment 
in the Northern Irish manufacturing sector. His model incorporates an industry production 
equation, an industry demand equation and factor demand equations. The parameters of 
these equations are estimated by full-information maximum likelihood using data for the 
period from 1950 to 1983. The parameterised model is then used to generate estimates of 
what output, labour and capital would have been, had automatic capital grants not been 
provided. The results show that had the automatic capital grants been unavailable, output 
would have been around 3.9% lower, the capital stock would have been smaller by almost 
23.8% and employment would have been higher by 26.1%. This shows that automatic 
capital grants created a large substitution of labour for capital and that this substitution 
effect outweighed the output effect so that the overall impact of the grants on employment 
was negative. 
 
The  use  of  industry  level  data  in  this  paper  was  not  problematic  because  the  support 
provided  was  automatic.  However,  many  papers  use  industry  level  data  to  analyse  the 
impact  of  discretionary  business  support  programmes  and  this  is  not  the  best  unit  of 
observation  to  use  in  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  such  programmes.  This  is  because 
industry level data precludes the comparison of treatment and control groups as there is no 
such thing as a treated industry because some plants or firms within each industry will not 
have received treatment and there is also unlikely to be an untreated industry, as some 
plants  or  firms  within  each  industry  will  generally  have  received  treatment.  To  find 
genuine treatment and control groups when the programme is discretionary, it is necessary 
to use plant or firm level data. Such data permits the direct comparison of an outcome 86 
 
variable  across  treated  and  control  groups  and  thereby  facilitates  the  estimation  of 
treatment effects. 
 
4.4. Empirical Papers Using Microeconomic Data 
 
Most  of  the  recent  papers  on  the  impact  of  grants  on  firm  performance  have  used 
microeconomic data which allows the construction of treatment and control groups in line 
with the approach advocated in the evaluation literature (see, for example, Blundell and 
Costa  Dias,  2008).  Such  papers  will  be  reviewed  in  this  section.  They  are  grouped 
according to the method employed to deal with self-selection and this section therefore 
links  into  chapter  3.3  where  the  methods  available  to  control  for  self-selection  are 
discussed. 
 
Difference-in-Difference 
 
One  of  the  most  popular  approaches  to  evaluating  business  support  programmes  is  by 
employing the difference-in-difference estimator. This is the approach taken by Hart and 
Scott (1994) who, as part of a broad analysis of the effectiveness of small firm policy in 
Northern Ireland, investigate the impact of receiving a SFA grant between 1984-5 and 
1988-9 on employment growth in small manufacturing firms between 1986 and 1990. SFA 
is Northern Ireland’s equivalent of the RSA scheme. They offer four alternative control 
groups: small manufacturing firms that did not receive support in Northern Ireland, small 
manufacturing firms in Leicestershire, small manufacturing firms in Wearside, and small 
manufacturing firms in the Republic of Ireland. Results are reported for all four although, 
as acknowledged by the authors, the last two are not appropriate control groups because 
government assistance was also available in Wearside and in the Republic of Ireland and 
those  plants  that  received  such  assistance  could  not  be  identified.  They  find  that 
employment growth in SFA assisted firms was 19.1% higher than in non-assisted Northern 
Irish firms and 22.3% higher than in small firms in Leicestershire. 
 
The most obvious problem with these estimates is the nature of the assumption required to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment effect. This is that grant recipients in Northern 
Ireland  would  have  experienced  exactly  the  same  employment  growth  as  non-assisted 
Northern Irish firms or firms in Leicestershire, had they not received a grant. With respect 87 
 
to the former, as Northern Irish grant recipients are a self-selected group of the population, 
they are likely to differ from Northern Irish firms that did not receive treatment in ways 
that  effect  their  employment  growth.  With  respect  to  the  latter,  not  only  are  firms  in 
Northern Ireland likely to have different characteristics from plants in Leicestershire that 
determine employment growth, macroeconomic conditions may also differ between the 
two areas and this will also lead to differences in their rates of employment growth. As a 
result, this application of the difference-in-difference estimator is not convincing. 
 
The difference-in-difference estimator is also used by Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) who 
provide an evaluation of the impact on investment of capital grants provided under Italy’s 
Law  488/1992.  These  grants,  intended  to  reduce  regional  inequalities  in  income,  are 
awarded  to  manufacturing  and  extractive  firms  through  auctions  where  applicant  firms 
score points in relation to criteria such as the number of jobs that will be created by the 
project.  As  a  control  group  they  use  those  firms  that  applied  for  assistance  but  were 
rejected.  Results  show  that  in  the  year  after  receiving  the  first  instalment  (of  three) 
recipients increase their investment levels relative to the control group. However, in the 
years after the last instalment is received, investment levels are lower for the treatment 
group which suggests that firms may have intertemporally substituted their investment in 
response to the grant. To test the robustness of this result to the control group they firstly 
use as an alternative control group firms which received scores in the auction process close 
to successful firms and secondly firms with investment profiles similar to treated firms 
prior to the provision of grants. Neither approach significantly changes the results. 
 
In their paper, the assumption that has to hold for the main estimates to be unbiased is that 
firms that received a grant would have experienced exactly the same growth in investment 
as those plants that applied for assistance but were rejected, had they not received a grant. 
As  the  firms  that  did  not  receive  treatment  did  not  do  so  because  they  did  not  score 
sufficiently well in the auction, it is reasonable to expect that they are different to those 
plants in terms of characteristics. If these characteristics affect their investment growth, 
this violates the assumption outlined above. Although it is commendable that this paper 
experiments with other control groups, these can be similarly criticised. 
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Multivariate OLS 
 
The  difference-in-difference  estimator  can  be  performed  with  a  regression  of  the  first-
differenced outcome variable on a treatment dummy variable using OLS. However, if there 
are observed variables that are likely to be correlated with the treatment variable and the 
error term, these should be included in the regression. This is what is done by Bergström 
(2000) in his analysis of the impact on TFP of Swedish selective capital subsidies. His 
dataset comprises firms that received a grant in 1989 and a control group randomly drawn 
from the population of Swedish firms. He begins by using a logit model to show that firms 
that received a subsidy in 1989 tended to have been situated in a support area, to have been 
younger  and  to  have  had  lower  labour  productivity  than  those  that  did  not  receive  a 
subsidy. In the main regression, he uses the growth of output between 1989 and dates 
ranging from 1990 to 1993 as the dependent variable. The treatment variable is the level of 
subsidy received by the firm in 1989. The equation is estimated by OLS and a bounded 
influence estimation technique which minimises the influence of outliers (see Maddala, 
2001: 476-479 for an introduction to bounded influence estimation). Results obtained by 
selecting 1990 as the terminal date showed that subsidies raised TFP growth in the year 
after the subsidies were provided (although the coefficient is not statistically significant 
using the bounded influence estimator). However using 1991 to 1993 as terminal dates 
gave  a  negative,  and  often  statistically  significant,  coefficient  on  the  subsidy  variable 
suggesting that subsidies may actually reduce TFP growth in the longer term. 
 
This approach is an improvement on the simple difference-in-difference estimator as it 
controls for differences in observed characteristics across treatment and control groups. 
Omitting these variables would create a correlation between the treatment variable and the 
error term. However, the econometrics may still be unsatisfactory as no attempt is made to 
control  for  possible  correlation  between  the  variable  measuring  the  size  of  the  grant 
awarded and the error term arising from differences in unobserved characteristics across 
treatment and control groups (see Chapter 3.3 for more discussion of the shortcomings of 
the fixed effects estimator). As firms that receive assistance are a self-selected group, they 
may have unobserved characteristics that allow them to grow faster or slower than the 
control group and this will generate a bias in the estimated coefficient. 
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A further problem with this paper is that correlation between the error term and the growth 
of factor inputs is ignored. As discussed in chapter 7.3, this arises when firms have some 
knowledge about the realisation of the error term and use this information to make their 
choice of the growth of inputs. As discussed by Frölich (2008), failing to account for the 
endogeneity of control variables can bias the estimate of the treatment effect. 
 
Fixed effects 
 
A paper of particular relevance to this thesis is by Harris and Robinson (2004). As in 
chapter 7, they use a plant-level panel dataset, created by linking SAMIS with the ARD, to 
estimate the impact of receiving an RSA grant on TFP. Their model is also an augmented 
log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function in which they deal with the endogeneity of 
capital,  employment  and  intermediate  inputs  using  the  system  GMM  estimator  (see 
appendix A7.1 for a discussion of the system GMM estimator). Unlike in this thesis, they 
also look at the impact of the SMART and SPUR schemes which are discussed in chapter 
2.6. In addition to a number of control variables, the model contains four dummy variables. 
The first is a dummy that takes the value of one in every period if a plant was assisted at 
any time by RSA and the second is the equivalent for the SMART and SPUR schemes. 
These  dummies  allow  the  intercepts  to  vary  across  treatment  and  control  groups  and 
therefore show whether RSA or SMART/SPUR recipients had high or low TFP levels 
prior to receiving support. The other two dummies are equal to one from the time that a 
plant  receives  an  RSA  or  SMART/SPUR  grant  and  their  coefficients  are  intended  to 
estimates the treatment effect. When the control group is drawn from plants throughout the 
whole of Britain, the results indicate that RSA recipients had initially lower levels but that 
SMART/SPUR recipients had higher levels of TFP. In the case of RSA, receiving support 
was  found  to  increase  TFP  by  2.5%  but  receiving  a  SMART/SPUR  grant  led  to  no 
statistically significant change in TFP. 
 
One criticism of this paper is that a larger proportion of the plants that received treatment 
were not linked to the ARD than in the dataset to be used in the empirical chapters here. As 
discussed in chapter 5.3, failure to identify RSA recipients can potentially generate biased 
estimates of the treatment effect. 
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A similar model is employed by Harris and Trainor (2005) to investigate the impact of 
SFA  in  Northern  Ireland  on  TFP.  Their  dataset  is  created  by  linking  the  ARD  with  a 
dataset constructed from the records of the Industrial Development Board. Again, a GMM 
estimator  is  used  to  control  for  the  endogeneity  of  factor  inputs.  Their  model  is  more 
sophisticated  than  that  estimated  in  Harris  and  Robinson  (2004).  It  allows  for  the 
possibility that SFA grant recipients may differ from plants that do not receive a grant in 
their  technologies  by  using  interaction  variables.  Furthermore,  they  separate  SFA  into 
capital grants and other forms of grant assistance, test if a 1990 change in industrial policy 
changed the impact of either on TFP and investigate whether their impact differs according 
to the location of the plant owners. The model is also estimated by industry because of ‘a 
strong a priori assumption that industries are likely to differ in terms of their underlying 
production functions, product life cycles, and thus the potential impact of SFA’ (Harris and 
Trainor, 2005: 65). This approach is also taken in chapter 7. The results show that capital 
grants were more likely than other types of grant support to increase TFP and that the 1990 
change  in  industrial  policy  towards  improving  competitiveness  rather  than  promoting 
employment did lead to a greater impact of SFA on TFP. 
 
This  approach  of  both  these  papers  is  a  specific  case  of  the  fixed  effects  estimator 
discussed in chapter 3.3. Instead of including a dummy variable for each plant, only a 
single dummy variable is included which equals one throughout time for plants that receive 
assistance. The problem with this approach is the same as that of the fixed effects in that it 
fails to deal with the potential existence of correlation between the error term and the 
treatment variable. This dummy variable will only control for self-selection bias if the 
mean of the error term is the same for plants that receive treatment before and after they 
receive treatment. If, for instance, plants tend to be performing better or worse than normal 
due to some unobserved characteristic and this leads to them applying for assistance, a 
correlation  will  exist  between  the  treatment  variable  and  the  error  term  that  is  not 
controlled for using this method. In this way, this method is not an adequate control for 
self-selection bias. 
 
A  standard  application  of  the  fixed  effects  estimator  is  provided  by  Kangasharju  and 
Venetoklis (2002). Their paper aims to calculate the effect of various types of subsidy 
provided by the Finnish government on firm employment between 1995 and 1998. They 
estimate a fixed effects panel model with control variables and time dummies in an attempt 91 
 
to mitigate the problem of self-selection bias. The key dependent variable, ‘own payroll’, is 
calculated by subtracting the value of the subsidy from the firm’s payroll in order to avoid 
a trivial relationship between the value of the subsidy received and the dependent variable. 
Allowing  subsidies  to  have  an  impact  on  employment  in  the  year  in  which  they  are 
provided and in the following year, results show that receiving employment subsidies led 
to an average increase of 11% in ‘own payroll’. Further analysis shows that an extra Euro 
of subsidies generates only an extra 34 cents in ‘own payroll’. This suggests that subsidies 
are displacing employment as on average firms cover 60% of the costs of a subsidised 
job.
23 At the 95% level, Investment and Operation subsidies and R&D subsidies are not 
found to have a statistically significant impact on this measure. 
 
The  fixed  effects  estimator  in  its  standard  form  possesses  no  advantage  in  terms  of 
overcoming  self-selection  bias  over  the  approach  outlined  in  the  Harris  and  Robinson 
(2004) and Harris and Trainor (2005). It is therefore subject to the same criticisms that it 
does not control for bias that arises when firms receive grants in years in which they are 
performing unusually well or badly due to some unobserved factor.  
 
A criticism that is more specific to this paper is that only allowing the subsidies to have an 
impact in the year in which they are provided and the following year is restrictive and will 
lead to underestimates of the treatment effect if some of the impact occurs after this period. 
Another concern is that, unlike in Harris and Robinson (2004) and Harris and Trainor 
(2005), no attempt is made to tackle the endogeneity of other covariates in the model. Sales 
is included in the model and, as owners choose their level of output and factor inputs 
simultaneously, this will be correlated with the error term and this may lead to biased 
estimates of the impact of treatment (Gorter, Hassink, Nijkamp and Pels, 1997). 
 
Matching and Multivariate Regression 
 
Perhaps the most intuitive way of evaluating a business support programme with non-
experimental data is with the matching estimator. Girma, Görg and Strobl (2007b) use this 
approach to investigate the impact of grants on plant survival using a Cox proportional 
hazard model. Their dataset is constructed by linking three datasets collected by Forfás, the 
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agency responsible for industrial development, science and technology in the Republic of 
Ireland. The control group is constructed using propensity score matching. Their results 
indicate that receiving a government grant lowered the probability of closing. It is noted 
that  the  closure  of  a  domestic  plant  is  more  likely  to  mean  the  closure  of  the  entire 
enterprise than the exit of a foreign-owned plant as in the latter case the enterprise may 
only be shifting production to another country. With this difference in mind, tests for a 
differential effect on closure probability of grants received by foreign-owned plants were 
run but no significant difference in closure probability was found. The authors therefore 
conclude that the evidence that grants are successful at maintaining foreign investment is 
not as strong as that showing their effectiveness on domestic firms. 
 
A strange feature of this paper is that the probit model which generates the propensity 
scores, which are then used to create the matched sample, contains variables that do not 
feature in the hazard model while the hazard model contains variables that are omitted 
from the probit model. If the strategy of estimating a multivariate outcome equation rather 
than one that only includes the treatment variable is taken, all variables that determine both 
treatment status and the outcome variable should be included in both the probit model and 
the hazard model. This is because, on the one hand, variables included in the probit but not 
the  hazard  model  will  lead  to  a  relatively  poorly  matched  sample  in  terms  of  those 
variables that are included in the hazard model because the sample will be matched on 
these variables in addition to those included in the hazard model. On the other hand, those 
variables included in the hazard model but not included the probit model will not be as 
well balanced as they would have been if they had been included in the probit model. This 
strategy will therefore create an unnecessarily poor balance of the observed characteristics 
across  the  treatment  and  control  groups  in  the  outcome  regression.  As  creating  a  well 
balanced sample is the reason for creating a matched sample, this approach is problematic. 
 
A more general point is the perennial issue with the matching estimator: whether there are 
any unobserved determinants of both the treatment and outcome variable that will generate 
a correlation between the treatment variable and the outcome variable. If such determinants 
exist, the estimated treatment effect will be biased. 
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Matching and Difference-in-Difference 
 
Ankarhem,  Daunfeldt,  Quoreshi  and  Rudholm  (2009)  investigate  whether  Regional 
Investment Grants given to Swedish firms between 1990 and 1999 had a positive impact 
on firm performance, as measured by employment and returns to equity growth. Using a 
large panel dataset containing all limited firms in the two support areas of Sweden, they 
use the difference-in-difference estimator on a sample of firms created using propensity 
score matching. As it is difficult to say, a priori, how long it will take for the grant to 
impact upon the dependent variable, estimates were calculated over one, three and five 
year  intervals  following  receipt  of  the  grant.  The  authors  also  allow  for  a  differential 
impact of the grants on firms of different sizes by calculating estimates using firms which 
have turnover of less than Swedish Krona (SEK) 100,000, firms with turnover greater than 
SEK 100,000 but less than 1 million and firms with turnover that is greater than SEK 1 
million. Estimation is performed by year. No statistically significant impact of Regional 
Investment Grants on returns to equity was found for any of estimations performed. A 
positive and statistically significant impact is found for a few of the employment estimates 
but the vast majority show no significant effect. 
 
As in Bronzini and de Blasio (2006), the effects of Italy’s Law 488/1992 are the subject of 
a paper by Pellegrini and Centra (2006). They create a matched sample, using both kernel 
and nearest neighbour matching, to create a control group drawn from those firms that 
applied but were rejected for a grant and then apply the difference-in-difference estimator 
to  control  for  time  invariant  differences  in  performance  across  treatment  and  control 
groups.  Using  either  matching  procedure  they  find  that  grant  recipients  experienced 
significantly higher rates of growth in turnover, employment and fixed assets than firms in 
the  control  group  which  is  unsurprising  given  the  nature  of  the  grants  provided. 
Importantly  though,  labour  productivity  grew  slower  in  the  treatment  group  by  a 
statistically significant amount which casts doubt upon the sustainability of the jobs created 
by the scheme.  
 
While  the  combination  of  matching  and  difference-in-difference  represents  an 
improvement  on  the  simple  difference-in-difference  method,  its  validity  can  still  be 
questioned. The fact that treatment and control groups have been matched on observed 
characteristics does not guarantee that they are well matched on unobserved characteristics 94 
 
that  determine  treatment  status  and  the  growth  in  the  outcome  variable.  When  such 
characteristics exist, the difference-in-difference assumption will not hold. Furthermore, 
even if the observed covariates are perfectly matched in the start period, differences may 
appear by the end period that are unrelated to treatment and which determine the value of 
the  outcome  variable.  These  differences  ought  to  be  controlled  for  and  this  is  the 
motivation for using the matched sample to estimate a multivariate regression rather than 
using the difference-in-difference estimator. 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
The standard econometric means of dealing with self-selection is instrumental variables 
estimation. Girma, Görg and Strobl (2007a) choose this method in their analysis of the 
effect of government grants on TFP. Their dataset is created by linking data from the Irish 
Economy Expenditure survey, an annual survey of manufacturing plants in the Republic of 
Ireland, with data collected by the Industrial Development Authority on grant payments.
24 
TFP is regressed on grant levels and a number of control variables using the system GMM 
estimator. When the grant levels variable is constructed using all grants available from the 
IDA, there is found to be no statistically significant impact on TFP. However when the 
grant level variable is disaggregated into a variable that includes grants that are likely to 
enhance productivity and another containing all other grants, a positive and statistically 
significant effect is found for the former. To test the hypothesis that financially constrained 
plants benefit most from grants, they augment their model with interactions between the 
disaggregated grant level variables and debt to equity ratios and find that, for productivity 
enhancing grants, the hypothesis holds. 
 
The major problem with this paper is the lack of good instrumental variables. The system 
GMM estimator tackles the endogeneity of factor inputs well but is not a good way of 
controlling  for  self-selection  bias.  Essentially,  the  instruments  in  this  paper  are  lagged 
levels and first differences of the grant levels for the endogenous first differences and 
levels of the grant levels respectively. Such instruments will be very weak predictors of 
current grant levels and the estimates will therefore be centred on the biased OLS estimates 
(see chapter 3.2). Furthermore, they may not be exogenous as, in the levels equation of the 
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system  GMM  estimator,  there  is  no  transformation  which  removes  time-invariant 
heterogeneity and lagged differences of the grant levels could well be correlated with this 
time-invariant heterogeneity. Another issue is that TFP is calculated in a first stage using 
the  Levinsohn and Petrin approach which, as discussed in appendix A7.1, is based on 
untenable assumptions. 
 
Using  the  same  dataset  as  in  their  paper  on  the  effects  on  TFP  of  grants  in  Northern 
Ireland,  Harris  and  Trainor  (2007)  find  that  SFA  was  mostly  aimed  at  preventing 
redundancies in existing plants rather than creating employment through the provision of 
assistance to new plants. Using a Cox proportional hazards model, they find, using no 
method to control for self-selection bias, that assisted plants had on average a 24.1% lower 
probability of closure than plants receiving no assistance. Noting the potential existence of 
self-selection bias, they then re-estimate the model using the predicted values from a Tobit 
regression of value of SFA received upon relevant variables instead of the actual values of 
SFA received. This yields a corresponding figure of 15%. 
 
A major problem with this application of IV estimation is the absence of a good IV. The 
only  variable  that  appears  as  a  determinant  of  grant  level  but  does  not  appear  in  the 
proportional hazards model is the natural logarithm of firm age. However, firm age, in 
levels,  does  appear  in  the  outcome  equation.  So  identification  depends  only  upon  this 
transformation  and  the  nonlinear  relationship  between  the  treatment  variable  and  the 
explanatory variables used in the treatment regression induced by the Tobit model. As a 
result, there is likely to be substantial collinearity involving the treatment variable in the 
outcome  equation  which  may  lead  to  inefficient  estimates.  Another  problem  is  that 
instrumental  variables  cannot  be  used  in  the  Cox  proportional  hazards  model  in  this 
manner  (Bijwaard,  2008).  The  method  of  replacing  the  treatment  variable  with  the 
predicted values from a regression of the treatment variable on exogenous determinants of 
treatment  is  only  valid  if  the  model  is  linear.  The  Cox  proportional  hazards  model  is 
nonlinear. 
 
A more conventional application of IV estimation is found in Criscuolo, Martin, Overman 
and Van Reenen (2007). Their paper investigates the impact of grants provided under the 
UK’s  RSA  scheme  between  1988  and  2003  on  employment,  investment  and  labour 
productivity  using  a  dataset  derived  from  the  same  datasets  as  are  used  here;  namely, 96 
 
SAMIS and the ARD. As an instrument for treatment status they use dummies representing 
the different levels of support to which plants are entitled. It is argued that these are subject 
to exogenous variation because lags in the process determining the Assisted Areas Map 
lead to the entitlement map being determined by measures of economic deprivation that are 
between three and five years out-of-date by the time the new map comes into force. The 
Assisted Areas map is also affected by changes in EU-wide average GDP per capita and 
unemployment which are heavily influenced by exogenous factors such as the accession of 
new countries to the EU. During the period under consideration there were changes to the 
Assisted Areas map in 1993 and 2000. Using this strategy they find a large and statistically 
significant  effect  of  RSA  on  employment  and  investment.  The  authors  do  not  find  a 
significant impact on labour productivity or TFP. 
 
In  the  analysis  of  business  support  programmes,  this  is  the  best  application  of  the 
instrumental variables estimator of which the author is aware. As such, a version of this 
instrumental variables strategy will be used in the empirical analysis later. The possibility 
that the instrument is not valid will therefore be discussed in chapter 7.3. Other criticisms 
may also be levelled at this paper. Firstly, the analysis is carried out at the reporting unit 
level.  As  discussed  in  chapter  5.3,  RSA  grants  are  given  to  individual  plants  so  the 
reporting unit is not the most appropriate level at which to conduct analysis. Furthermore, 
many firms that received RSA have not been linked from SAMIS to the ARD. These firms 
therefore remain erroneously in the control group. Assuming a positive impact of RSA, 
this will lead to downwards biased estimates of the impact of RSA grants. While it is not 
possible to match all firms to the ARD, it is possible to link a higher percentage than is 
achieved here. Lastly, there is no attempt made to control for correlation between the error 
term and the control variables. As will be discussed in chapter 7.3, this may also lead to 
biased estimates of the treatment effect. 
 
Control Functions 
 
In  all  the  papers  discussed  below,  the  dependent  variable  is  a  growth  rate  so  that  the 
analyses  are  cross-sectional.  This  may  reflect  the  difficulties  in  extending  the  control 
function method to the panel data case (see chapter 3.3 for a discussion of this issue). 
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Faulk (2002) analyses the impact of the Georgia Job Tax Credit on employment growth. 
Using firm level data, a switching regression model is employed to allow the impact of the 
explanatory variables to vary across treatment and untreated groups. The inverse Mills 
ratio is estimated and included in the outcome equation for treatment and untreated groups 
to control for self-selection into the treatment group. The coefficients on the inverse Mills 
ratio are found to be insignificant in both equations indicating that firms did not self-select 
into the scheme. The results show that 23.5% to 27.6% of the employment created by firms 
that participated in the programme was attributable to the employment boosting effects of 
the  Job  Tax  Credit.  Attention  is  however  drawn  to  the  issue  of  additionality  as  these 
estimates imply that 72.4% to 76.5% of the jobs that were created by the participant firms 
would have been created without the assistance of the Job Tax Credit. 
 
A very similar study is by Gabe and Kraybill (2002). Their paper examines the impact of 
five development programmes on the growth of 366 establishments in Ohio that undertook 
major expansions between 1993 and 1995. The largest share of assisted firms received 
assistance  under  the  Ohio  Job  Tax  Credit  which  is  Ohio’s  version  of  the  programme 
examined by Faulk (2002). Their focus is not only on the effect of these programmes on 
actual employment growth but also on the impact on the employment growth that firms 
announce  they  will  achieve.  The  latter  question  is  of  interest  because  firms  may 
overestimate the number of jobs they intend to create in order to secure more generous 
awards  from  the  government.  A  switching  model  is  employed  with  self-selection 
controlled  for  by  the  inclusion  of  inverse  Mills  ratios.  They  find  that  overall  these 
programmes had little effect on actual employment growth but a large and positive impact 
on the amount of jobs that firms announce they will create. 
 
An obvious problem with switching models is that although an estimate can be calculated 
of  the  impact  of  the  scheme  on  the  outcome  variable,  because  separate  equations  are 
estimated for the treatment and untreated groups, the statistical significance of this estimate 
is not automatically provided as it is when a single equation approach is used. It should 
also be noted that the justification used for switching regressions – that they allow the 
impact of the explanatory variables to vary across treatment and control groups – does not 
necessitate separate equations as this could be achieved with one equation using interaction 
variables (such interaction variables are used in Harris and Trainor, 2005). 
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Control functions are used in a single equation by Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2001) to 
investigate the impact of business support grants on turnover growth, employment growth 
and  profit  to  asset  ratios  between  1991  and  1994  in  small  businesses operating  in  the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. For the Republic of Ireland, the selection term 
was found to be not statistically significant using any of the variables mentioned above as 
dependent variables. For Northern Ireland, it was not significant when turnover growth and 
the profit to assets ratio were used. However when employment growth was the dependent 
variable,  the  selection  term  was  negative  and  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level 
suggesting that grants were being targeted at firms that, in the absence of assistance, would 
have  experienced  below  average  levels  of  employment  growth.  For  the  Republic  of 
Ireland, the coefficient on the assistance dummy is not statistically significant at the 5% 
level  using  any  of  the  dependent  variables  although  it  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant at the 10% level in the employment growth equation. Results are the same for 
Northern  Ireland  with  the  exception  that  the  assistance  variable  is  now  positive  and 
significant at the 5% level when employment growth is the dependent variable. Another 
regression  is  run  using  the  Northern  Irish  data  to  test  the  impact  of  grants  on  labour 
productivity. This yields a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the assistance 
indicator which shows that grants, while boosting employment growth, have a detrimental 
impact on labour productivity. This suggests that that the jobs created by the grants may 
not be sustainable in the long-run. 
 
Roper  and  Hart  (2005),  using  the  same  approach,  evaluate  the  impact  of  participation 
between 1996 and 1998 in the Business Links programme on the growth of employment, 
turnover and labour productivity between 1996 and 2000 in small firms in England. The 
Business Links programme consisted primarily of subsidised consultancy and specialist 
advice and is thus an example of ‘soft’ support. Probit models provide little evidence that 
Business Links was being targeted at firms that had performed well in the past.  In the 
main regression, selection terms are found to be not statistically significant when any of 
the dependent variables are used. The coefficients on the Business Links dummy are also 
never significant which suggests that the Business Links programme had no impact on the 
chosen indicators of performance. However, the authors also find that when the selection 
term  is  not  included  in  the  employment  growth  equation,  a  positive  and  statistically 
significant  effect  of  Business  Links  participation  is  obtained.  This  highlights  the 
importance of controlling for self-selection bias. 99 
 
 
Control functions are also used by Hart, Driffield, Roper and Mole (2008a) in their wide-
ranging report into the impact of RSA grants provided in Scotland between 2000 and 2004 
on  plant  performance.  Their  dataset  is  gathered  from  a  telephone  survey  of  157  RSA 
recipients and 157 non-recipients and includes a broad set of variables thought likely to 
influence performance and growth. It also includes what the authors argue to be good IVs: 
the existence of a published business plan, firm age, exporting behaviour and the degree of 
local R&D. Using the growth of employment between 2004 and 2006 as the dependent 
variable, they find that RSA grants had a positive and statistically significant impact.
25 The 
estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is negative indicating that RSA grants went 
to plants that would have experienced below average employment growth had they not 
received an RSA grant. Using sales and labour productivity growth as dependent variables, 
the treatment dummy was not significant and it is suggested that two years may have been 
an insufficient period of time to capture the entire effects of assistance on these variables. 
 
As  with  most  applications  of  the  control  function  estimator,  it  is  hard  to  argue  that  a 
complete specification of the treatment equation has been provided in these papers. As 
discussed in chapter 3.3, the requirement for a full specification of the treatment equation 
is one of the drawbacks of this approach. Furthermore, the instruments used in these papers 
may be invalid. For example, in Hart, Driffield, Roper, and Mole (2008) the following 
instruments  are  used:  the  existence  of  a  published  business  plan,  firm  age,  exporting 
behaviour and the degree of local R&D. However, an argument can be made that all of 
these instruments are not valid: the existence of a published business plan may reflect 
managerial  skills;  firm  age  may  capture  the  vintage  of  technology  (Samaniego,  2006); 
exporting may force a firm to become more efficient (Harris and Li, 2007) and the degree 
of local R&D may capture technology spillovers (Harhoff, 2000). If these variables are not 
valid  instrumental  variables,  their  usage  as  such  will  lead  to  biased  estimates  of  the 
treatment effect. Finally, the criticism that the endogeneity of other covariates is ignored 
can also be levelled at all these studies.
26 
 
                                                 
25 Results from a two-stage-least-squares model are also reported. These are the same in terms of the sign and 
statistical significance of the treatment variable. 
26 These criticisms can also be made against the papers discussed in the control functions and switching 
regressions section. 100 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This first part of this chapter reviewed what predictions are available from the theoretical 
literature  concerning  the  empirical  analyses  of  chapters  6,  7  and  8.  In  relation  to  the 
productivity decomposition, the theoretical literature appears to suggest that a scheme such 
as RSA will have a negative impact on the growth of aggregate productivity. In relation to 
chapters 7 and 8, receipt of an RSA grant is expected to have a positive impact on TFP and 
a negative impact on the probability of closure. 
 
The review of empirical papers offered ambiguous evidence concerning what results may 
be  expected  from  the  chapter  that  examines  the  impact  of  RSA  on  TFP.  Limiting  the 
discussion to studies that look specifically at the RSA scheme, Harris and Robinson (2004) 
find a positive and significant impact of RSA on TFP. Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and 
Van Reenen (2007) find no significant impact on either TFP or labour productivity and 
Hart,  Driffield,  Roper  and  Mole  (2008a)  find  no  impact  on  the  growth  of  labour 
productivity.  The  evidence  on  the  impact  of  other  business  support  programmes  on 
productivity  is  also  inconclusive  although  more  studies  find  no  statistically  significant 
effect  than  studies  that  do.  Fewer  studies  analyse  the  impact  of  business  support 
programmes on survival. Of the two discussed here, Girma, Görg and Strobl (2007b) and 
Harris  and  Trainor  (2007)  find  a  significant  reduction  in  closure  probability.  As  the 
programmes analysed in these papers are similar to the RSA scheme, this provides further 
evidence in support of an a priori expectation that RSA will be found to reduce closure 
probability. 
 
The approach taken to analyse the impact of RSA on TFP in chapter 7 differs from all the 
studies in that it not only takes account of bias arising from self-selection but also deals 
with the endogeneity the factor inputs. In the studies that examine the effectiveness of RSA 
using  the  same  dataset  as  is  used  here,  Criscuolo,  Martin,  Overman  and  Van  Reenen 
(2007) deal with the former but not the latter while Harris and Robinson (2004) tackle the 
latter but not the former. Furthermore, the dataset used here is superior to that used in both 
of these studies as more of the plants that received RSA have been identified in the ARD. 
 
The method adopted to examine the effectiveness of RSA in reducing the closure rate is 
very similar to that taken in Girma, Görg and Strobl (2007b) in that a Cox proportional 101 
 
hazard model is estimated on a matched sample. Aside from the obvious point that they 
were  looking  at  the  effectiveness  of  Irish  grants  rather  than  RSA,  there  are  other 
differences.  Most  importantly,  their  specification  of  the  probit  model  that  determines 
treatment is not consistent with the hazard model because variables are included in the 
former that are excluded in the latter and excluded in the former but included in the latter. 
The approach adopted in chapter 8 is not open to the same criticism. 102 
 
 
5. Data 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The dataset that will be used in the empirical analyses of chapters 6, 7 and 8 is created by 
merging the SAMIS into the ARD. The former is a register containing information on 
plants that received support under the following grant schemes: RSA, IFG, SMART and 
SPUR.
27 The ARD is a longitudinal database that contains a range of variables including 
factor inputs and outputs. Successfully linking the two databases is crucial as failure to 
identify  a  high  proportion  of  plants  which  received  an  RSA  grant  in  the  ARD  will 
undermine the results in the empirical analyses. The work undertaken to merge the two 
datasets builds on that of Harris (2005a) and Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen 
(2007). This resulted in over 91% of the plants that received RSA grants in Scotland being 
located in the ARD. This is a higher link than has been achieved in previous studies and 
therefore provides a firmer basis for analysis of the impact of RSA. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section will provide descriptive statistics 
from SAMIS on the distribution of grants across year, industry and region; the third section 
describes the method used and the extent to which SAMIS was linked into the ARD; the 
fourth section gives a description of the variables in the merged dataset; the fifth gives a 
comparison  of  the  characteristics  of  RSA  plants  and  non-assisted  plants  and  the  final 
section concludes. 
 
5.2. SAMIS Descriptive Statistics 
 
The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
28 maintains the SAMIS 
database which contains information on the plants and firms that receive assistance under 
various business support schemes in GB. Although the statistical analysis conducted later 
will  focus  exclusively  on  the  largest  of  these  schemes,  RSA,  this  section  will  provide 
                                                 
27 Information on firms that received support under the LINK and Benchmark schemes is also given in 
SAMIS but, as these are not grant schemes, they will not be discussed. 
28 Formerly the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) 103 
 
descriptive  statistics  on  all  the  grant  schemes  contained  in  SAMIS  for  comparative 
purposes and to place the RSA scheme in the context of the different types of grant support 
available in Scotland. 
 
Table  5.1  shows  some  basic  descriptive  statistics  on  the  number  and  value  of  grants 
awarded under different schemes. Detailed information on the RSA and SMART schemes 
is given in chapter 2.6. As discussed in that chapter, the IFG and SPUR schemes have 
recently been subsumed into the RSA and SMART schemes respectively. The former was 
an investment grant scheme which provided grants to smaller projects than those assisted 
by RSA. The SPUR scheme was an innovation grant scheme that supported R&D projects. 
Further details on the IFG and SPUR schemes are given by Harris (2005a). 
 
Table 5.1: Number and value of grants awarded by scheme in Scotland, 1972-2003 
   Number of Grants  Mean Number of 
Grants Per Year 
Mean Grant Value 
(2003 prices) 
RSA  2,023  65  747,467 
IFG   146  37  58,209 
SMART  151  10  56,395 
SPUR  55  4  191,265 
Source: SAMIS 
 
The first column shows that 2,023 grants have been awarded under the RSA scheme in 
Scotland  since  its  initiation  in  1972.  The  corresponding  figures  for  IFG,  SMART  and 
SPUR are far smaller but these numbers are, in large part, a reflection of the different 
lengths of time for which the schemes have operated. To avoid this spurious comparison, 
the next column shows the average number of grants awarded each year during the period 
in which the schemes were in operation. This shows that, at 65 grants per year, many more 
RSA grants were awarded on average per year than any other type of grant. 37 IFG grants 
were provided on average each year while, for the innovation grants, the average number 
of SMART and SPUR grants was only 10 and 4 respectively. The final column gives the 
average  value  of  grants  awarded  under  each  scheme.  The  RSA  scheme  is  far  more 
generous than the other schemes with an average award of almost £750,000. The average 
award made under the IFG scheme was under 8% of the value of the average award made 
under the RSA scheme which is the result of IFG grants being only awarded to smaller 
projects. The average award made under the SMART scheme was of a similar magnitude 
to  that  provided  to  IFG  grant  recipients  while  the  average  SPUR  grant  was  almost 
£200,000. The difference between the average award made under the SMART and SPUR 104 
 
scheme is a consequence of the SPUR scheme having provided support for large R&D 
projects while the SMART scheme, prior to subsuming the SPUR scheme, gave support 
for less costly feasibility studies. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the number of grants received each year under each scheme in Scotland. 
The numbers for recent years should be treated with caution as, due to delays in updating 
SAMIS, the database may not include all of the more recent awards. Figure 5.2 gives the 
total  value  of  grants  provided  each  year  under  each  scheme.105 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Number of grants received in Scotland by year, 1972-2003 
Source: SAMIS 
 
Figure 5.2: Value of grants received in Scotland by year, 1972-2003 (2003 prices) 
Source: SAMIS 106 
 
 
As is clear from figure 5.1, RSA is the scheme that has been in operation for the longest 
period  of  time,  having  begun  throughout  GB  in  1972,  although  the  first  grants  were 
awarded in Scotland in 1973. The number of awards made under the RSA scheme has 
fluctuated considerably over time but an upward trend is discernible until 1999. Dramatic 
falls were witnessed in 2000 and 2001 due to the introduction of the IFG scheme which 
provided investment grants to smaller projects that had previously been given under the 
RSA scheme. Turning to the innovation grants schemes, the first SMART grants were 
provided in 1988 in Scotland and the number of awards has displayed no obvious trend. 
The largest number of SMART grants awarded was 17 in 1995. The first award in Scotland 
under the SPUR scheme was made in 1991. Compared to other schemes, relatively few of 
these grants have been provided with a peak in 1997 of 11 awards. 
 
The  most  obvious  lesson  from  figure  5.2  is  that  the  value  of  RSA  grants  has  always 
dwarfed that of grants provided under different schemes. This is a reflection of both the 
larger number of RSA grants as well as their larger value. The value of RSA awards has 
fluctuated  even  more  than  their  number  but  has  displayed  no  discernible  upward  or 
downward trend. In 1975, 1990, 1993 and 1994 over £80 million of RSA support was 
awarded but in 1973, 1976, 1982, 1986, 1991, 2001 and 2003, less than £25 million was 
awarded under the scheme. As the number of RSA grants tended to rise until 2000, this 
implies that RSA grant levels have fallen over time. 
 
Because of the relatively high value of the grants awarded under the RSA scheme, figure 
5.2 is not particularly helpful in showing the value of grants awarded under other schemes. 
To better illustrate this, figure A5.1 in appendix A5 shows the value of grants awarded by 
year under the IFG, SMART and SPUR schemes only. This shows that the IFG scheme 
never awarded more than £6 million in spite of providing a larger number of grants than 
RSA in 2001 and 2002. As discussed earlier, this is a consequence of the smaller projects 
that it assisted. In terms of the innovation grant schemes, the value of SMART awards 
peaked at £1 million in 1995 and has since declined. The largest amount awarded under the 
SPUR scheme was £2.8 million in 2001. As discussed earlier, because SPUR awards were 
provided  to  assist  more  costly  projects  than  SMART  awards,  this  is  consistent  with 
expectations. 
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Figure  5.3  shows  the  number  of  grants  awarded  under  each  scheme  for  each  2-digit 
standard  industrial  classification  (SIC)  80  code.  In  order  to  avoid  making  misleading 
comparisons  due  to  differences  in  the  length  of  time  for  which  schemes  have  been 
operating, the total number of grants for each industry is divided by the number of years 
that each scheme has been in operation so that the figures represent the average number of 
grants received under each scheme for each year that the scheme operated. The industries 
represented by each code are listed in Appendix A2. Figure 5.4 shows the value of grants 
received by 2-digit SIC 80 industry on the same basis as the number of grants is shown in 
figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5.3: Average number of grants received per year in Scotland by 2-digit industry, 
1972-2003 
Source: SAMIS 
 
Figure 5.4: Average value of grants received per year in Scotland by 2-digit industry (2003 
prices), 1972-2003 
Source: SAMIS 109 
 
The following industries received an average of over three RSA grants per year between 
1973 and 2003: the manufacture of metal goods (SIC 31), mechanical engineering (SIC 
32), electrical and electronic engineering (SIC 34), food, drink and tobacco manufacturing 
industries (SIC 41), textile industry (SIC 43), footwear and clothing industries (SIC 45) 
and manufacture of paper & paper products; printing & publishing (SIC 47). That these are 
all  manufacturing  industries  is  a  consequence  of  RSA  being  initially  only  available  to 
manufacturing plants (Harris and Robinson, 2001a). The following industries received an 
average of at least three IFG grants per year during the years of that scheme’s operation: 
the manufacture of metal goods (SIC 31), mechanical engineering (SIC 32), electrical and 
electronic engineering (SIC 34) and the business services (SIC 83) industries. That these 
industries, with the exception of business services, also receive a large share of RSA grants 
is unsurprising given that the latter is a spin-off from the RSA scheme. 
 
Turning to the innovation grant schemes, the following industries have received an average 
of  over  0.7  SMART  grants  per  year:  mechanical  engineering  (SIC  32),  electrical  and 
electronic engineering (SIC 34), instrument engineering (SIC 37), business services (SIC 
83) and R&D (SIC 94). The SPUR scheme has provided an average of over 0.65 grants to 
the electrical and electronic engineering (SIC 34), instrument engineering (SIC 37) and 
business services (SIC 83) industries. As SMART and SPUR are similar in that they both 
represent attempts to boost innovative activities, that industries receiving a high share of 
SMART  grants  generally  also  receive  a  large  share  of  SPUR  is  consistent  with 
expectations. 
 
The instrument engineering (SIC 37), business services (SIC 83) and the R&D (SIC 94) 
industries all receive a large share of either or both SMART and SPUR grants and smaller 
shares of RSA grants. On the other hand, the food, drink and tobacco manufacturing (SIC 
41), textile industry (SIC 43), footwear and clothing industries (SIC 45) and manufacture 
of paper and paper products; printing & publishing (SIC 47) industries receive large shares 
of RSA grants but smaller shares of SMART and SPUR grants. This is a result of the 
differing nature of these schemes: RSA, as a capital grant scheme, has tended to go to 
capital  intensive  industries  whereas  SMART  and  SPUR  has  tended  to  go  to  more 
innovative industries. 
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Turning to figure 5.4, the industries which received the largest value of RSA grants are the 
mechanical  engineering  (SIC  32),  manufacture  of  office  machinery  &  data  processing 
equipment (SIC 33) and electrical and electronic engineering (SIC 34) and the manufacture 
of other transport equipment (SIC 37) industries. The latter received by far the largest 
amount of RSA grants at almost £12 million a year. The industries that received an average 
of over £160,000 of IFG grants are also those that received the largest number of IFG 
grants. Electrical and electronic engineering (SIC 34), instrument engineering (SIC 37) and 
business services (SIC 83) are the industries that receive the largest amount of SMART 
grants  while  manufacture  of  office  machinery  &  data  processing  equipment  (SIC  33), 
electrical  and  electronic  engineering  (SIC  34),  instrument  engineering  (SIC  37)  and 
business services (SIC 83) received the largest amounts of SPUR grants. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the average number of grants received per year during the years in which 
the scheme operated by region for the RSA and the IFG schemes. Figure 5.6 gives the 
average  value  of  grants  awarded  each  year  on  the  same  basis  by  region  for  the  same 
schemes. Information on the location of the recipients of SMART and SPUR grants is not 
given because it is not readily available in SAMIS. 111 
 
Figure 5.5: Average number of RSA and IFG grants received per year by region, 1972-
2003 
Source: SAMIS 
 
Figure 5.6: Average value of RSA and IFG grants received per year by region (2003 
prices), 1972-2003 
Source: SAMIS 112 
 
 
As  Scotland’s  population  represents  8.69%  of  the  total  population  of  GB  (Office  for 
National Statistics, 2009a), Scotland, by receiving 10.85% and 9.81% of RSA grants and 
IFG grants, is receiving a disproportionately large share of RSA and IFG grants. This is 
explained by the relatively large proportion of Scotland that has assisted areas status. More 
remarkable is the fact that plants located in Scotland received a higher value of RSA grants 
than plants in any other region. This amounts to 22.58% of the total value of RSA awarded 
and points to the fact that the average value of an RSA grant in the rest of GB was only 
£311,772 – less than half the average amount of RSA grant awarded in Scotland. This is a 
consequence of the assisted areas of Scotland generally being in higher tiers than those of 
other  regions  which  allows  higher  proportions  of  project  costs  to  be  covered  by  RSA 
grants. In terms of IFG grants, Scotland received 15.39% of the total value of grants which 
is a result of the average value of IFG grants in the rest of GB being only 60% of the value 
of IFG grants awarded in Scotland.
29 
 
In  summary,  this  section  has  shown  that  RSA  has,  in  most  years,  offered  the  largest 
number of grants per year and that the total value of these grants has always been far larger 
than the total value of grants provided under other schemes. Ignoring the years after 2000 
when the IFG scheme was introduced, the number of RSA grants provided has risen since 
its introduction in 1972 although this has not been matched by an increase in the total 
amount awarded, implying that the value of RSA grants has fallen slightly. The largest 
number of RSA grants has gone to engineering and manufacturing plants. Finally, Scotland 
has received a disproportionately large number of RSA grants due to its having a larger 
proportion of its territory designated as assisted areas. The value of RSA grants provided in 
Scotland is, on average, more than twice as large as the average value of an RSA grant 
provided in the rest of GB which is a consequence of Scottish assisted areas generally 
being in higher tiers than those of other regions. 
 
5.3. Data Linking 
 
In order to estimate the impact of RSA on plant performance it is, of course, necessary to 
be able to identify which plants received such support in the dataset to be used for the 
                                                 
29 Note that the equivalent of the IFG scheme in England and Wales was the Enterprise Grants scheme. 113 
 
analysis. This section will describe how, for this purpose, the SAMIS database was linked 
to the ARD. The process also involved a third database: the inter-departmental business 
register  (IDBR).  Although  the  empirical  analyses  will  examine  the  impact  of  RSA  on 
Scottish plants, use will also be made of non-assisted plants in the rest of GB. Therefore, to 
avoid incorrectly classifying RSA recipients outside Scotland as plants that did not receive 
a grant, the linking process must be undertaken for RSA recipients throughout GB. The 
first part of this section provides a description of each of the three databases; the next 
section describes the method employed to link SAMIS to the ARD and the final section 
gives statistics showing the extent of the link achieved across time and industry. 
 
Databases 
 
SAMIS, from which statistics were provided in the previous section, has data on over 
50,000 firms in GB that applied for an RSA grant between 1972 and 2003. This includes 
the postcode, SIC code, employment level of the applicant firm and the date in which the 
application was made. For successful applications, the date when the payment was made 
and the value of the grant are also recorded. 
 
The IDBR provides the name, address, ownership structure, industrial classification and 
employment level of all plants in the UK (the description of the IDBR and the ARD is 
based on that provided by Oulton, 1997; Robjohns, 2006). Plants are organised into local 
units, reporting units and enterprise groups. Local units are plants or offices at a single 
geographical location. A reporting unit, or establishment, is the smallest unit which can 
provide the full range of data required for the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI), which is 
discussed  in  the  next  paragraph.  When  a  local  unit  can  provide  the  full  range  of 
information necessary for the ABI, it will report to the ABI. When it reports on behalf of 
itself only, it is a ‘single’ as the reporting unit consists of only one local unit. However, not 
all local units are able to provide the required information for the ABI and, for these plants, 
another local unit will report on their behalf. In this case, the local unit that reports is a 
‘parent’ while those local units on whose behalf it reports are its ‘children’. The reporting 
unit  then  consists  of  both  the  parent  and  children  local  units.  Enterprises  consist  of 
reporting units that share a common owner. Figure 5.7 shows a hypothetical enterprise 
consisting of two reporting units, one of which is a parent with one child while the other is 
a single. 114 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Structure of Hypothetical Enterprise 
 
Local units, reporting units and enterprises are all identified by unique reference numbers 
in the IDBR which allow them to be tracked through time. As the ARD also contains these 
reference numbers, an RSA recipient that has been found in the IDBR is also found in the 
ARD. 
 
The  ARD  is  a  longitudinal  dataset  dating  from  1970  (see  Griffith,  1999  for  more 
information on the ARD).
30 It is created by combining information from the IDBR, termed 
‘indicative data’, with more detailed information collected at the reporting unit level by the 
ABI, referred to as ‘returned data’. The more detailed information collected in the ABI 
includes data on investment, intermediate inputs and gross output. In each year there is a 
‘selected’ and a ‘non-selected’ file. The ‘selected’ file contains a combination of indicative 
and returned data on reporting units – the level at which the ABI is collected - which were 
selected for surveying in the ABI. The ‘non-selected’ file contains indicative data from the 
IDBR and covers establishments that were not selected for sampling in the ABI, the local 
associated with such reporting units and the local units associated with reporting units 
selected for inclusion in the ABI. 
 
Reporting units are selected for surveying in the ABI based on employment data contained 
in the IDBR with the sampling frame skewed towards larger reporting units. At present, 
25% of reporting units with fewer than 10 employees are surveyed in the ABI; 50% of 
reporting units with between 10 and 99 employees are surveyed; the proportion surveyed 
of reporting units with between 100 and 249 employees varies by industry from 100% to 
less than 50% while 100% of reporting units with 250 or more employees are surveyed 
(Robjohns, 2006).  
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As  the  more  detailed  ‘returned’  data  in  the  ARD  is  generally  required  econometric 
analyses, many studies (see, for example, Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen, 
2007) have used the reporting unit as their unit of analysis. However, when analysing the 
impact  of  RSA  grants,  this  is  not  appropriate  as  RSA  is  awarded  to  support  capital 
investment  in  specific  plants  rather  than  throughout  the  enterprise.  Furthermore,  the 
reporting unit is an accounting rather than an economic unit. As such, the number of plants 
covered by a reporting unit may change as enterprises open and close plants, buy and sell 
plants or simply because of changes in the way that an enterprise chooses to report to the 
ABI (Harris, 2005b). The consequences of using the reporting unit rather than the local 
unit to calculate measures of the capital stock are investigated by Harris (2005c). To permit 
econometric analysis at the more appropriate local unit level, it is therefore necessary to 
‘spread back’ to the local unit those variables that are only collected in the ABI at the 
reporting unit. These include important variables such as gross output, intermediate inputs 
and investment. This is done using the plant level employment data collected in the IDBR 
using the assumption of constant labour-investment ratios and labour productivity levels 
within  reporting  units.  This  should  be  born  in  mind  when  interpreting  the  results  as 
standard errors will be artificially reduced by this method. 
 
Linking Process 
 
The dataset used in the analysis here is built upon the dataset used in Harris (2005a). The 
following will describe the steps taken by Harris to construct his dataset. His starting point 
was a version of SAMIS provided by BERR containing 33,328 RSA applicants (successful 
and  unsuccessful)  which  had  been  linked  at  either  the  local  unit,  reporting  unit  or 
enterprise level to the IDBR. This represented 61% of all RSA applicants listed in SAMIS. 
Using IDBR reference numbers common to both SAMIS and the ARD, he was able to link 
14,649 RSA applicants at the local unit level.
31 Some could not be linked because the ARD 
only covers the manufacturing sector before 1997 and, at the time, was only available until 
2001. Due to the limited length of time for which plants outside manufacturing had been 
observed, these were removed from his dataset. The use of Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
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reference  numbers
32  that  go  back  to  1970  gave  a  sufficiently  long  time  series  for 
manufacturing plants. The removal of plants outside manufacturing reduced the number of 
RSA applicants linked to the ARD at the local unit level to 11,194. 
 
Further work has been done in linking between SAMIS and the ARD by Criscuolo, Martin, 
Overman  and  Van  Reenen  (2007).  In  total,  they  were  able  to  link  68%  of  the  RSA 
applicants in SAMIS to the ARD. Of the additional links, some were made at the local unit 
level and these have been added to those made by Harris. Other links were made at the 
reporting unit and enterprise level. The main unit of observation in their paper was the 
reporting  unit  rather  than  the  plant  so  they  did  not  attempt  to  use  these  links  to  find 
additional links at the plant level. This was done here by listing the plants that fall under 
the  linked  reporting  units  or  enterprises  in  the  ARD  and  choosing  the  plant  that  best 
matches the description of the plant in SAMIS on the basis of postcode, SIC code, plant 
employment and year in which the application was made. Often there is no choice to be 
made as reporting units and enterprise groups frequently encompass only one plant. 
 
The final stage in the linking process was the most laborious. It involved manually trying 
to locate all the other plants in SAMIS that had not yet been linked to the ARD. At this 
point,  plants  in  SAMIS  outside  manufacturing  and  those  whose  applications  were 
unsuccessful were removed from the list of plants that had to be linked. The former were 
excluded as the empirical analyses will be conducted using a sample consisting exclusively 
of manufacturing plants. The latter were excluded because all plants in the ARD not linked 
to an RSA recipient in SAMIS are assumed to be untreated and will therefore have the 
correct treatment status regardless of whether they are identified in the ARD. The approach 
taken was twofold. Firstly, a search was conducted in the ARD by postcode for the RSA 
receiving plant. If on the basis of SIC code, plant employment and the year in which the 
application was made it was judged that one of the plants displayed was the RSA recipient 
in SAMIS, the link was made. If this approach failed to provide a link, a second attempt 
was made. This involved searching by SIC code, plant employment and year in which the 
                                                 
32 IDBR and CSO reference numbers are both local unit reference numbers. IDBR reference numbers were 
introduced in 1994 to replace CSO reference numbers. However, work carried out by Harris extended the 
CSO reference number series past 1993 so that a plant existing in both 1993 and 1994 (or any year after 
1993) is identifiable as the same plant. This allows the researcher to use every year of data contained in the 
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application was made. If this search gave a plant likely to be the RSA recipient in SAMIS, 
a link was made. 
 
This  latter  stage  in  particular  depends  upon  the  judgement  of  the  researcher  and  it  is 
unavoidable that in some cases an incorrect link will have been made. It is important to 
consider the implications both of failure to link at all from SAMIS to the ARD and of 
making an incorrect link. When a plant is not linked from SAMIS to the ARD this means 
that a plant that belongs in the treatment group remains in the untreated group. Assuming a 
positive impact of treatment on a given outcome variables, this will lead to downwards 
biased estimates of treatment. If the wrong plant is linked, this not only leaves a plant that 
should be in the treatment group in the untreated group but also allocates a plant that 
belongs in the untreated group to the treatment group. This will generate estimates that are 
more biased than if the plant was not linked at all. As a result, considerable caution was 
taken to try to minimise the number of erroneous links. 
 
Comparison of linked and non-linked plants 
 
In  the  end,  this  process  achieved  a  link  from  SAMIS  to  the  ARD  of  91.43%  of 
manufacturing plants that received RSA in Scotland and 92.44% of manufacturing plants 
that received RSA in GB. This is higher than the level achieved in previous studies of the 
impact of receipt of an RSA grant (Harris and Robinson, 2004; Harris, 2005a; Criscuolo, 
Martin,  Overman  and  Van  Reenen,  2007)  and  therefore  provides  a  firmer  basis  for 
empirical analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to probe whether the linking process may 
create any bias in the empirical results of later chapters. This would be the case if, for 
instance,  the  percentage  of  plants  linked  to  the  ARD  rose  over  time  and  RSA  grants 
became more successful in improving plant performance over time. The empirical results 
may then indicate that RSA had a large and positive impact on plant performance but these 
results would not be representative of the entire period. 
 
To probe whether the linking process may have created any bias in the empirical results, a 
number of t-tests were performed. The mean of employment for the linked plants across all 
years is 206.66 while the corresponding figure for unlinked plants is 111.48. A t-test shows 
that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 99% level and therefore that 
the  process  has  been  more  successful  in  linking  larger  plants.  This  is  consistent  with 118 
 
expectations as it was more difficult to find small plants that received assistance in the 
ARD when manually looking for a link. This is because the size distribution of plants in 
the economy, and hence the ARD, is skewed towards smaller plants and it is therefore 
difficult to identify the small plants that received grants as there can be many candidate 
plants in the ARD with the correct employment level, SIC code and year in which the 
application  was  made.  This  will  create  a  bias  in  the  estimation  results  if  larger  plants 
respond differently to receipt of an RSA grant than smaller plants. 
 
Further t-tests were performed using the value  of RSA grants and the  number of jobs 
created or safeguarded within the recipient plant. The mean value of RSA grants across all 
years was £306,750 (2000 prices) for linked plants and £282,843 for plants that have not 
been linked. A t-test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between 
these figures. On average, RSA created or safeguarded 100 jobs in the linked recipient 
plants  and  81  in  those  that  were  not  linked.  This  difference  was  also  not  statistically 
significant at the 90% level. 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the extent of the link for plants located in Scotland achieved by year 
using  several  of  the  variables  included  within  SAMIS:  the  first  column  shows  the 
percentage  of  the  number  of  RSA  recipients  linked  to  the  ARD;  the  second  gives  the 
percentage of the value of grants awarded linked; the third shows the percentage of the 
jobs created or safeguarded in RSA recipients linked and the fourth shows the percentage 
linked of the employment of RSA recipients. Figure 5.8 gives the same information by 2-
digit industry. 119 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Percentage of SAMIS variables linked to the ARD by year in Scotland, 1972-
2003 
Source: SAMIS 
 
Figure 5.9: Percentage of SAMIS variables linked to the ARD by 2-digit industry in 
Scotland, 1972-2003 
Source: SAMIS 
No figures are provided for SIC26 (production of man-made fibres) to avoid disclosure. 120 
 
 
There are only two years which give cause for concern: 1975 and 1998. For these years, 
over 80% of the RSA recipients in SAMIS have been linked to the ARD. However, the 
proportion of the employment of RSA assisted plants in 1975 linked to the ARD is only 
57% which indicates that the linked plants are smaller than those that have not been linked. 
In 1998, only 66% of the value of RSA grants provided have been linked which shows that 
plants that have not been linked in 1998 tended to receive larger grants than those that have 
been linked. With the exceptions of these years, the percentage linked of all the variables 
considered never falls below 80%. For the link achieved in 1975 or 1998 to create a greater 
bias in the empirical estimation than the link achieved in other years would require large 
plants that received a grant in 1975 or plants that received large grants in 1998 to respond 
differently to receipt of an RSA grant than other plants. As there is no obvious reason why 
this should be true, it is reasonable to conclude that differences in the percentage of plants 
linked  across  time  are  unlikely  to  create  any  bias  in  the  empirical  estimation  of  later 
chapters. 
 
The percentage of RSA plants linked to the ARD is above 80% for all of the industries 
considered. For manufacture of leather and leather goods (SIC 44), the percentage of the 
value of RSA grants linked and the percentage of the jobs created and safeguarded linked 
is 47% and 49% respectively. As these figures are based on a sample size of only 13 grants 
and the plants in the industry are not used on their own for estimation in the empirical 
analyses, the poor quality of the link is unlikely to generate a large bias. With the exception 
of this industry, the percentage of the amount of RSA grants, jobs created and safeguarded 
by RSA and recipient plants’ employment is above 80% for all the industries considered. 
This suggests that difference in the percentage of plants linked across industry will not bias 
the results of the empirical estimation.  
 
In summary, the linking process undertaken here has managed to find a higher proportion 
of grant recipients in the ARD than any previous study. This allows greater confidence in 
the results as fewer plants mistakenly omitted from the treatment group will lead to less 
bias in estimates of the impact of assistance. Those plants that have not been linked tend to 
be smaller and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. The relatively 
constant extent of the link across time and industry in relation to number of grants, value of 
grants linked, jobs created or safeguarded and plant employment permits confidence that 121 
 
the results obtained will be representative of the impact of RSA across the entire period 
during which the scheme has been in operation. 
 
5.4. Variables 
 
In this section, a description of the variables that will be used in the empirical analyses is 
given. Explanations of the usefulness of these variables are given in the empirical chapters 
where they are used. The first variables described are intrinsic to the plant while the latter 
variables refer to the environment in which the plant is operating. 
 
Gross Output 
 
Gross output is the total value of sales made by the plant. It is available from the ABI at 
reporting unit level so was spread back using plant-level employment data from the IDBR 
to give estimates of gross output at the plant level. 
 
GVA 
 
GVA measures the value added by the plant to its intermediate inputs. It is calculated by 
subtracting intermediate inputs from gross output. 
 
Employment 
 
The employment variable measures the number of people employed at the plant and is 
taken at the plant level from the IDBR. In chapter 7, where the impact of receipt of an RSA 
grant on TFP is estimated, it was decided not to make an adjustment to employment to 
better  reflect  productive  services  from  labour  as  the  cost  of  retaining  an  unproductive 
worker  encourages  the  plant  to  retain  only  those  productive  employees.  The  same 
argument cannot be made in relation to the capital stock variable and this explains the 
apparent asymmetry in the treatment of these variables (see below). 
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Intermediate Inputs 
 
Intermediate inputs are materials and services consumed in the production process. This 
variable is available from the ABI at reporting unit level so was spread back using plant-
level employment data to give estimates of intermediate input consumption at the plant 
level. 
 
Capital 
 
Investment data is available from the ABI at the reporting unit level. To give estimates of 
investment  at  the  plant-level,  it  was  spread  back  to  the  plant-level  using  plant-level 
employment data. 
 
The major problem associated with transforming an investment series into a capital stock 
series is finding an appropriate rate of deterioration which reflects the loss of efficiency 
through time due to decay caused by use in production and obsolescence as a result to 
ageing. Following Harris and Drinkwater (2000), a net capital stock measure is calculated 
assuming  straight-line  deterioration.  The  ‘bought’  (as  opposed  to  hired)  capital  stock 
variable is then calculated by summing a gross capital stock measure and the net capital 
stock measure using a weight of three to one as follows: 
  ,
4
1
4
3
it it it NK GK BK 




 + 




 =   (5.1) 
where BKit is the bought capital stock in plant i at time t, GKit is gross capital and NKit is 
net capital. The attraction of this approach is that the pattern of deterioration is slow at first 
and then accelerates, reflecting the idea that firms will invest more in maintenance and 
repair to maintain the initial level of service from a piece of capital when it is relatively 
new. Denison (1972) provides a fuller discussion of the merits of this deterioration pattern. 
 
Assuming  that  this  method  provides  an  accurate  representation  of  deterioration,  this 
measure will provide a good measure of the productive services available from bought 
capital.  However,  a  plant  may  choose  not  to  fully  utilize  the  capital  that  it  has  at  its 
disposal because of, for instance, a lack of demand for its outputs. For the TFP analysis 
that  will  be  conducted  in  chapters  6  and  7,  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  measure  of  the 
productive services from bought capital that were actually used rather than a measure of 123 
 
the  productive  services  from  capital  that  could  have  been  used.  Therefore,  a  further 
adjustment is required. 
 
The  first  step  in  this  adjustment  required  calculating  for  each  plant  and  time  period  a 
measure of bought capital usage, Yit/BKit, where Yit is gross output. The highest level of this 
measure, Yit*/BKit*, is then identified, which is, for now, assumed to be the maximum that 
the plant can produce from one unit of bought capital. If a plant has a lower level of 
Yit/BKit, it is regarded as not fully utilising its bought capital stock. The measure of bought 
capital utilisation is therefore: 
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One problem with this process is that the average level of bought capital utilisation across 
the entire sample calculated using (2) is rather low at around 60%. Ornaghi (2006), using 
data on Spanish manufacturing firms, finds 80% to be the average capital utilisation figure. 
To replicate this average within the sample, KUit is scaled. This creates a bought capital 
utilisation figure which exceeds one for certain plants which requires a value of one to be 
redefined to be merely a high level of bought capital utilisation rather than the maximum 
level. 
 
The adjusted estimate of the productive services from bought capital is then: 
  , it it it BK KU ABK ´ =   (5.3) 
where ABKit is the adjusted capital stock. There is also data on the hire of capital in the 
ABI at the reporting unit level. Once again, this can be spread back using employment 
shares. Under the assumption that hired capital is always fully utilised this can be simply 
added to the adjusted measure of bought capital to yield total capital as follows: 
  , it it it H ABK K + =   (5.4) 
where Kit represents the total capacity utilisation adjusted capital stock and Hit is the hire of 
capital. 
 
Capital-to-Labour Ratio 
 
The capital-to-labour ratio is calculated by dividing the unadjusted capital stock by the 
number of employees at the plant. 
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Labour Productivity 
 
Labour productivity is a measure of plant productivity calculated by dividing gross output 
by employment. 
 
Real Wage 
 
A total labour costs variable is available in the ARD at the reporting unit level. To obtain a 
measure  of  the  real  wage,  this  variable  is  spread  back  to  the  plant  using  plant-level 
employment data. It is then divided by the number of employees and deflated by an output 
price index to obtain the real wage. 
 
Age 
 
The IDBR contains codes that allow the identification of a plant through time. As a result, 
for plants that began operation during or after 1970, it is straightforward to identify the 
year in which a plant first operated and calculate an age variable. However, because the 
IDBR was first collected in 1970, it is not possible to identify when a plant that began 
operation before 1970 started to produce. The age variable is therefore truncated. 
 
FDI 
 
The FDI variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if a plant is owned by a foreign 
firm. Information on the nationality of the plant’s owner is available from the IDBR. 
 
Single 
 
The single variable takes the value of one if a plant does not belong to a wider enterprise 
group.  This  variable  is  created  by  identifying  whether  the  plant  possesses  a  unique 
enterprise group code. If this is the case, the plant is defined as a single plant. 
 125 
 
Industry Dummies 
 
Industry dummies take the value of one when the plant belongs to a particular industry. 
These dummies are derived from the SIC 80 codes contained in the IDBR. 
 
Region Dummies 
 
The regional dummies equal one when a plant is located within a particular region. These 
dummies are calculated from the government office region variable contained within the 
IDBR. 
 
RSA dummy 
 
The  variable  shows  whether  the  plant  has  received  an  RSA  grant.  The  standard 
specification of the dummy is one which takes the value of one in the period in which an 
RSA grant was received and from that period onwards. The way in which plants were 
identified as having received a grant was described at length in section 2. 
 
Local Authority Industry Share 
 
To capture specialisation or localisation externalities, the share of industry output within 
the local authority of the plant is calculated. This variable is calculated using gross output 
data from the ABI, SIC codes from the IDBR and local authority codes derived from the 
IDBR. 
 
Diversity 
 
To measure externalities that arise from being situated near a diverse range of plants, the 
number of SIC codes within a local authority is calculated. 
 
Industry Growth Rate 
 
The industry growth rate is the growth of aggregate gross output in the industry in which 
the plant is operating. The aggregate industry gross output data is calculated by weighting 126 
 
plant output, to avoid inaccurate estimates due to the sampling frame of the ARD, and then 
aggregating weighted plant gross output across industry. 
 
Displacement 
 
The displacement variable is the proportion of total industry gross output produced by 
plants  in  their  first  year  of  operation.  The  data  used  to  calculate  this  variable  is  also 
weighted in order to avoid inaccuracy due to the sampling frame of the ARD. 
 
Herfindahl Index 
 
The Herfindahl Index is a measure of concentration within an industry (Herfindahl, 1950). 
It is calculated by summing the squared share of industry output of each establishment 
within an industry. Under the assumption that the elasticity of demand does not vary too 
greatly across industry, the Herfindahl Index can be used as a measure of market power 
(see, for example, Cabral, 2000). It can therefore also serve as a measure of the level of 
competition in an industry with larger values indicating greater market power and less 
competition within the industry. The share of industry output is calculated from the gross 
output  data  discussed  above  while  the  establishment’s  industry  is  identified  from  SIC 
codes in the IDBR. 
 
Time 
 
The time trend is calculated from the year variable in the ARD. 
 
Weights 
 
Because the probability of being surveyed in the ABI is determined by the size of the 
reporting unit to which the plant belongs, the sample of plants is not representative of the 
population of plants. To avoid obtaining results that are not representative of all plants, the 
data must be  weighted. The weights are the inverse of the probability of being in the 
sample, given the size of the plant. This can be calculated because the IDBR contains the 
population of plants in GB and their employment level. 
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5.5. Comparison of Treated and Untreated Plants 
 
This section will describe the differences in characteristics between RSA recipients and 
non-assisted plants. Descriptive statistics will be presented first and then results from a 
probit model will be given. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.2 presents means and standard deviations of the key variables for Scottish plants. 
Counts vary slightly due to the unavailability of certain variables for some observations. 
Plants classified as RSA-assisted are plants that have received an RSA grant in that period 
or  at  some  period  in  the  past.  The  data  is  weighted  so  as  to  be  representative  of  the 
population of plants. 128 
 
Table 5.2: Mean and standard deviation of variables by RSA status 
  Non-Assisted Plants  RSA-Assisted Plants 
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Count  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Count 
Difference in 
Means 
Gross output  5591.10  31262.48  47,590  20155.82  72293.57  5,105  -14564.72*** 
GVA  2186.22  13932.03  47,590  4781.97  27560.56  5,105  -2595.75*** 
Employment  55.50  128.62  47,716  175.54  226.56  5,107  -120.04*** 
Intermediate Inputs  3404.89  22191.55  47,590  15373.85  70286.22  5,105  -11968.96*** 
Unadjusted Capital Stock (1980 prices)  1101.49  7728.11  47,026  4909.69  14575.13  5,086  -3808.20*** 
Adjusted Capital Stock (1980 prices)  873.70  6833.99  44,580  3570.86  11811.29  4,995  -2697.16*** 
Labour Productivity  189.65  20723.07  47,447  70.36  102.77  5,105  119.29 
Capital Per Worker (1980 prices)  0.02  0.24  47,233  0.02  0.25  5,090  -0.00 
Real Wage  18.59  355.46  47,444  14.66  13.09  5,106  3.93 
Age  13.61  10.66  47,507  16.98  9.13  5,107  -3.37*** 
Foreign Direct Investment (Dummy)  0.13  0.36  47,716  0.21  0.35  5,107  -0.08*** 
Single (Dummy)  0.23  0.44  47,716  0.32  0.44  5,107  -0.09*** 
Local Authority Industry Share  0.60  0.86  47,715  0.61  0.86  5,107  -0.01 
Diversity  15.91  13.16  47,645  11.91  9.22  5,102  4.00*** 
Industry Employment Growth   0.04  0.76  45,118  -0.01  0.33  4,932  0.05*** 
Displacement  0.12  0.41  47,650  0.07  0.11  5,102  0.05*** 
Herfindahl Index  0.10  0.11  47,716  0.07  0.07  5,107  0.03*** 
* denotes statistical significance at the 90% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 95% level, *** denotes statistical significance at the 99% level 
Unless stated otherwise, financial variables are measured in £1,000 and 2000 prices 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 129 
 
Firstly, RSA-assisted plants are far larger on average than non-assisted plants: they tend to 
produce almost four times as much output, have over twice as much GVA and have over 
three  times  as  many  employees.  Unsurprisingly,  they  also  use  a  lot  more  intermediate 
inputs (over four times as many) and have far larger capital stocks (also four times as 
large). These differences are all statistically significant at the 99% level. Given that the 
main objective of RSA is to promote and safeguard employment, it is not surprising that 
RSA recipients tend to be relatively large. 
 
RSA-assisted plants are less productive on average with labour productivity levels only 
37% as large as non-assisted plants although this difference is not statistically significant 
due to the large variance of labour productivity among non-assisted plants. Non-assisted 
plants  also  give  higher  real  wages  on  average  than  RSA-assisted  plants  although  the 
difference  is  far  smaller  than  the  difference  in  labour  productivity  and  not  statistically 
significant at the 90% level. These statistics jointly imply that the unit labour costs of RSA 
recipients are higher than those of plants that do not receive assistance and are suggestive 
of why they may need assistance to safeguard employment. 
 
There  is  no  statistically  significant  difference  in  the  mean  of  the  capital  per  worker 
variable.  This  may  be  a  consequence  of  RSA  being  a  scheme  that  aims  to  boost 
employment through supporting investment rather than a scheme that attempts to increase 
one or the other. 
 
As would be expected given that one of the uses of RSA is to attract FDI, a significantly 
larger proportion of RSA plants are owned by foreigners. RSA-assisted plants are also less 
likely to be part of a larger enterprise than non-assisted plants. As would be expected given 
their greater size, RSA recipients are also older by a statistically significant amount. 
 
Turning to variables that relate to the environment in which the plant operates, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the proportion of industry output located in the 
areas in which RSA-assisted and non-assisted plants are situated. These areas are however 
less diverse, by a statistically significant amount, in terms of the number of plants from 
different  industries  operating  in  that  area.  The  average  growth  rate  for  the  industry  in 
which RSA-assisted plants operate is minus 1% while the corresponding figure for non-
assisted plants is 4%. This difference is statistically  significant and suggests that RSA 130 
 
recipients tend to operate in struggling industries. A large and significant difference also 
exists with regard to displacement with RSA-assisted plants tending to operate in industries 
with less displacement than non-assisted plants. Finally, RSA-assisted plants tend to be 
found in more competitive industries as indicated by the lower value of the Herfindahl 
index. 
 
Probit Model of Determinants of Receipt of an RSA Grant 
 
Table 5.3 presents results from estimating a probit model of the determinants of receiving 
an RSA grant in Scotland. The advantage of the probit model over the simple comparison 
of  means  provided  in  table  5.2  is  that  it  permits  the  investigation  of  the  relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the RSA dummy, holding other variables constant. 
The explanatory variables are employment, the capital to labour ratio, plant age, a single 
plant dummy, an FDI dummy, the Herfindahl Index, the local authority’s share of industry 
output, a measure of the diversity of the local authority’s industrial base and a time trend 
(these variables are similar to those that are used in Harris and Robinson, 2004). The 
dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one in the year in which the plant 
receives  treatment  but  reverts  to  zero  in  the  following  years.  Continuous  variables  are 
logged and the data is weighted so that the results are representative of the population of 
plants. 
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Table 5.3: Probit Model of Determinants of Receipt of an RSA Grant 
 
Coefficient  Robust Standard 
Error 
Ln(Empment)  0.22***  0.03 
Ln(Capital per worker)  0.01  0.01 
Ln(Herf)  -0.11***  0.04 
Ln(Industry share)  0.09***  0.03 
Ln(Diversity)  -0.08*  0.04 
Ln(Age)  0.06  0.05 
Ln(Time)  0.04  0.03 
Single  0.29***  0.05 
FDI  0.08  0.07 
SIC 22  0.44  0.28 
SIC 24  0.00  0.14 
SIC 25   0.44***  0.16 
SIC 31   0.34***  0.12 
SIC 33   0.37***  0.14 
SIC 34  0.34***  0.11 
SIC 35   0.02  0.18 
SIC 36  -0.01  0.17 
SIC 37  0.21  0.18 
SIC 41   -0.01  0.14 
SIC 43   0.13  0.12 
SIC 44   0.37*  0.21 
SIC 45   0.52***  0.15 
SIC 46   0.10  0.14 
SIC 47  0.02  0.11 
SIC 48  0.32***  0.12 
SIC 49  -0.04  0.19 
Constant  -3.78***  0.33 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.1582   
Observations              50,914   
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
The results mostly confirm what would be expected from table 5.2:
33 larger plants are more 
likely to receive an RSA grant; plants operating in more competitive industries (which 
therefore have a lower Herfindahl index) have a higher probability of receiving an RSA 
grant; plants operating in areas with a higher share of their industry’s output are more 
likely to receive assistance and single plants are more likely to receive an RSA grant, 
ceteris paribus. The coefficients of the capital per worker, age, time and FDI variables are 
not statistically significant at the 90% level. The lack of significance of the FDI dummy is 
the only major surprise as RSA is frequently used to attract FDI. 
                                                 
33  Note  that  the  dependent  variable  used  for  the  probit  model  differs  from  the  variable  used  to  denote 
treatment status in table 5.2. 132 
 
 
Plants  operating  in  the  following  industries  have  a  greater  probability,  at  the  90% 
significance  level,  of  receiving  an  RSA  grant  relative  to  the  mechanical  engineering 
industry (SIC 32) which serves as the baseline: chemical industry (SIC 25), metal goods 
not elsewhere specified (SIC 31), office machinery & data processing equipment (SIC33), 
electrical & electronic engineering (SIC 34), leather & leather goods (SIC 44), footwear & 
clothing industries (SIC 45) and processing of rubber & plastics (SIC 48). 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the data that will be employed in the empirical analyses of 
chapters 6, 7 and 8. It began by providing descriptive statistics from the SAMIS database. 
These showed that RSA offers the largest number and the most generous grants of all the 
grant  schemes  in  Scotland.  The  next  section  described  how  the  SAMIS  database  was 
linked into the ARD. This process managed to link a higher proportion of RSA recipients 
into the ARD than previous researchers have managed which allows greater confidence in 
the results from the empirical analyses. A description of the variables that will be used in 
the  empirical  analysis  was  then  given.  The  fifth  section  provided  a  comparison  of  the 
characteristics of RSA recipients with untreated plants. This showed that RSA recipients 
tended  to  be  larger,  older  and  were  more  likely  to  be  foreign  owned.  They  tended  to 
operate in areas with a less diverse industrial base. The industries to which they belong 
tended  to  have  lower  employment  growth,  lower  levels  of  displacement  and  greater 
competition.  The  probit  model  showed  that,  ceteris  paribus,  plant  employment,  the 
competitiveness of the industry in which the plant operates, the proportion of industry 
output produced in the plant’s local authority and whether the plant is a single plant were 
all positive and statistically significant determinants of the probability of receiving an RSA 
grant. 133 
 
A5.1. Figures Showing the Value of Grants Awarded by Scheme excluding RSA 
by Year and Industry 
 
Figure A5.1: Value of grants excluding RSA received in Scotland by year, 1988-2003 
(2003 prices) 
Source: SAMIS 
 
Figure A5.2: Average value of grants excluding RSA received per year in Scotland by 2-
digit industry, 1988-2003 (2003 prices) 
Source: SAMIS 
No figures are provided for SIC26 (production of man-made fibres) to avoid disclosure. 
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A5.2. SIC 80 codes 
 
The following are the 1-digit SIC 80 codes used above to disaggregate by industry (Office 
for National Statistics, 1998): 
0  Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
1   Energy & water supplies 
2   Extraction of minerals & ores other than fuels; manufacture of metals, mineral 
products & chemicals 
3   Metal goods, engineering & vehicles industries 
4   Other manufacturing industries 
5   Construction 
6   Distribution, hotels & catering (repairs) 
7   Transport & communication 
8   Banking, finance, insurance, business services & leasing 
9   Other services 
 
The following are the 2-digit SIC 80 codes used: 
01   Agriculture & horticulture 
02   Forestry 
03   Fishing 
11   Coal extraction & manufacture of solid fuels 
12   Coke ovens 
13   Extraction of mineral oil & natural gas 
14   Mineral oil processing 
15   Nuclear fuel production 
16   Production & distribution of electricity, gas & other forms of energy 
17   Water supply industry 
21   Extraction & preparation of metalliferous ores 
22   Metal manufacturing 
23   Extraction of minerals not elsewhere specified 
24   Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
25   Chemical industry 
26   Production of man-made fibres 
31   Manufacture of metal goods not elsewhere specified 135 
 
32   Mechanical engineering 
33   Manufacture of office machinery & data processing equipment 
34   Electrical & electronic engineering 
35   Manufacture of motor vehicles & parts thereof 
36   Manufacture of other transport equipment 
37   Instrument engineering 
41/42   Food, drink & tobacco manufacturing industries 
43   Textile industry 
44   Manufacture of leather & leather goods 
45   Footwear & clothing industries 
46   Timber & wooden furniture industries 
47   Manufacture of paper & paper products; printing & publishing 
48   Processing of rubber & plastics 
49   Other manufacturing industries 
50   Construction 
61   Wholesale distribution (except dealing in scrap & waste materials) 
62   Dealing in scrap & waste materials 
63   Commission agents 
64/65   Retail distribution 
66   Hotels & catering 
67   Repair of consumer goods & vehicles 
71   Railways 
72   Other inland transport 
74   Sea transport 
75   Air transport 
76   Supporting services to transport 
77   Miscellaneous transport services & storage not elsewhere specified 
79   Postal services & telecommunications 
81   Banking & finance 
82   Insurance, except for compulsory social security 
83   Business services 
84   Renting of movables 
85   Owning & dealing in real estate 
91   Public administration, national defence & compulsory social security 136 
 
92   Sanitary services 
93   Education 
94   Research & development 
95   Medical & other health services; veterinary services 
96   Other services provided to the general public 
97   Recreational services & other cultural services 
98   Personal services 
99   Domestic services 
00  Diplomatic representation, international organisations, allied armed forces 137 
 
 
6. Productivity Growth Decomposition 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will decompose the growth of aggregate labour productivity and aggregate 
TFP of Scottish manufacturing between 1994 and 2004. This will reveal the contribution to 
productivity  growth  of  five  sources:  productivity  growth  within  continuing  plants; 
redistributions of market share between continuing plants; productivity growth coinciding 
with increasing market share within continuing plants; entering plants and exiting plants. 
The share attributable to each source of productivity growth will also be split into shares 
accounted for by RSA grant recipients and plants that did not receive an RSA grant to give 
an indication of whether and how RSA grant recipients have contributed to or hindered 
aggregate productivity growth. 
 
The relationship between the decomposition of aggregate productivity growth that will be 
performed in this chapter and the analysis that will be undertaken in chapter 7 requires 
clarification. The decomposition will show the contribution made by plants that received 
an RSA grant to aggregate productivity growth. The results will not be informative as to 
whether receipt of an RSA grant has a causal impact on plant productivity because the 
productivity performance of RSA-assisted plants is a reflection of numerous factors, many 
of which are unrelated to whether the plant received an RSA grant. The establishment of a 
causal relationship between receipt of an RSA grant and productivity is the subject of 
chapter 7. 
 
The  only  paper  that  has  examined  the  contribution  of  RSA  recipients  to  aggregate 
productivity growth is by Harris and Robinson (2005). Also using a dataset created by 
merging SAMIS into the ARD,
34 they decompose the growth of labour productivity and 
TFP in UK manufacturing plants between 1990 and 1998. Their results show that RSA 
assisted plants made a proportionately large positive contribution to the growth of labour 
productivity  but  a  negative  contribution  to  the  growth  of  TFP.  The  former  effect  is 
                                                 
34 As discussed in chapter 5.3, their dataset is built upon to create the dataset used here and therefore contains 
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primarily due to RSA grant recipients that improve their productivity between 1990 and 
1998  also  improving  their  market  share  while  the  latter  is  mostly  due  to  RSA  grant 
recipients  with  low  TFP  in  1990  increasing  their  market  share.  These  results  will  be 
discussed in more detail below when they are compared with the results obtained here. 
 
The  next  section  sets  out  the  method  used  to  decompose  the  growth  of  aggregate 
productivity and how the measures of productivity are calculated; the third section will 
present the results from the decomposition and the final section concludes. 
 
6.2. Decomposition Methodology 
 
The index of aggregate productivity is calculated as follows: 
  , ln ln ∑ =
i
it it t P P q   (6.1) 
where θit is the share of aggregate output belonging to plant i at time t and Pit is the 
productivity of plant i at time t. 
 
The geometric growth rate of aggregate productivity between 1994 and 2004 is: 
  . ln ln ln 1994 2004 2004 P P P - = D   (6.2) 
Following Haltiwanger (1997), this can be decomposed as follows:
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The first term of the decomposition is the sum of the growth in plant-level productivity 
between 1994 and 2004 of plants that existed in both years, weighted by the plant’s market 
share in 1994. It measures what aggregate productivity growth would have been, allowing 
for plant-level productivity growth within plants but holding market shares constant, and is 
termed the within component. The second term, which is the between component, captures 
what  aggregate  productivity  growth  would  have  been  without  plant-level  productivity 
                                                 
35 A justification for the choice of the Haltiwanger decomposition above other decompositions is provided in 
the appendix. 139 
 
growth, entry or exit but allowing for reallocations in market share between continuing 
plants. It is the sum of the growth of continuing plants’ market shares between 1994 and 
2004, weighted by the deviation of the plant’s 1994 productivity level from the average. 
The third term is the covariance component and is the sum of the change in continuing 
plants’ productivity between 1994 and 2004 multiplied by the plant’s change in market 
share between 1994 and 2004. It is a covariance effect measuring the contribution to the 
growth  in  aggregate  productivity  of  the  coincidence  of  increases  in  market  share  with 
improvements in productivity. 
 
The fourth term gives the contribution to aggregate productivity growth of entrants. It is 
calculated  as  the  sum  of  the  deviation  of  each  entrant’s  productivity  from  average 
productivity in 1994, weighted by its output share in 2004. A priori expectations are that 
this  term  will  be  positive  as  new  plants  will  employ  the  latest  technologies  (see,  for 
example,  Samaniego,  2006).  The  final  term  enters  negatively  and  is  the  sum  of  the 
deviation of exiting plants’ productivity from average productivity in 1994, weighted by 
the plant’s market share in 1994. Assuming that lower productivity plants are more likely 
to close, this term will be negative which implies a positive contribution of plants that exit 
to aggregate productivity growth. 
 
In the decomposition presented below, each of the five components is decomposed further 
into  two  parts:  one  representing  the  component  for  plants  that  received  an  RSA  grant 
between 1994 and 2004 and the other for plants that did not receive an RSA grant. It 
should be noted that this does not mean that the sample was first split into plants that 
received an RSA grant and plants that did not before performing the decomposition as this 
would not allow for reallocations in market share across plants that received a grant and 
those that did not and would therefore not give an accurate representation of the between 
and  covariance  components.  Instead,  the  decomposition  was  performed  using  the  full 
sample and then the components for plants that received a grant and those that did not were 
calculated. 
 
Two  measures  of  productivity  will  be  considered  here:  labour  productivity  and  TFP. 
Performing  the  analysis  using  these  two  measures  of  productivity  allows  a  better 
understanding  of  the  behaviour  of  RSA  recipients.  The  natural  logarithm  of  labour 
productivity is calculated as follows: 140 
 
  , it it it e y lp - =   (6.4) 
where  yit  is  GVA  in  plant  i  at  time  t  and  eit  is  employment.  Both  variables  are  in 
logarithmic form. 
 
TFP is calculated using the following log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function which 
is almost identical to that set out in chapter 7.2: 
  ), ( it it i it X it K it E it m x k e y + + + + + = u h b b b   (6.5) 
where kit represents the capacity utilisation adjusted capital stock (henceforth referred to 
simply  as the capital stock) and xit is a vector of variables thought likely to influence 
TFP.
36  All  continuous  variables  are  in  logarithmic  form.  The  only  difference  between 
equation (6.5) above and equation (7.5) is that the RSA dummy is excluded. This is done 
because this variable was not statistically significant in any of the models estimated in 
chapter 7. 
 
The error term, εit, can be written as: 
  , it it i it m + + = u h e   (6.6) 
where ηi is an unobservable, plant-specific, time-invariant effect, νit is a TFP shock which 
may be autoregressive, and mit is a measurement error which is assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated. 
 
Once  the  coefficients  have  been  estimated,  the  logarithm  of  TFP  can  be  calculated  as 
follows: 
  . ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
it it X it K it E it x k e y p f t e b b b + = - - =   (6.7) 
 
Equation (6.5) is estimated in the same way as in chapter 7.3 where a detailed description 
of the estimation process is provided. Here only a brief summary is given. Because of the 
endogeneity of certain explanatory variables in equation (6.5), the model was estimated 
using the system GMM estimator. To allow for an autoregressive productivity shock which 
would  otherwise  invalidate  the  instruments  used  in  the  system  GMM  estimator,  the 
following dynamic version of equation (6.5) was estimated: 
 
, 6 1 , 5 4 1 , 3 2 1 , 1 it i it t i it t i it t i it x k k e e y y e h p p p p p p + + + + + + + =
*
- - -    (6.8) 
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where i i h a h ) 1 ( - =
* and 1 , - - + = t i it it it m m a u e . The long-run coefficients used to calculate 
TFP are calculated from the short-run coefficients in equation (6.8) as shown in chapter 
7.3. 
 
As  discussed  in  chapter  7.4,  it  is  undesirable  to  impose  a  common  technology  across 
disparate industries. As a result, equation (6.5) is estimated by 2-digit industry so that the 
coefficients are allowed to vary by industry. 
 
6.3. Decomposition Results 
 
In order to place the results in context, it is helpful to state that between 1994 and 2004, the 
GVA of Scottish manufacturing grew by an average of only 0.9% (Office for National 
Statistics, 2008). However, during this period, employment in Scottish manufacturing fell 
by  a  little  over  a  quarter  from  almost  320,000  in  1994  (Office  for  National  Statistics, 
2009b). This implies a large increase in labour productivity to be decomposed below. 
 
Table 6.1 gives the output shares, θit, attributable to each group. These are calculated using 
weighted data so that the output shares are representative of the population of plants rather 
than the stratified sample of plants selected for surveying in the ABI (see chapter 5.3 for 
more detail on the sampling frame of the ABI). Care was also taken to ensure that plants 
that were genuinely continuers but were only observed in either 1994 or 2004 were not 
incorrectly  classified  as  exiters  or  enterers.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  output  shares 
attributable to each group are a function of the time that elapses between the chosen base 
and end years because the number of enterers and exiters is cumulative over time. This 
means  that  it  is  not  possible  to  make  direct  comparisons  between  the  output  shares 
presented below and those presented in Harris and Robinson (2005) because their analysis 
decomposes the growth of productivity over eight  years whereas the analysis below is 
concerned  with  productivity  growth  over  ten  years.  The  total  number  of  plants  in  the 
sample was 2,703 in 1994 and 2,191 in 2004. 
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Table 6.1: Output Shares of Continuers, Exiters and Enterers in Scottish Manufacturing, 
1994 and 2004 (%) 
  Continuers (1994)  Exiters (1994)  Continuers (2004)  Enterers (2004) 
Non-assisted  24.85 
(20.94) 
58.73 
(75.58) 
30.38 
(25.83) 
50.80 
(70.10) 
RSA-assisted  10.73 
(2.18) 
5.69 
(1.29) 
15.01 
(2.69) 
3.81 
(1.37) 
All  35.58 
(23.12) 
64.42 
(76.88) 
45.39 
(28.53) 
54.61 
(71.47) 
Figures in parentheses are the proportion of the total number of plants in that year in each group. 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
Table 6.1 shows that, in 1994, almost two-thirds of output was produced by plants that 
would close before 2004, while in 2004, over half of output was produced by plants that 
had opened since 1994. This demonstrates the importance of entry and exit. The share of 
output attributable to continuers rose from slightly over a third to over 45% between 1994 
and 2004. Comparing the output shares with the share of plants in each group shows that 
continuers tended to be larger than both exiters and enterers. Distinguishing now by RSA 
status, continuing plants that received an RSA grant produced a significant proportion of 
output (10.7% and 15.0% in 1994 and 2004 respectively). Exiters that received an RSA 
grant produced 5.7% of output in 1994 while the proportion of output produced by enterers 
that received a grant is small by comparison at just less than 4%. RSA-assisted plants are 
larger, on average, than non-assisted plants which accords with what was shown in the 
descriptive statistics of chapter 5.5. 
 
Table 6.2 gives an indication of the differences in labour productivity and TFP across 
groups. The productivity indices are calculated as in equation (6.1) and are therefore in 
logarithmic form. Rather than present them in this form, the antilog is taken to provide a 
more easily interpretable measure of productivity. 
 
Table 6.2: Productivity Indices of Continuers, Enterers and Exiters in Scottish 
Manufacturing Plants, 1994 and 2004 (£ thousands) 
  Continuers (1994)  Exiters (1994)  Continuers (2004)  Enterers (2004) 
  Labour Productivity 
Non-assisted  42.52  51.42  49.40  85.63 
RSA-assisted  40.04  66.02  60.34  42.10 
  TFP 
Non-assisted  22.42  27.11  26.84  34.81 
RSA-assisted  17.46  46.99  24.29  45.60 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
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The table shows that for continuers in 1994, the output-weighted labour productivity of 
RSA-assisted plants was 6% lower than the corresponding measure for non-assisted plants. 
However, for the exiters, the index for RSA-assisted exiters is over 25% larger than the 
index for non-assisted plants. In fact, the productivity index for RSA-assisted exiters is 
only  surpassed  by  the  index  for  enterers  in  2004  which  is  surprising  as  it  would  be 
expected that exiters have the lowest productivity of all the groups. This is a consequence 
of weighting by output shares as the unweighted mean of labour productivity for the exiters 
is only £15,640 per worker - the lowest unweighted mean of all the groups. This implies 
that  a  particularly  strong  positive  relationship  exists  between  output  shares  and  labour 
productivity in this group. It is worth noting that Harris and Robinson (2005) also find that 
RSA-assisted exiters have the highest labour productivity index of all the groups in the 
base year. 
 
By 2004, the labour productivity indices of non-assisted and RSA-assisted continuers have 
grown from their 1994 levels by 16% and 51% respectively so that the index for RSA-
assisted continuers is now over 20% larger than the index for non-assisted continuers. The 
largest difference between non-assisted and RSA-assisted plants is found in the enterers. 
The index for non-assisted enterers is over twice as large as the corresponding index for 
RSA-assisted enterers. Very similar results are also found by Harris and Robinson (2005) 
for the continuers and enterers. 
 
The situation is rather different from that found using labour productivity when TFP is 
used to measure productivity. In 1994, the index for continuers that received an RSA grant 
is  less  than  80%  as  large  as  the  index  for  continuers  that  did  not  receive  a  grant.  By 
contrast, exiters that received an RSA grant have an output-weighted productivity index 
which is almost 75% greater than non-assisted exiters and this is the largest index of all the 
groups considered. Again, this is found to be the product of weighting productivity by 
output shares as the unweighted mean of TFP would give this group the lowest TFP index. 
Harris and Robinson (2005) also find that RSA-assisted exiters have a higher index of TFP 
than non-assisted exiters but, unlike in table 6.2, the index is lower than that for both 
assisted and non-assisted continuers in the base year and for entering plants in the end year 
which accords better with a priori expectations. 
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By 2004, the index of TFP for RSA-assisted continuers remains lower than the index for 
non-assisted continuers although it is now only 10% smaller. This is the result of non-
assisted continuers improving their TFP by 20% while RSA-assisted continuers increased 
their TFP by 39%. Harris and Robinson (2005) do not replicate this finding as their index 
of TFP is lower for continuers in 1990 than in 1998 although, as in table 6.2, they do find a 
slight TFP advantage towards non-assisted plants in both years. This is the first instance 
where the ranking of non-assisted and RSA-assisted plants differs between the two indices 
of productivity and this is explained by the large difference between the two groups in the 
amount of capital employed (see Appendix A6.2 for employment and capital indices that 
explain the differences in ranking across the two measures of productivity). 
 
Finally,  the  output-weighted  TFP  index  is  31%  larger  for  RSA-assisted  enterers  than 
exiters. Again, this is the reverse of what is seen using labour productivity and is explained 
by  the  fact  that  enterers  that  receive  an  RSA  grant  have  far  larger  capital  stocks  than 
enterers that do not receive a grant. This contradicts the finding of Harris and Robinson 
(2005) that non-assisted enterers had a higher index of TFP than RSA-assisted enterers. 
 
Table 6.3 gives the results from the decomposition of labour productivity growth between 
1994 and 2004. As shown in equation (6.3), the size of the within, entering and exiting 
components and therefore the continuers and total for both plants that received an RSA 
grant and plants that did not are partly determined by their output shares. These output 
shares,  given  in  table  6.1,  should  therefore  be  borne  in  mind  when  assessing  what 
represents a strong performance from RSA-assisted plants. 
 
Table 6.3: Decomposition of Labour Productivity Growth between 1994 and 2004 (%) 
  Total 
(A+B+C+D-E) 
Within 
(A) 
Between 
(B) 
Covariance 
(C) 
Continuers 
(A+B+C) 
Entrants 
(D) 
Exiters 
(E) 
Non-assisted  28.85  0.01  -2.47  6.26  3.80  28.58  3.53 
RSA-assisted  3.02  2.65  -6.44  9.07  5.28  -0.53  1.74 
All  31.87  2.66  -8.91  15.33  9.08  28.05  5.27 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
Overall, plants that received an RSA grant made a positive contribution towards aggregate 
labour  productivity  growth.  Without  these  plants,  aggregate  labour  productivity  would 
have grown by 28.9% instead of 31.9%. However, the contribution to aggregate labour 
productivity from RSA-assisted plants is smaller than what would be expected, given their 
share of output in 1994. 145 
 
 
The within-plant contribution to aggregate productivity growth is 0.01% from non-assisted 
plants and 2.7% from RSA-assisted plants. This indicates that continuers that received an 
RSA grant substantially improved their labour productivity between 1994 and 2004 while 
non-assisted plants barely improved their labour productivity at all. Taking account of the 
relative  shares  of  output  in  1994,  this  represents  a  very  strong  performance  by  RSA-
assisted continuers relative to non-assisted continuers. The between plant component is 
negative for both non-assisted and RSA-assisted plants, indicating that in both groups, the 
market shares of plants with high productivity  in 1994 tended to fall compared to the 
market share of plants with low productivity. By contrast, the covariance effect is large and 
positive for both non-assisted and RSA-assisted continuers at 6.3% and 9.1% respectively, 
which shows that continuers that improved their productivity between 1994 and 2004 also 
tended to increase their output shares. The performance of plants that received an RSA 
grant is particularly strong in this regard. In sum, therefore, the relative performance of 
RSA-assisted continuers in terms of their contribution to aggregate labour productivity 
growth is impressive. 
 
The largest contributor to aggregate labour productivity growth by far is entrants that did 
not receive assistance who provide 28.6% to the growth in labour productivity. In contrast, 
the contribution from entrants that received an RSA grant is negative, albeit very small. 
This is a major concern as it suggests that RSA grants are being provided to a poorly 
performing subset of entrants. 
 
Finally, the exiters’ component for both non-assisted and RSA-assisted plants is, contrary 
to  expectations,  positive  and  therefore,  in  accordance  with  equation  (6.4),  these  plants 
make a negative contribution to aggregate productivity growth. Given their relatively small 
share of output, the proportion of the exiters’ component accounted for by RSA-assisted 
plants  is  particularly  large.  This  is  consistent  with  the  objective  of  supporting  high 
productivity plants although the fact that they closed also suggests that their subsequent 
performance  was  poor.  However,  this  finding  is  the  result  of  the  strong  positive 
relationship between output shares and labour productivity within this group mentioned 
earlier and may therefore be considered to be somewhat of an anomaly. 
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Table 6.4 provides the results from the decomposition of TFP growth. It should be noted 
that some plants are lost when TFP is used as a measure of productivity instead of labour 
productivity due to the greater number of variables needed to produce estimates of TFP. 
Therefore, these results are produced using 2,530 plants in 1994 and 2,037 in 2004 which 
is slightly fewer than were used to produce the results in table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.4: Decomposition of TFP Growth between 1994 and 2004 (%) 
  Total 
(A+B+C+D-E) 
Within 
(A) 
Between 
(B) 
Covariance 
(C) 
Continuers 
(A+B+C) 
Entrants 
(D) 
Exiters 
(E) 
Non-assisted  14.36  -2.88  1.86  6.82  5.8  12.58  4.03 
RSA-assisted  2.27  1.31  -3.11  5.36  3.56  2.25  3.54 
All  16.63  -1.57  -1.25  12.18  9.36  14.83  7.57 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
The overall contribution of plants that received an RSA grant to the growth of TFP is 2.3% 
compared to a contribution of 14.4% from plants that did not receive a grant. It is therefore 
slightly smaller than what would be expected given their share of output in 1994. 
 
The within component is negative for continuers that did not receive a grant and positive 
for  continuers  that  did  receive  a  grant.  This  indicates  that  RSA-assisted  continuers 
increased  their  TFP  while  non-assisted  continuers  experienced  a  fall  in  TFP.  This 
represents  a  strong  performance  from  RSA-assisted  plants  and  is  similar  to  the  labour 
productivity case in which the within component was far larger for RSA-assisted than non-
assisted plants. The situation is reversed when considering the between component with a 
contribution to aggregate TFP growth of 1.9% from non-assisted continuers and a negative 
contribution of 3.1% from RSA-assisted continuers. This shows that those non-assisted 
continuers with initially high TFP in 1994 increased their output share while RSA-assisted 
continuers  with  high  TFP  in  1994  experienced  a  fall  in  their  share  of  output.  The 
covariance component is positive for both non-assisted and RSA-assisted continuers at 
6.8%  and  5.4%  respectively,  showing  that,  for  both  groups,  improvements  in  TFP 
coincided with increases in output share. Overall, the contribution from continuers that 
received an RSA grant is 3.6% which, considering output shares in 1994, is a relatively 
large part of the total contribution from continuing plants to the growth of aggregate TFP. 
 
The largest contribution to aggregate TFP growth comes from entering plants that did not 
receive an RSA grant which contributed 12.6% to the growth of aggregate TFP. However, 
unlike  with  labour  productivity,  the  contribution  from  RSA-assisted  entering  plants  is 147 
 
positive at 2.3% which is a larger part of the total enterers’ component than would be 
expected given their share of output in 2004. As with labour productivity, the contribution 
to aggregate TFP growth of both non-assisted and RSA-assisted exiting plants is negative 
at 4.0% and 3.5% respectively because the weighted average of TFP of both these groups 
of plants is higher than the average in 1994. Taking account of the relative output shares of 
these groups, this represents a very large part of the total negative contribution of exiters to 
aggregate TFP growth from plants that received an RSA grant but this is once more the 
consequence of the relatively strong relationship between TFP and output in this group. 
 
Overall, these results show that plants that received an RSA grant did not make as large a 
contribution to either labour productivity or TFP growth as their output shares in 1994 
suggest they ought to have made although the size of their contribution is slightly more 
impressive when the measure of productivity is TFP rather than labour productivity.  
 
The proportion of the total contribution that comes from RSA-assisted plants that were in 
operation in both 1994 and 2004 is larger than what would be expected, given their share 
of output, and most of this contribution is made through the process by which plants that 
improve their productivity also improve their output shares. This implies that continuers 
that receive an RSA grant tend to be more dynamic than plants that do not receive support. 
However, entrants that received an RSA grant made a negative contribution of 0.5% to the 
growth in aggregate labour productivity but a positive contribution of 2.3% to the growth 
in  aggregate  TFP.  This  is  the  result  of  RSA-assisted  entrants  having  higher  TFP  than 
average but lower labour productivity than average which, unsurprisingly given the main 
objective of the RSA scheme, suggests that RSA recipient are more labour intensive than 
the average. Given the very large contribution from non-assisted entrants, this suggests that 
the entrants need to be better targeted for receipt of RSA grants if the scheme is to make a 
larger contribution to the growth of productivity. Turning to the exiters, there is a large and 
negative contribution to aggregate productivity growth from exiters that received a grant 
due to their high productivity indices. However, this is slightly misleading as RSA-assisted 
entrants  are,  on  the  basis  of  an  unweighted  average,  the  least  productive  using  either 
measure of productivity. It is only that there is a particularly strong positive relationship 
between the share of output and productivity within this group. 
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The results are in many ways similar to those obtained by Harris and Robinson (2005) 
despite differences in the area, length and period of time analyzed and the quality of the 
dataset as well as slight differences in the methodology. Overall, they also found that RSA-
assisted  plants  made  a  positive  contribution  to  productivity  growth  although  the 
contribution is over twice as large as that identified here. In terms of the sources of this 
contribution, in accordance with the results presented in table 6.3, they found that RSA-
assisted plants made a small contribution to aggregate labour productivity growth through 
the  within  component,  a  large  positive  contribution  through  the  covariance  component 
(although less than half the size of that identified here), a negative contribution through the 
entering  plants’  component  and  a  negative  contribution  through  the  exiting  plants’ 
components.  The  results  differ  in  that  they  find  that  RSA-assisted  continuers  made  a 
positive contribution through the between effect which indicates that RSA-assisted plants 
with high levels of labour productivity tended to increase their market share between 1990 
and 1998. 
 
Turning to the decomposition of TFP growth, Harris and Robinson (2005) find that RSA-
assisted plants contributed negatively whereas table 6.4 shows that RSA-assisted plants 
contributed positively to aggregate TFP growth. The within and between components are 
similar  in  both  sign  and  magnitude  but,  unlike  the  results  in  table  6.4,  they  find  that 
enterers made a small negative contribution to aggregate TFP growth which is the result of 
RSA-assisted  enterers  being  less  productive  than  average  while  exiters  made  a  small 
positive  contribution  because  they  were  less  productive  than  the  average.  The  largest 
difference is in the covariance effect as Harris and Robinson find that RSA-assisted plants 
make  a  contribution  of  only  0.8%  to  aggregate  productivity  growth  whereas  table  6.4 
shows a contribution of 5.4%. This means that UK manufacturing plants that improved 
their TFP between 1990 and 1998 were less successful at improving their market share 
than Scottish manufacturing plants that improved their TFP between 1994 and 2004. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has decomposed the growth of aggregate labour productivity and aggregate 
TFP in Scotland between 1994 and 2004 in order to identify the extent to and the channels 
through  which  plants  assisted  by  RSA  contributed  to  productivity  growth.  The 
decomposition showed that RSA-assisted plants made a positive but small contribution, 149 
 
relative to the output share of these plants in 1994, to the growth in aggregate labour 
productivity and TFP. For both labour productivity and TFP, the bulk of this contribution 
came from plants that operated in both 1994 and 2004 and, more specifically, through the 
process by which plants that improve their productivity also improve their market share. 
This suggests that continuers that receive an RSA grant are more dynamic than continuers 
that do not receive support. 
 
The contribution of entrants that received an RSA grant is negative to aggregate labour 
productivity growth and positive and small, relative to output shares in 2004, to aggregate 
TFP growth which implies, in accordance with the objectives of the scheme, that RSA-
assisted  entrants  are  relatively  labour  intensive.  The  small  contribution  to  productivity 
growth from RSA-assisted entrants is a major concern as the largest contribution to the 
growth of both measures of productivity comes from non-assisted entrants. This suggests 
that RSA grants should be better targeted at entering plants. 
 
A6.1. Decomposition Methods 
 
There are three competing methods that can be employed to decompose the growth of 
productivity (Disney, Haskel & Heden, 2003a). A description of the Haltiwanger (1997) 
approach has been provided above. This appendix will describe the other two approaches 
and explain why the Haltiwanger approach was chosen instead of them. 
 
Bailey, Hulten and Campbell (1992) suggest a decomposition of the form: 
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The first term is identical to the within component in the Haltiwanger decomposition. It 
shows what the contribution to productivity growth of continuing plants would have been, 
had output shares been held constant. However, while the Haltiwanger decomposition has 
two  terms  –  the  between  and  covariance  components  -  which  jointly  capture  the 
contribution to aggregate productivity of changes in the share of continuing plants’ output 
between the base and end years, there is only one such term in equation (A6.1). This term 
is calculated as the sum of the change in output shares multiplied by the productivity of the 150 
 
continuers. It therefore captures both the contribution to productivity growth of plants with 
initially higher productivity increasing their market share and the contribution of plants 
that improve their productivity between the base and end year and also increase their share 
of output. The ability of the Haltiwanger decomposition to provide more information on 
the nature of the contribution from change in output shares is a clear advantage. 
 
The contribution to productivity growth from exiters in equation (A6.1) is simply the sum 
of the productivity of entrants in the end year weighted by their output shares while the 
contribution from exiters is the sum of the productivity of exiters in the base year weighted 
by  their  output  shares.  As  shown  by  Haltiwanger  (1997),  even  if  entrants  are  more 
productive than exiters, this does not guarantee that the net contribution from entry and 
exit, calculated using equation (A6.1) is positive if the output share of entrants is smaller in 
the  end  year  than  the  output  share  of  exiters  in  the  base  year.  This  is  an  undesirable 
property and one which the Haltiwanger decomposition and the decomposition discussed 
next does not share. 
 
The following decomposition is proposed by Griliches and Regev (1992): 
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where a bar denotes the average calculated over the end and base year. The main difference 
between this approach and the Haltiwanger approach is that the latter uses deviations of 
productivity from the average in the base year whereas this approach employs deviations 
of productivity from the average over both base and end year. This has the advantage of 
making equation (A6.2) less sensitive to measurement error than the Haltiwanger approach 
(Disney, Haskel & Heden, 2003a). 
 
The first term is the sum of the growth in the productivity of continuers, weighted by their 
average market share over the base and end year. The second component is the change in 
market shares of continuers multiplied by the deviation in average plant productivity over 
base and end year from average aggregate productivity over the base and end year. The 
entrants’ term is the output share of plants in the end year multiplied by the deviation in 
their  productivity  levels  from  aggregate  productivity  over  base  and  end  year  and  the 151 
 
exiters’ contribution is calculated as the output share of exiters in the base year multiplied 
by the deviation of their productivity from aggregate productivity over base and end year. 
 
The major problem with equation (A6.2) is that the first component does not represent a 
recognisable  component  of  productivity  growth.  It  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  as  the 
contribution  from  continuers  that  improve  their  productivity,  holding  output  shares 
constant because i q is determined by the growth of market shares between the base and the 
end year. For this reason, the Haltiwanger decomposition is judged to be a better way of 
decomposing the growth of productivity and was used above. 
 
A6.2. Employment and Capital Indices 
 
To assist in the understanding of differences between the two measures of productivity, 
table  A6.1  provides  the  weighted  average  of  employment  and  capital  for  each  group. 
Assuming  the  coefficients  on  employment  and  capital  in  the  production  function  are 
greater  than  zero  but  less  than  one,  equations  (6.4)  and  (6.7)  show  that  plants  with  a 
relatively high index of employment would prefer to be compared on the basis of TFP, 
ceteris paribus. On the other hand, these equations also show that plants with a relatively 
high index of capital would prefer to be compared on the basis of labour productivity, 
ceteris  paribus.  When  one  group  have  both  more  employment  and  capital,  it  is  not 
immediately clear which measure of productivity provides a more favourable comparison. 
This  will  depend  upon  the  coefficients  on  employment  and  capital  in  the  production 
function. 
 
Table A6.1: Employment and Capital Indices, 1994 and 2004 
  Continuers (1994)  Exiters (1994)  Continuers (2004)  Enterers (2004) 
  Employment 
Non-assisted  652.94  355.70  472.61  399.20 
RSA-assisted  996.04  1039.74  694.12  483.59 
  Capital 
Non-assisted  12713.69  10184.64  9446.06  20311.78 
RSA-assisted  17534.60  8327.98  23994.05  5641.72 
Capital is measured in measured in £1,000 (1980 prices). 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
The employment index for RSA-assisted continuers in 1994 is over 50% larger than the 
corresponding index for non-assisted continuers. The capital index for RSA-assisted plants 
is almost 40% larger than the index for plants that did not receive an RSA grant. Table 6.2 152 
 
shows that RSA-assisted continuers are at less of a productivity disadvantage in a labour 
productivity comparison than a TFP comparison. In accordance with equations (6.4) and 
(6.7), this implies that the disadvantage to this group that arises in a TFP comparison from 
having a larger capital stock is outweighed by the lower weight that is placed on its larger 
level of employment. 
 
For exiters in 1994, the index of employment is almost three times larger for RSA-assisted 
than non-assisted plants but the capital index is over 20% larger for non-assisted plants. 
This implies that RSA-assisted plants would prefer to be compared on the basis of TFP and 
this is indeed the case as table 6.2 shows a larger productivity advantage for RSA-assisted 
exiters than non-assisted plants using TFP as the measure of productivity. 
 
Continuers in 2004 are similar to continuers in 1994 in that RSA-assisted plants have a 
higher weighted average for both employment and capital. The former is larger by almost 
50% while the latter is larger by over 150%. The TFP index is again more favourable to 
RSA-assisted plants as it ranks them above non-assisted plants while non-assisted plants 
have a higher index of labour productivity. The explanation for this is identical to that set 
out for continuers in 1994. 
 
Finally, the employment index for RSA-assisted enterers in 2004 is over 20% larger than 
the corresponding index for non-assisted enterers while the capital index for non-assisted 
enterers  is  almost  four  times  larger  for  non-assisted  enterers.  This  suggests  that  a 
comparison based on TFP would favour RSA-assisted plants and this is precisely what is 
shown  in  table  6.2  where  RSA-assisted  entrants  have  a  far  lower  index  of  labour 
productivity but a larger index of TFP. 153 
 
 
7. The Causal Impact of RSA on Productivity 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine whether receipt of an RSA grant has a causal impact on plant 
TFP. To tackle the problem of self-selection into the treatment group outlined in chapter 
3.2, propensity score matching and instrumental variables will be employed. In order to 
control  for  the  endogeneity  of  other  variables  in  the  model,  all  estimations  will  be 
performed using the system GMM estimator. 
 
There are two measures of productivity upon which the impact of receipt of an RSA grant 
could  be  measured:  labour  productivity  and  TFP.  Labour  productivity  is  calculated  by 
dividing  output  or  GVA  by  employees.  TFP  measures  the  contribution  to  output  not 
attributable to factor inputs and, as such, captures technology and efficiency. TFP is chosen 
instead of labour productivity as the measure of productivity because the latter, unlike the 
former,  is  determined  by  factor  input  levels  in  addition  to  levels  of  efficiency  and 
technology (Harris, 2005b). To be precise, more capital or higher TFP leads to higher 
labour productivity while higher employment is associated with lower labour productivity 
under the assumption of diminishing returns to labour. As RSA is a capital grant scheme 
which has the promotion and safeguarding of employment as its main aim, any estimated 
impact of RSA on labour productivity will be the sum of the impact of an RSA grant on 
employment, capital and TFP. It will therefore be more difficult to interpret than when TFP 
is used as the measure of productivity. 
 
As discussed in chapter 4.2, there are two main channels through which an RSA grant may 
improve TFP. The first is by allowing the acquisition of modern capital which demands the 
reorganisation of the plant along more efficient lines. The second is by allowing the plant 
to create a new product that can be produced with greater efficiency than older product 
lines. 
 
As  shown  in  chapter  4.4,  previous  studies  have  generally  failed  to  find  a  statistically 
significant impact of receipt of an RSA grant on productivity. One exception is Harris and 
Robinson (2004) who, using a control group consisting of all untreated plants in GB, find a 154 
 
positive and statistically significant impact on TFP. However, this result is not replicated 
when the control group consists of untreated plants from the assisted areas, which implies 
that untreated plants in the assisted areas performed better, in terms of productivity, during 
the period under investigation. Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen (2007), using 
an instrumental variable approach which is partially replicated below, also do not find a 
significant effect of RSA on either labour productivity or TFP. Finally, Hart, Driffield, 
Roper  and  Mole  (2008a),  using  the  control  functions  approach  on  data  taken  from  a 
telephone survey of Scottish firms, do not find a positive impact of receipt of an RSA grant 
on labour productivity. While the latter two papers use appropriate methods to tackle the 
consequences  of  self-selection  into  the  treatment  group,  they  fail  to  deal  with  the 
endogeneity of other explanatory variables. Harris and Robinson (2004), by contrast, do 
not employ a sufficiently sophisticated method to control for self-selection but do control 
for the endogeneity of control variables. The analysis below tackles both sources of bias. 
 
The  next  section  will  set  out  the  econometric  model  that  will  be  estimated.  The  third 
section  will  describe  how  the  propensity  score  matching  and  instrumental  variables 
estimators,  described  in  chapter  3.3,  are  implemented  and  discusses  the  system  GMM 
estimator which is used to handle the endogeneity of control variables in the model. The 
fourth section presents the results and the final section concludes. 
 
7.2. Econometric Model 
 
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function (Cobb and Douglas, 1928): 
  ,
K E
it it it it K E A Y
b b =   (7.1) 
where Yit is GVA in plant i at time t, Eit represents employment, Kit represents the capacity 
utilisation adjusted capital stock and Ait is TFP. Taking natural logs of equation (7.1) gives: 
  , it it K it E it a k e y + + = b b   (7.2) 
where the lower case is used to denote the natural logarithm of a variable. 
 
It is now postulated that the natural logarithm of TFP can be modelled as follows: 
  ), ( it it i it ATT it X it m D x a + + + + = u h b b   (7.3) 
where xit is a vector of variables thought to influence TFP (in which continuous variables 
are logged) and Dit is a dummy taking the value of one if a plant receives an RSA grant in 
that period or has done so in the past. The error term is composed of ηi, an unobservable, 155 
 
plant-specific, time-invariant effect, νit, a TFP shock, and mit, a measurement error which is 
assumed to be serially uncorrelated. The RSA dummy is the key variable in the model as 
its coefficient, βATT, will provide the estimate of the impact of receiving an RSA grant on 
TFP.
37 
 
The TFP shock takes the following form: 
  it t i it e + = -1 , au u    . 1 < a   (7.4) 
It is autoregressive if . 0 ¹ a  
 
The model is therefore: 
  ). ( it it i it ATT it X it K it E it m D x k e y + + + + + + = u h b b b b   (7.5) 
 
The xit variables are included in equation (7.5) to avoid a biased estimate of the ATT 
caused by observed variables that are correlated with both the treatment variable and the 
error term (see chapter 5.4 for descriptions of all the variables used in the model). The 
first of these variables is the Herfindahl Index (Herfindahl, 1950), calculated at the four-
digit industry level. The Herfindahl Index is a measure of the concentration of output and 
hence  competition  within  an  industry.  Intuitively,  one  would  expect  that  greater 
competition (which implies a lower Herfindahl index) demands that plants operate more 
efficiently. However, it is arguable that the level of competition may be inversely related 
to productivity if monopoly rents are required for management to invest in R&D which in 
turn leads to improvements in TFP (Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers, 2001). 
 
The  next  two  variables  included  in  xit  represent  attempts  to  measure  two  types  of 
agglomeration  externalities.  Agglomeration  externalities  are  reductions  in  costs  or 
improvements  in  productivity  which  accrue  to  plants  located  in  the  vicinity  of  other 
plants. The first type of such externalities is localisation externalities. These arise due to 
the  concentration  of  plants  from  a  particular  industry  in  a  given  area  and  are  termed 
Marshallian externalities (Marshall, 1890). By contrast, Jacobian externalities arise as a 
                                                 
37 It is clear that receiving an RSA grant will have an impact upon employment and capital as well as on TFP. 
Therefore, the coefficient on the RSA dummy cannot be interpreted as the full impact of receiving an RSA 
grant on output. As interest here lies entirely in its impact on TFP, this presents no problems. 
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result  of  diversity  in  the  activities  of  plants  in  a  particular  area  (Jacobs,  1969).  The 
different types of externality are a reflection of difference views of information spillovers. 
Marshall  believed  that  information  spillovers  arose  primarily  within  industries  while 
Jacobs believed that they arose primarily between industries (Van Der Panne, 2004). In 
what  follows,  Marshallian  externalities  are  captured  by  a  variable  measuring  the 
proportion of industry output located within the local authority. Jacobian externalities are 
measured by a variable calculated as the number of different SIC codes within the local 
authority. 
 
An age variable is also included in xit. A priori, it is not immediately clear whether older 
plants will have higher TFP. On one hand, old plants are less likely to be employing the 
most modern technologies. On the other hand, they may have higher TFP as their survival 
indicates that they are the best of their cohort of plants. 
 
A time trend is also included to control for common improvements in TFP through time. 
The model was also run using year dummies but this made no substantive difference to 
the estimate of the ATT. 
 
A single plant dummy, equal to one if that plant is the only plant owned by the firm, is 
also included in xit. If technology is shared within multi-plant enterprises, this may confer 
a  TFP  benefit  to  being  part  of  a  multi-plant  enterprise  which  would  imply  that  the 
coefficient on the single plant dummy should be negative. 
 
A foreign ownership dummy was also included in the model. This is justified by the 
observation that multinationals must possess advantages that allow them to overcome the 
costs  of  operating  in  a  foreign  country  (Hymer,  1976).  If  one  of  these  advantages  is 
superior technology, foreign owned plants would have higher TFP (Harris and Li, 2007). 
It may also be hypothesised that foreign owned plants are a self-selected group of the 
population of plants as multinationals tend to acquire plants that have high levels of TFP. 
On  the  other  hand,  domestic  plants  may  experience  difficulties  in  adjusting  to  the 
technologies of the multinational owner which  implies that FDI plants may have low 
levels of TFP (Kronborg and Thomsen, 2008). It is therefore not obvious whether FDI 
plants should have higher or lower TFP than other plants in the population. 
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7.3. Estimation Strategy 
 
As discussed at length in chapter 3.2, the major econometric issue that must be tackled 
when estimating the impact of an RSA grant is that of self-selection into the treatment 
group. If all variables that determine both treatment status and the outcome variables are 
observed,  the  only  problem  with  estimating  equation  (7.5)  using  OLS  is  that  of 
misspecification. To deal with this, propensity score matching will be used. On the other 
hand,  if  there  are  unobservable  variables  that  determine  both  treatment  status  and  the 
outcome  variable,  the  matching  estimator  will  not  provide  unbiased  estimates  of  the 
treatment  effect.  To  overcome  the  problems  posed  by  the  potential  existence  of  such 
variables, an instrumental variables approach will be adopted. Regardless of the approach 
used to tackle the consequences of self-selection into the treatment group, it is necessary to 
control for correlation between the covariates and the error term in equation (7.5). This will 
be done using the system GMM estimator. 
 
Propensity Score Matching  
 
The major difficulty in creating a matched sample when the dataset is a panel is to avoid 
matching  on  variables  that  are  themselves  affected  by  treatment  status  (chapter  3.3 
provides a more detailed discussion of why this is important). If this is not done, treated 
and  untreated  plants  are  matched  on  the  basis  of  characteristics  that  are  similar  only 
because of differences in treatment status. Had they had the same treatment status, they 
would  have  different  characteristics  and  therefore  different  values  of  the  outcome 
variables. This is therefore a violation of the conditional independence assumption which 
underpins the matching estimator. When the dataset is cross-sectional, the researcher can 
either ignore this issue or only match on variables that are not affected by treatment status. 
When the dataset is a panel, treated observations can be matched to untreated observations 
using data from the period prior to treatment. This is the approach taken here for those 
variables that are affected by treatment. 
 
The first stage in performing propensity score matching is to estimate the propensity score. 
The probit model that is used to estimate the propensity score is: 
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where endit-1 is a once lagged vector of variables that may be affected by treatment and 
exoit  is  a  vector  of  variables  that  are  not  affected  by  treatment.  Included  in  endit  are 
employment, the capital stock, the Herfindahl  Index and the Marshallian specialisation 
externalities  variables.  exoit  consists  of  Jacobian  diversification  externalities;  the  single 
plant dummy, the foreign ownership dummy and government office region dummies. IDit 
is a dummy taking the value of one in the year in which a plant receives an RSA grant for 
the first time. This is different from Dit which takes the value of one if a plant receives an 
RSA grant in that period or has done so in the past. 
 
The matching proceeds by year on the basis of the predicted values from equation (7.6) so 
that treated plants are only matched to untreated plants from the same year. This is done 
because  matched  plants  are  supposed  to  act  as  matches  for  each  other  throughout  the 
sample  time  period.  The  same  treated  plant  cannot  be  matched  to  different  plants  in 
different  years  because  this  would  involve  matching  on  variables  that  are  affected  by 
treatment  after  the  treatment  has  occurred.  It  is  however  impossible  to  avoid  ‘broken’ 
matches with this approach as plants (treated or untreated) may become unobserved due to 
closure or being removed from the selected group of plants in the ARD. This is one reason 
why a multivariate regression approach is used on the matched sample as this will control 
for remaining differences in the distributions of the observables across the treatment and 
control groups. 
 
The precise form of matching was nearest neighbour matching where treated plants were 
matched  to  50  untreated  plants.
38  Such  a  large  number  of  treated  plants  were  chosen 
because of the relatively few plants in the sample that received RSA and the need for many 
observations to facilitate the use of the system GMM estimator which requires a large 
number of observations. The cost of so many neighbours is that the treated and control 
group plants are not as well matched as they would be with fewer matches. Again, this 
provides further justification for estimating a multivariate regression rather than simply a 
comparison  of  means  across  treatment  and  control  groups  because  differences  in  the 
distributions of the observed covariates are likely to remain in the matched sample. 
 
                                                 
38 Propensity score  matching is performed in STATA 9.2 using the ‘psmatch2’ command developed by 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 159 
 
As our focus is on the impact of RSA on Scottish manufacturing plants, the treatment 
group  always  consists  exclusively  of  Scottish  plants.  However,  the  ARD  contains 
information  on  plants  from  throughout  GB  and  these  are  allowed  to  form  part  of  the 
control group in the matched sample. The main advantage of this approach is that, in the 
matched sample, plants in the treatment group should be more closely matched to those in 
the control group in terms of the observed covariates in equation (7.5) than would be the 
case had only Scottish plants been available to form the control group. The disadvantage of 
this approach is that if non-Scottish plants have unobserved characteristics that differ from 
those in the Scottish treatment group, this will generate a bias in the estimate of the ATT. It 
should  however  be  noted  that  the  inclusion  of  region  dummies  in  (7.6)  reduces  the 
probability  that  non-Scottish  untreated  plants  are  in  the  matched  sample  so  that  this 
problem, if it exists at all, should not be too severe. 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
Finding a genuine IV is the major obstacle to implementing the IV estimator. Here, the 
instrument that is used is the location of the plant, AAit, defined as a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one if the plant is situated in an assisted area and zero otherwise. This 
approach is based on that taken by Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen (2007). 
 
The  difference  between  the  approach  taken  by  Criscuolo,  Martin,  Overman  and  Van 
Reenen (2007) and that taken here is that they use a series of dummies that equal one when 
the plant is located in different tiers of the assisted areas in which different proportions of 
project costs can be covered by RSA grants. This is not done here because some of these 
instruments will not satisfy the monotonicity assumption, discussed in chapter 3.3, which 
must be satisfied to estimate the LATE. This assumption requires that if some plants are 
induced to apply and receive a grant because the dummy equals one, no plants can be 
induced not to apply and receive a grant because the dummy equals one. But some plants 
may be induced to apply for an RSA grant when, for example, 20% of project costs can be 
covered by the grant while others may only apply for an RSA grant if a higher proportion 
of  project  costs  can  be  covered  by  the  grant  as  they  regard  20%  of  project  costs  as 
insufficient for it to be worthwhile receiving a grant. A dummy that equals one when a 
plant is situated in an area where RSA can provide grants up to a level of 20% of project 
costs would then not satisfy the monotonicity condition as some plants could be induced to 160 
 
apply  for  an  RSA  grant  when  the  dummy  takes  the  value  of  one  but  some  would  be 
induced not to apply when the dummy equals one. No such problem exists when a single 
assisted areas dummy is used.
39 
 
As discussed in chapter 3.3, an instrumental variable must be correlated with the RSA 
dummy and uncorrelated with all components of the error term, (ηi + νit + mit), in equation 
(7.5). With regard to the former  criterion, the  RSA dummy must be a function of the 
assisted areas dummy as a plant has to be situated in an assisted area if it is to receive an 
RSA  grant.  With  regard  to  the  latter,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  would  be 
correlated with the measurement error component of the error term, mit. The productivity 
shock, vit, is arguably not correlated with the assisted areas variable because the map of 
assisted areas is drawn using data on economic deprivation which is at least three years 
obsolete by the time the map comes into force. The assisted areas dummy should therefore 
not  capture  contemporaneous  factors  that  would  determine  the  productivity  shock,  vit. 
However, if economic conditions are slow to change in an area and are not captured by the 
time-invariant effects, there may still be correlation between the productivity shock and the 
assisted areas dummy. 
 
It is even more difficult to argue that there will be no correlation between the assisted areas 
dummy  and  the  time-invariant  effects,  ηi,  if  plants  derive  TFP  advantages  and 
disadvantages from being situated in different locations.
40 If no variables were included in 
xit which captured the influence of locational factors on output, the assisted areas variable 
will  be  correlated  with  the  time-invariant  effects,  ηi,  which  would  be  a  function  of 
unobserved locational factors from all periods. As assisted areas are poorly performing 
areas,  it  is  expected  that  this  correlation  would  be  negative.  However,  xit  includes  the 
Marshallian and Jacobian externalities variables discussed earlier. If these are sufficient to 
measure the influence of locational influences on plant performance, they will purge from 
the time-invariant effects, ηi, (and also from the productivity shock, vit) those locational 
                                                 
39 Another difference between the approach of Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen (2007) and that 
taken here is their use of data at the reporting unit level. As discussed in chapter 5.3, because RSA grants are 
awarded to individual plants, the local unit is the appropriate unit at which to conduct analysis of RSA. 
40 Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen (2007) employ the fixed effects estimator, which eliminates 
the time-invariant effects,  so do not need to concern themselves  with correlation between the treatment 
dummy and the time-invariant effects. 161 
 
influences on output which, if ignored, would create a correlation between the assisted 
areas dummy and the error term. They would therefore justify the exclusion of the assisted 
areas dummy from the outcome equation and hence its use as an instrumental variable. 
However, it is doubtful whether these variables will be sufficient to remove from the error 
term all locational influences on plant performance. If these doubts are well founded, the 
estimate of the ATT obtained using this strategy will be biased downwards because of the 
negative correlation between the assisted areas dummy and the error term. 
 
System GMM 
 
In addition to correlation between the error term and the RSA dummy resulting from self-
selection into the treatment group, there will also be correlation between the factor inputs 
and  the  productivity  shock  in  the  error  term.  This  is  the  product  of  simultaneity  and 
attrition bias.
41 Simultaneity bias arises because plants may have some knowledge about 
the value of the productivity shock in equation (7.5) and use this knowledge to choose the 
level of inputs in the production function (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). Attrition bias is 
present if plants base their exit decisions on their productivity level. As plants with a larger 
capital  stock  will  be  able  to  withstand  lower  productivity  levels,  this  will  generate  a 
negative correlation between the productivity shock and the capital stock variable. More 
generally, capital and labour are endogenous if the demand curve for the output of the plant 
is downward sloping and firms maximise profits. Although the main variable of interest is 
the RSA dummy, it is essential to deal with the endogeneity of other explanatory variables 
if an unbiased estimate of the ATT is to be obtained. This point is made forcefully by 
Frölich (2008) who shows that the asymptotic bias of the estimate of the treatment effect 
can be large if the endogeneity of other variables in the model is ignored. 
 
Therefore,  the  coefficients  in  equation  (7.5)  will  be  estimated  using  the  system  GMM 
estimator developed initially by Arellano and Bond (1991), augmented by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and further improved by Blundell and Bond (1998) (see Bond, 2002 for an 
introduction). This estimates the equation as a system, using lagged levels and lagged first 
differences of the endogenous variables as instruments for the equations in first differences 
                                                 
41 Van Beveren (2007) lists other potential sources of correlation between factor inputs and the error term. 
Here, consideration is given only to the two that are most frequently discussed in the literature. 162 
 
and levels respectively.
42 The endogenous variables in our model that will be dealt with in 
this way are employment, capital, the Herfindahl index and the Marshallian externalities 
variable.  It  is  assumed  that  the  other  variables  in  xit  are  exogenous.  A  more  detailed 
description  of  the  system  GMM  estimator  is  provided  in  the  appendix  along  with  an 
explanation of why the system GMM estimator was chosen ahead of a two stage approach 
in which the popular Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach is used to estimate TFP. 
 
However, if the productivity shock, vit, is autoregressive so that 0 ¹ a  in equation (7.4), it 
is not possible to estimate equation (7.5) using the system GMM estimator (Blundell and 
Bond,  2000).  This  is  because  the  instruments  for  the  endogenous  variables  will  be 
correlated with the error term regardless of the number of times they  are lagged.  It is 
therefore necessary to transform equation (7.5) so that the following dynamic equation is 
estimated: 
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where i i h a h ) 1 ( - =
* and 1 , - - + = t i it it it m m a u e . This error term is now serially uncorrelated 
if  there  is  no  measurement  error  and  it  is  a  first-order  moving  average  if  there  is 
measurement  error.  In  either  case,  the  system  GMM  estimator  using  suitably  lagged 
instruments will provide unbiased estimates of the parameters of the model. The long run 
coefficients in equation (7.5) on employment, capital, xit and the RSA dummy are given by 
the following: 
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7.4. Results 
 
Rather than performing the analysis using the entire sample, it is done separately for four 
industries. This is done to avoid the imposition of common coefficients across disparate 
industries. In particular, it is undesirable to impose common coefficients for labour and 
capital as different industries operate with different technologies. If the imposition was not 
valid,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  argue  that  the  coefficients  on  the  other  variables 
                                                 
42  This  estimator  is  can  be  implemented  in  STATA  9.2  using  the  ‘xtabond2’  command  developed  by 
Roodman (2005). 163 
 
accurately measure their impact on TFP. The industries that will be used are the food (SIC 
41), textiles (SIC 43), footwear and clothing (SIC 45) and paper, printing and publishing 
(SIC 47) industries. These are chosen because they receive a relatively large number of 
RSA grants and the estimated parameters were stable across instrument sets. 
 
All the results presented below are obtained using weighted data. Weighting is required to 
make  the  results  representative  of  the  population  of  plants  because  of  the  stratified 
sampling frame of the ABI. The sampling frame of the ABI and the construction of the 
weights are discussed in more detail in chapter 5 (Harris, 2005b gives a more general 
discussion of the need for weighting). 
 
The long-run coefficients obtained from estimation of equation (7.7) using no mechanism 
to  control  for  self-selection  into  the  treatment  group  are  displayed  in  table  7.1.  These 
results are useful in establishing a baseline set of estimates that allow comparison with the 
estimates obtained using propensity score matching and instrumental variables. To allow 
for measurement error, instruments are lagged at least three times for textiles, footwear and 
clothing and paper, printing and publishing. This proved to be a sufficient number of lags 
to avoid rejection of the null of valid instruments in the Hansen test. For the food industry, 
however, the instruments had to be lagged at least five times to avoid rejection of the null 
of valid instruments at the 95% level in the Hansen test. 
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Table 7.1: Estimates of Augmented Production Function obtained using no control for self-
selection 
  Food  Textiles  Footwear & 
Clothing  
Paper, Printing 
& Publishing 
ln(Employment)  0.612*** 
(0.132) 
0.732*** 
(0.159) 
0.647*** 
(0.166) 
0.665*** 
(0.099) 
ln(Capital)  0.379*** 
(0.131) 
0.327** 
(0.143) 
0.376** 
(0.150) 
0.383*** 
(0.082) 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
0.269** 
(0.108) 
-0.065 
(0.070) 
0.225** 
(0.094) 
0.017 
(0.024) 
ln(Marshallian 
Externalities) 
0.314 
(0.298) 
-0.048 
(0.120) 
0.092 
(0.128) 
0.143 
(0.131) 
ln(Jacobian 
Externalities) 
-0.424 
(0.322) 
-0.345*** 
(0.093) 
-0.146 
(0.158) 
-0.292 
(0.196) 
ln(Age)  -0.382 
(0.255) 
-0.832*** 
(0.261) 
-0.437*** 
(0.166) 
0.464*** 
(0.116) 
ln(Time)  0.151 
(0.113) 
-0.179*** 
(0.044) 
-0.092 
(0.089) 
-0.038 
(0.035) 
Single  -0.120 
(0.113) 
0.032 
(0.101) 
0.021 
(0.096) 
-0.344*** 
(0.070) 
FDI  0.114 
(0.083) 
0.193 
(0.130) 
0.205 
(0.174) 
0.088 
(0.064) 
RSA  0.124 
(0.167) 
0.214 
(0.130) 
-0.050 
(0.121) 
-0.155 
(0.092) 
Lags  5  3  3  3 
Hansen statistic  100.33*  92.48  80.33  92.22 
Observations  4,095  1,897  1,198  3,262 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses   
 
The estimates of the coefficients on employment and capital are all statistically significant 
at the 95% level and of a reasonable order of magnitude. This is important as it gives 
confidence  that  the  coefficients  on  the  other  variables  are  genuinely  estimates  of  their 
impact on TFP. With the exception of the textiles industry, which has a larger employment 
coefficient and a smaller capital coefficient than the other industries, the estimates of the 
coefficients  are  similar  across  industry.  The  estimates  of  the  coefficient  on  capital  are 
particularly close across the other three industries. 
 
The coefficient on the Herfindahl Index is positive and statistically significant at the 95% 
level for the food and the footwear and clothing industry but not significant at the 90% 
level for the textiles and the paper, printing and publishing industry.  Given the earlier 
discussion, this suggests that monopoly rents may be required to encourage plants to invest 
in R&D in the food and the footwear and clothing industries. The shortcomings of the 165 
 
Herfindahl Index as a measure of competition should also be noted as the Herfindahl Index 
does not take account of either potential or international competition and is dependent on 
the definition of the industry (Okada, 2005). 
 
The Marshallian specialisation externalities variable is not statistically significant at the 
90% level for any of the industries considered which suggests that productivity benefits of 
being situated near plants from the same industry are negligible in these industries. By 
contrast, the Jacobian externalities variable is negative and statistically significant for the 
textiles industry and negative but not significant for the other three industries. This may 
suggest that the benefits from being in areas with plants from many different industries are 
outweighed by disadvantages that arise from congestion. 
 
For the textiles, footwear and clothing and the paper, printing and publishing industries, 
older plants are found to have lower TFP, ceteris paribus. This is unsurprising as older 
plants are less likely to be employing the latest technologies. The time variable is negative 
and statistically significant for the textiles industry but not significant for the other three 
industries. This is difficult to explain as TFP would be expected to improve over time. 
 
The coefficient on the single plant dummy is negative and statistically significant for the 
paper, printing and publishing industry but not for any of the other industries considered. A 
negative coefficient is precisely what would be expected if plants derive benefits from 
being part of a multi-plant enterprise. While always positive, the coefficient on the FDI 
dummy is not statistically significant for any of the industries considered. 
 
The most important coefficient is, of course, that associated with the RSA dummy. It is 
positive for food and textiles but negative for footwear and clothing and paper, printing 
and publishing. It is not significant at the 90% level for any of the industries considered. 
Whether  this  lack  of  statistical  significance  is  the  product  of  misspecification  of  the 
observed  variables  or  RSA  recipients  possessing  unobserved  characteristics  that  make 
them prone to poor performance is the issue that will now be investigated. 
 
The results from estimating equation (7.7) using the matched sample are given in table 7.2. 
It should be borne in mind that all the observed covariates have been used to calculate the 
propensity score. As a result, they have less variance in the matched sample and their 166 
 
coefficients  will  therefore  be  less  reliable.  Appendix  A2  shows  the  extent  to  which 
differences in the distribution of these variables across treated and untreated groups are 
reduced by moving from the full to the matched sample. 
 
Table 7.2: Estimates of Augmented Production Function obtained using Propensity Score 
Matching 
  Food  Textiles  Footwear & 
Clothing  
Paper, Printing 
& Publishing 
ln(Employment)  0.581*** 
(0.105) 
0.243 
(0.162) 
0.174 
(0.186) 
0.841*** 
(0.127) 
ln(Capital)  0.405*** 
(0.131) 
0.796*** 
(0.141) 
0.668*** 
(0.161) 
0.176 
(0.138) 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
0.116 
(0.079) 
0.053 
(0.077) 
0.019 
(0.089) 
0.063 
(0.042) 
ln(Marshallian 
Externalities) 
-0.124 
(0.162) 
0.126 
(0.096) 
0.887*** 
(0.237) 
0.149 
(0.177) 
ln(Jacobian 
Externalities) 
0.038 
(0.152) 
-0.411*** 
(0.128) 
-0.645*** 
(0.233) 
-0.120 
(0.175) 
ln(Age)  -0.517** 
(0.250) 
-1.825*** 
(0.338) 
-0.924** 
(0.422) 
-0.334* 
(0.183) 
ln(Time)  0.076** 
(0.067) 
-0.174*** 
(0.061) 
-0.072 
(0.062) 
0.077 
(0.069) 
Single  -0.248*** 
(0.065) 
0.041 
(0.109) 
-0.023 
(0.115) 
-0.112 
(0.076) 
FDI  0.076 
(0.104) 
-0.212 
(0.145) 
-0.015 
(0.220) 
0.123** 
(0.058) 
RSA  0.032 
(0.087) 
0.151 
(0.155) 
-0.126 
(0.194) 
-0.099 
(0.114) 
Lags  3  3  3  3 
Hansen statistic  103.14  102.11  103.45  102.38 
Observations  2,115  1,748  1,391  2,213 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
Generally, the coefficients on the control variables are of the same sign as those in table 
7.1  although  there  are  notable  variations  in  significance.  The  coefficient  on  the 
employment  variable  is  positive  but  not  statistically  significant  for  the  textiles  and 
footwear and clothing industries while the coefficient on the capital stock is also positive 
for all industries but not significant for the paper, printing and publishing industry. Unlike 
in table 7.1, the Marshallian Externalities variable is positive and statistically significant 
for the footwear and clothing industry while the Jacobian Externalities variable is negative 
and  statistically  significant  for  this  and  the  textiles  industry.  The  age  variable  is  now 
negative and statistically significant for all of the industries instead of only for some as in 167 
 
table 7.1. The coefficient on time is positive and significant at the 95% level for the food 
industry and negative and significant at the 99% level for the textiles industry. The latter is 
the same as in the results using no control for self-selection. The single plant enterprise 
variable is negative and statistically significant for the food industry. 
 
Most importantly, for all four industries, the RSA dummy is once more not statistically 
significant. The point estimate is positive for the food and the textiles industry but negative 
for the footwear and clothing industry and the paper, printing and publishing industry. 
 
Table  7.3  gives  estimates  of  equation  (7.7)  using  instrumental  variables.  The  only 
difference between these estimates and those presented in table 7.1 is that the RSA dummy 
has been replaced in the instrument set by the assisted areas dummy. The Hansen test is of 
particular relevance in this set of estimates as it provides some evidence as to whether or 
not the instrument is valid. The null of valid instruments is not rejected at the 95% level for 
any  of  the  industries  considered  although  it  is  rejected  at  the  90%  level  for  the  food 
industry. This was also the case for the estimates presented in table 7.1 so this does not cast 
additional doubt on the validity of the instrument. However, it is important to note that the 
Hansen test is weak when there are many instruments (Roodman, 2009). Given that there 
were 96, 104, 101 and 106 instruments for the food, textiles, footwear and clothing and 
paper, printing and publishing industries respectively, this suggests that the Hansen test 
may  not  be  very  useful  as  a  test  of  the  validity  of  the  assisted  areas  dummy  as  an 
instrument. 
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Table 7.3: Estimates of Augmented Production obtained using Instrumental Variables 
  Food  Textiles  Footwear & 
Clothing  
Paper, Printing 
& Publishing 
ln(Employment)  0.551*** 
(0.151) 
0.755*** 
(0.164) 
0.684*** 
(0.194) 
0.682*** 
(0.105) 
ln(Capital)  0.413*** 
(0.148) 
0.236* 
(0.142) 
0.327* 
(0.171) 
0.353*** 
(0.087) 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
0.290** 
(0.117) 
-0.106 
(0.064) 
0.203** 
(0.090) 
0.017 
(0.025) 
ln(Marshallian 
Externalities) 
0.363 
(0.231) 
0.055 
(0.126) 
0.058 
(0.097) 
0.191 
(0.140) 
ln(Jacobian 
Externalities) 
-0.487** 
(0.239) 
-0.266*** 
(0.090) 
-0.162 
(0.169) 
-0.309 
(0.210) 
ln(Age)  -0.429 
(0.266) 
-0.567** 
(0.243) 
-0.329 
(0.205) 
-0.375*** 
(0.121) 
ln(Time)  0.127 
(0.122) 
-0.123*** 
(0.047) 
-0.031 
(0.086) 
0.019 
(0.049) 
Single  -0.214 
(0.168) 
0.070 
(0.108) 
0.104 
(0.094) 
0.259** 
(0.113) 
FDI  0.047 
(0.109) 
0.243* 
(0.137) 
0.366* 
(0.201) 
0.122* 
(0.066) 
RSA  0.842 
(1.235) 
-0.354 
(0.482) 
-0.633 
(0.586) 
-0.572 
(0.510) 
Lags  5  3  3  3 
Hansen statistic  99.03*  90.02  87.63  96.30 
Observations  4,095  1,897  1,198  3,262 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
As with the results in table 7.1, the coefficients on the factor inputs are all positive and 
statistically significant at the 90% level. With the exception of the coefficient on the RSA 
dummy, there are few differences with table 7.1 in terms of the size or significance of the 
coefficients  on  the  explanatory  variables.  This  is  unsurprising  given  that  the  only 
difference relates to the replacement of one variable in the instrument set. In terms of 
coefficients that are statistically significant, the coefficient on the Jacobian externalities 
variable  remains  negative  and  is  still  statistically  significant;  the  age  coefficient  is  no 
longer  statistically  significant  for  the  footwear  and  clothing  industry;  strangely,  the 
coefficient on the single plant dummy in the paper, printing and publishing industry has 
changed signs but retained its significance while, in accordance with expectations, the FDI 
dummy is now significant at the 90% level for all industries apart from the food industry. 
 
More importantly, comparing these results with those in table 7.1 that are obtained using 
no control for self-selection, the coefficient on the RSA dummy has fallen for all industries 169 
 
with the exception of the food industry. That it is not statistically significant for any of the 
industries considered implies that RSA had no impact on TFP. This is the same result as 
that  obtained  by  Criscuolo,  Martin,  Overman  and  Van  Reenen  (2007)  using  a  similar 
instrumental variables approach. 
 
Comparing  the  magnitudes  of  the  coefficients  obtained  using  different  estimators  can 
reveal  the  direction  of  bias  from  using  different  estimators.  For  all  of  the  industries 
considered, the estimate of the ATT using the matched sample is very close to the estimate 
obtained using no control for self-selection bias. This suggests that the latter estimates are 
not greatly contaminated by misspecification. It should be recalled that neither method will 
provide  unbiased  estimates  of  the  treatment  effect  if  there  is  correlation  between  the 
treatment variable and the error term due to the existence of unobserved variables that 
determine treatment status and the outcome variable as both sets of estimates depend on 
the  conditional  independence  assumption  holding  to  obtain  unbiased  estimates  of  the 
treatment effect. 
 
The instrumental variables estimate of the ATT is lower than the estimate obtained using 
no  control  for  self-selection  and  using  the  matched  sample  for  all  industries  with  the 
exception of the food industry. Assuming that the instrumental variable used is valid, this 
suggests that, for these three industries, there are unobserved covariates that are positively 
correlated with treatment status that are generating an upwards biased estimate of the ATT 
in tables 7.1 and 7.2. An alternative interpretation is that the instrumental variable is not 
valid and that the negative coefficients can be explained by the instrument being negatively 
correlated with the error term. Although it is not possible to prove conclusively which is 
the correct interpretation, it is the view of the author that the latter is more likely for two 
reasons: firstly, the direction of the movement of the estimate of the ATT between the 
matched  sample  and  instrumental  variable  estimates  conforms  with  what  would  be 
expected if the instrument was not valid; secondly, while it is quite conceivable that receipt 
of  an  RSA  grant  would  have  no  impact  on  TFP,  a  negative  impact  of  the  magnitude 
suggested  for  the  textiles,  footwear  and  clothing  and  paper,  printing  and  publishing 
industries is difficult to understand. Therefore, the preferred results are those obtained from 
the matched sample. 
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In order to probe the robustness of the results in tables 7.2 to 7.3, a number of variations on 
equation  (7.7)  were  estimated.  Firstly,  interactions  between  the  employment,  capital,xit 
variables and the RSA dummy were included to allow for different technologies across 
treated and untreated groups. These interactions were generally not statistically significant 
so this route was not pursued any further. 
 
Secondly,  as  SAMIS  provides  information  on  the  value  of  grants  received,  the  RSA 
dummy  was  substituted  for  a  variable  measuring  the  size  of  grant  received.  This 
specification of the treatment variable was statistically significant for one of the industries 
considered above for the matched sample at the 95% level but was not significant at the 
90%  level  either  for  any  of  the  other  industries  using  either  the  matched  sample  or 
instrumental variables. 
 
Thirdly, SAMIS also states whether an RSA grant was provided to safeguard or promote 
employment.  In  order  to  check  whether  the  impact  on  productivity  differed  for  grants 
provided  for  different  purposes,  equation  (7.7)  was  estimated  using  two  treatment 
dummies:  the  first  took  the  value  of  one  when  a  plant  received  a  grant  to  increase 
employment  and  the  second  equalled  one  if  a  plant  received  a  grant  to  safeguard 
employment. Neither dummy was statistically significant at the 90% level using either the 
matched sample or instrumental variables. 
 
Fourthly, the results above are obtained by treating plants that received multiple grants in 
exactly the same way as plants that received a single grant. Therefore, equation (7.7) was 
estimated using dummies that took the value of one from the time at which a plant received 
a  second  grant,  a  third  grant  and  so  on.  Although  these  dummies  were  occasionally 
statistically significant, there was no obvious pattern indicating that receipt of more grants 
led to greater improvements or deteriorations in TFP. Taken together, these robustness 
tests provide further evidence that the receipt of an RSA grant tends to have no statistically 
significant impact on TFP. 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to establish the existence of a causal impact of receipt of an RSA 
grant on plant TFP. In confirmation of results from other analyses of the RSA scheme, no 171 
 
statistically significant effect was identified for any of the industries considered. This is a 
worrying finding as an important objective of the RSA scheme is to improve productivity. 
It also calls into question whether jobs safeguarded or created by RSA grants will endure. 
 
The use of different estimators to estimate the ATT allows the researcher to see if the 
estimated  treatment  effect  is  robust  to  the  choice  of  estimation  strategy.  When  these 
estimates  differ,  the  differences  can  be  explained  with  reference  to  the  assumptions 
underpinning the different estimators. The small difference between the estimates obtained 
using  no  control  for  self-selection  and  the  estimates  obtained  using  a  matched  sample 
suggests that there is little problem of misspecification from using no control for self-
selection. However, for three of the four industries considered, the instrumental variables 
estimate of the treatment effect was considerably lower than the estimate obtained using 
the matched sample. Under the assumption that the instrument is valid, this suggests that 
plants that receive a grant have unobserved characteristics that lead to higher TFP which, if 
not controlled for, generate a misleadingly high estimate of the impact of an RSA grant. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  instrumental  variable  is  correlated  with  the  error  term  and 
therefore not a valid instrument, this is what will be driving the difference in results.  
 
Although it is impossible to state conclusively which conclusion ought to be drawn, the 
latter is more likely because the very large negative coefficient on the estimate of the ATT 
obtained  using  instrumental  variables  is  consistent  with  the  existence  of  a  negative 
correlation between the assisted areas dummy and treatment variable in spite of attempts to 
remove this. Therefore, the preferred results are those obtained using the matched sample 
although, as no statistically significant coefficient on the treatment variable is found using 
any of the estimators employed, the conclusion that receipt of an RSA grant has no causal 
impact on TFP is not put in doubt by the issue of which set of estimates are preferable. 
 
A7.1. Production Function Estimation 
 
This appendix will provide a description, based upon that provided by Bond (2002), of the 
system GMM estimator that will be used to estimate equation (7.7). It will then set out the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach to estimating the parameters of production functions 
and discuss why their approach will not be used here. 
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The first part will describe the difference GMM estimator of which the system  GMM 
estimator is an extension. To simplify the exposition, assume that we wish to estimate a 
simple AR(1) model: 
  , 1 it i it it y y u h a + + = -   (A7.1) 
where  yit  is  an  observation  of  some  variable  pertaining  to  plant  i  at  time  t,  ηi    is  an 
unobserved, plant-specific, time-invariant effect and υit is an error term which is assumed 
to be independently distributed across plants. It is assumed that the number of plants for 
which  data  is  available  is  large  while  the  number  of  time  periods  for  which  data  is 
available is small. 
 
The presence of yit-1 amongst the explanatory variables means that equation (A7.1) cannot 
be estimated using OLS because yit-1 is correlated with the ηi. Similarly, the fixed effects 
estimator  cannot  be  used  because,  although  the  within-transformation  removes  ηi,  a 
correlation  exists  between  the  transformed  lagged  dependent 
variable, ( ) 1 1 1 ... ...
1
1
- - + + + +
-
- iT it i it y y y
T
y ,  and  the  transformed  error  term, 
( ) iT it i it T
u u u u + + + +
-
- - ... ...
1
1
1 2 .  This  is  because  the  transformed  error  term  includes 
every realisation of the error term. 
 
Another  means  of  removing  the  time-invariant  effects  is  first-differencing.  First-
differencing equation (A7.1) gives: 
  . 1 it it it y y u a D + D = D -   (A7.2) 
This cannot be estimated by OLS because of the correlation between yit-1 in the  yit-1 term 
and υit-1 in the  υit term. However, the crucial difference between the within-transformed 
error term and the first differenced error is that the latter does not include every realisation 
of the error term. If yit is assumed to be predetermined – that is, yi1 is assumed to be 
uncorrelated  with  the  error  term  in  future  periods  –  and  υit  is  assumed  to  be  serially 
uncorrelated, the vector (yi1, yi1, ..., yiT-2) can be used as instrumental variables.
43 Therefore, 
consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (A7.2) can be obtained by 2SLS. 
 
                                                 
43 If υit is MA(1),  υit is MA(2) and yiT-2 is no longer a valid instrument.  In this case, the instrument set 
becomes (yi1, yi1,..., yiT-3). 173 
 
However,  2SLS  is  not efficient  because  the  complete  set  of  moment  conditions  is  not 
exploited.  The  difference  GMM  estimator  does  fully  exploit  all  available  moment 
conditions. It uses the following instrument matrix: 
  ,
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(A7.3) 
where the first row contains the instrument set for period 3, the second row the instrument 
set for period 4 and the final row the instrument set for period T. The moment conditions 
are given by: 
  ( ) , 0 , ' = D it i Z Cov u   (A7.4) 
where  ( )' ,..., , 4 3 iT i i i u u u u D D D = D . 
 
The difference GMM estimator minimises the following criterion: 
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(A7.5) 
where the weighting matrix, WN, is given by: 
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where i u ˆ D is a consistent estimate of the first difference error taken from a preliminary 
consistent estimator. 
 
When data is available for more than 3 time periods, the validity of the moment conditions 
can be tested using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Under the null that the 
moment conditions are valid, NJN has an asymptotic χ
2 distribution. 
 
Suppose now that, instead of estimating the simple AR(1) model in equation (A7.1), we 
wish to estimate the following model: 
  , 1 it i it it it x y y u h b a + + + = -   (A7.7) 
where xit is an additional vector of explanatory variables that are assumed to be correlated 
with ηi.  
 
Once again, first-differencing removes the ηi so equation (A7.7) becomes: 174 
 
  , 1 it it it it x y y u b a D + D + D = D -   (A7.8) 
If it is assumed that xit is correlated with υit, it is treated in the same way as yit-1, so xit-2, xit-3 
and longer lags can be used as instruments. 
 
So far, the difference GMM estimator has been described. Consider now estimation of 
equation (A7.7) if we are willing to assume that  xit is uncorrelated with the ηi: 
  , 0 ) , ( = D it it x Cov h   (A7.9) 
but we continue to assume that xit is correlated with the error term. In this situations,  xit-2, 
 xit-3 and longer lags are available as instruments for the estimation of equation (A7.6). 
 
Whether lags of  yit can be used as instruments for estimation of equation (A7.6) depends 
upon whether or not the following condition holds: 
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Equation (A7.10) states that the initial value of the yit does not differ systematically from 
the value,
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i , towards which the series converges. Equation (A7.10) then implies: 
  ( ) . 0 , 2 = D i i y Cov h   (A7.11) 
If it is also assumed that that the time-invariant effects, ηi, are uncorrelated with υit-1, the 
following moment conditions are available: 
  ( ) ( ) . 0 , 1 = + D - it i it y Cov u h   (A7.12) 
The main benefit of the additional moment conditions is that estimation of the parameters 
in equation (A7.7) no longer depends entirely on the use of lagged levels of variables as 
instruments for their first-differences as in the difference GMM estimator. This can be 
problematic because, as α approaches one or as ( ) ( ) it i u h var var  grows, lagged levels are 
only  weakly  correlated  with  subsequent  first  differences  and  the  difference  GMM 
estimator  is  hampered  by  the  problem  of  weak  instruments  (Blundell,  Bond  and 
Windmeijer,  2000).  This  problem  is  diminished  when  use  is  made  of  the  additional 
moment conditions which allow estimation of the equation in levels. 
 
Another method that is often used in this type of analysis is a two-stage approach in which 
estimates of TFP are obtained in the first stage and then used as the dependent variable in a 
second stage regression in which the treatment effect is estimated. Usually, the method 175 
 
developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is used 
in the first stage to calculate the measure of TFP. However, the validity of this approach is 
subject to question. Their method will now be set out and an explanation provided of why 
it will not be used here. 
 
The  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  approach  will  be  discussed  here  as  this  is  now  the  more 
commonly used of the two. Consider the following model: 
  , 0 it it it K it N it E it k n e y u w b b b b + + + + + =   (A7.13) 
where ωit represents productivity shocks observed by the plant but not by the researcher 
and nit is intermediate inputs. It is accepted that input choices will be based, at least on 
part,  on  the  realisation  of  these  productivity  shocks.  Assuming  that  demand  for 
intermediate inputs is a function of capital and the productivity shock, intermediate inputs 
can be written as follows: 
  ( ). , it it it it k n n w =   (A7.14) 
This can be inverted to obtain the following function: 
  ( ). , it it it it k n w w =   (A7.15) 
Substituting equation (A7.15) into equation (A7.13) gives:  
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which can be estimated using a high-order polynomial in nit and kit to approximate ωit. This 
is said to provide an estimate of the coefficient on employment although the coefficients on 
capital  and  intermediate  inputs  are  not  identified  since  these  variables  enter  equation 
(A7.16) more than once. 
 
In the second stage, the dependent variable is output net of the contribution from labour, 
y*, so that the following is estimated: 
  . 0 it it it K it N it E it it k n e y y u w b b b b + + + + = - =
*   (A7.17) 
Levinsohn  and  Petrin,  following  Olley  and  Pakes,  assume  that  the  productivity  shock 
follows a first-order process and that capital does not respond immediately to differences 
between  the  expected  value  and  the  realised  value  of  the  productivity  shock.  This 
difference is given by: 
  [ ].. | 1 , - - = t i it it it E w w w e   (A7.18) 
An estimate of [ ] 1 , | - t i it E w w  can be taken from the estimates from equation (A7.16). 176 
 
 
Equation (A7.17) can then be rewritten as:  
  [ ] . | 1 , 0 it it t i it it K it N it E k n y u e w w b b b + + + + + = -
*   (A7.19) 
By assumption, capital is uncorrelated with the error term. This is not true of intermediate 
inputs which may respond to the innovation in productivity. To estimate the coefficient on 
intermediate inputs, Levinsohn and Petrin use the moment condition implied by the fact 
that  the  lagged  value  of  intermediate  inputs  will  be  uncorrelated  with  the  productivity 
innovation. All the coefficients required to calculate TFP are therefore identified. 
 
This  approach,  which  has  become  popular  in  recent  years,  suffers  from  a  number  of 
drawbacks. It has been pointed out by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) that, if the ideas 
underpinning  identification  in  the  model  are  applied  consistently,  the  coefficient  on 
employment is not, in fact, identified unless some unappealing assumptions are made. To 
be specific, as employment and intermediate inputs are chosen at the same time and are 
assumed to be perfectly-variable, non-dynamic variables, it is natural to assume that they 
are both functions of the same variables, kit and ωit, so that employment can be written as: 
  ( ). , it it it it k e e w =   (A7.20) 
Substituting equation (A7.15) into equation (A7.20) gives: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ). , , , it it it it it it it it k n h k k n e e = = w   (A7.21) 
Employment is therefore also a function of intermediate inputs and the capital stock which 
implies  perfect  collinearity  between  employment  and ( ) it it it k n , w in  the  first-stage  of  the 
model and, therefore, that the coefficient on employment is not identified in the first-stage. 
 
Another drawback of this approach is that, unlike the system GMM estimator, it does not 
allow for unobserved, time-invariant effects in the error term that are correlated with the 
factor inputs. Instead, the productivity shock is the only component of the error term which 
is allowed to be correlated with the factor inputs. As time-invariant effects are likely to be 
important  due  to  the  existence  of  constant  unobserved  variables  (such  as  managerial 
ability) that determine output, this is a major shortcoming of the Levinsohn and Petrin 
approach. 
 
Another problem noted by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) is that there must be strict 
monotonicity between intermediate input demand and the productivity shock. If the latter 177 
 
does not hold, then the intermediate input function cannot be inverted and used as a proxy 
for the productivity shock.
44 Because of these three problems, the system GMM method 
outlined above is preferred. 
 
A7.2. Covariate Balance in the Full and Matched Sample for Productivity Analysis 
 
This appendix gives information on the distribution of each variable across treated and 
untreated groups in the full and the matched sample for each industry. The mean of each 
variable is presented and t-tests are employed to establish if this difference is statistically 
significant.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  tests  are  also  performed  which  test  the  null  that  the 
variable in the treated and untreated groups are drawn from the same distribution. This 
information is valuable as it provides an indication of the extent to which the balance of the 
observed covariates across the treated and untreated groups is improved by moving from 
the  full  to  the  matched  sample  and  therefore  the  extent  to  which  problems  of 
misspecification caused by self-selection are alleviated. 
 
Table A7.1 shows the results for the food industry. 
 
                                                 
44 The major difference between the Levinsohn & Petrin method and the Olley & Pakes method is that, in the 
latter,  investment  performs  the  function  of  intermediate  inputs.  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  choose  to  use 
intermediate inputs because they argue that the monotonicity condition is more likely to be satisfied using 
intermediate inputs because of the ‘lumpiness’ of investment. 178 
 
Table A7.1: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Food Industry for Productivity Analysis 
  Full Sample  Matched Sample 
  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S 
ln(Employment)  2.52  3.48  -0.96***  0.40***  3.29  3.63  -0.34***  0.16*** 
ln(Capital)  3.29  4.62  -1.33***  0.34***  4.43  4.91  -0.48***  0.14*** 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-2.11  -1.77  -0.35***  0.24***  -1.64  -1.58  -0.06  0.08** 
ln(Marshallian 
Externalities) 
-1.06  -0.73  -0.33***  0.18***  -0.68  -0.65  -0.03  0.06 
ln(Jacobian 
Externalities) 
2.26  1.86  0.40***  0.21***  1.76  1.75  0.01  0.05 
ln(Age)  1.98  2.06  -0.07  0.11***  2.17  2.18  -0.01  0.07* 
Single  0.19  0.36  -0.17***  0.23***  0.13  0.16  -0.04**  0.06 
FDI    0.03  0.07  -0.04***  0.06*  0.09  0.13  -0.04**  0.06 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
With the exception of the age variable, the differences in the mean of the explanatory 
variables across treated and untreated groups are all statistically significant at the 99% 
level in the full sample. In the matched sample, the differences in the mean have fallen for 
all variables. While the differences remains statistically significant for the employment, 
capital, age and single plant enterprise variable, the differences in the mean for the other 
variables  are  no  longer  statistically  significant.  In  the  full  sample,  the  Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistic indicates a rejection of the null that the treated and untreated groups 
are drawn from the same distribution for each variable at the 90% level. In the matched 
sample, the null is only rejected at this level for the employment, capital, Herfindahl Index 
and the age variable. 
 
Table A7.2 provides the same information for the textiles industry. 
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Table A7.2: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Textiles Industry for Productivity Analysis 
  Full Sample  Matched Sample 
  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S 
ln(Employment)  3.31  3.46  -0.15***  0.10***  3.64  3.63  0.01  0.07* 
ln(Capital)  4.51  4.54  -0.03  0.08**  5.05  5.07  -0.02  0.07* 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-2.55  -2.07  -0.48***  0.20***  -1.99  -2.07  0.08*  0.09** 
ln(Marshallian 
Externalities) 
-0.43  -0.30  -0.19**  0.17***  -0.15  -0.28  0.13**  0.18*** 
ln(Jacobian 
Externalities) 
1.92  1.61  0.31***  0.14***  1.75  1.70  0.05  0.06 
ln(Age)  2.44  2.29  0.15**  0.10***  2.48  2.47  0.01  0.03 
Single  0.24  0.23  0.01  0.03  0.26  0.24  0.03  0.04 
FDI  0.05  0.07  -0.02**  0.04  0.09  0.11  -0.02  0.03 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
In  the  full  sample,  the  difference  in  mean  across  the  treated  and  untreated  groups  is 
statistically significant at the 95% level for all variables apart from the capital and the 
single plant enterprise variable. In the matched sample, the difference in mean has fallen 
for all variables apart from the single plant variable and remains statistically significant at 
the  90%  level  for  the  Herfindahl  index  and  Marshallian  Externalities  variables.  The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates a difference in the distribution of all variables, with 
the exception of the single plant and FDI variable, at the 95% level in the full sample. In 
the matched sample, the difference is only statistically significant at the 90% level for the 
employment, capital, Herfindahl Index and Marshallian Externalities variable. 
 
The results for the footwear and clothing industry are given below in table A7.3. 
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Table A7.3: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Footwear and Clothing Industry for Productivity Analysis 
  Full Sample  Matched Sample 
  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S 
ln(Employment)  3.08  3.58  -0.49***  0.21***  3.48  3.67  -0.19***  0.11*** 
ln(Capital)  3.31  4.05  -0.74***  0.21***  3.99  4.24  -0.25***  0.14*** 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-2.56  -2.01  -0.55***  0.27***  -1.95  -1.84  -0.11**  0.10** 
ln(Marshallian 
Externalities) 
-0.84  -0.44  -0.40***  0.17***  -0.48  -0.50  0.02  0.18*** 
ln(Jacobian 
Externalities) 
2.57  1.80  0.77***  0.26***  1.62  1.45  0.17***  0.19*** 
ln(Age)  2.18  2.15  0.03  0.15***  2.24  2.15  0.08**  0.08* 
Single  0.30  0.26  0.05*  0.08**  0.27  0.21  0.06***  0.11*** 
FDI  0.06  0.14  -0.08  0.16***  0.01  0.09  -0.08***  0.11*** 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
In  the  full  sample,  there  is  a  statistically  significant  difference  in  the  mean  of  all  the 
variables, apart from the age and FDI variables across treated and untreated groups. In the 
matched sample, the magnitude of the difference falls for all variables apart from the age 
and  the  single  plant  enterprise  variable.  However,  the  differences  are  statistically 
significant at the 90% level for all variables except the single plant variable. The null that 
the treated and untreated groups are drawn from the same distribution is rejected for all 
variables at the 95% level in the full sample. Although the test statistic decreases for all but 
the Marshallian Externalities and the age variable, the null is still rejected at the 90% level 
for all variables in the matched sample. 
 
Table  A7.4  provides  the  equivalent  statistics  for  the  paper,  printing  and  publishing 
industries. 
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Table A7.4: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Paper, Printing and Publishing Industry for Productivity Analysis 
  Full Sample  Matched Sample 
  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  Combined 
K-S 
ln(Employment)  2.58  3.88  -1.30***  0.51***  3.46  3.65  -0.19***  0.17*** 
ln(Capital)  3.89  5.60  -1.71***  0.37***  5.08  5.69  -0.61***  0.22*** 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-3.01  -2.88  -0.13  0.13***  -2.40  -2.84  0.44***  0.17*** 
ln(Marshallian 
Externalities) 
-1.03  -0.79  -0.24***  0.16***  -0.78  -0.91  0.12**  0.15*** 
ln(Jacobian 
Externalities) 
2.49  2.22  0.27***  0.14***  1.94  2.17  -0.23***  0.16*** 
ln(Age)  2.33  2.36  -0.03  0.14***  2.30  2.63  -0.33***  0.23*** 
Single  0.22  0.37  -0.16***  0.19***  0.23  0.40  -0.17***  0.19*** 
FDI  0.12  0.17  -0.05***  0.11***   0.14  0.18  -0.04*  0.09* 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
In the paper, printing and publishing industry, the difference in mean across the treated and 
untreated groups is statistically significant at the 99% level for all but the Herfindahl Index 
and the age variables. The difference in mean decreases for all but the Herfindahl Index, 
age and the single plant enterprise variables in the matched sample but is still statistically 
significant at the 95% level for all variables. The null of the treated and untreated groups 
being drawn from the same distribution is rejected at the 99% level for each variable in the 
full sample. While the distributions are better matched across treatment and control groups 
in the matched sample, the null is still rejected for all variables at the 90% level. 
 
Taken  together,  these  tables  show  that  the  matching  process  has  brought  into  closer 
alignment the distribution of the observed covariates in equation (7.7) across the treated 
and untreated groups. This is unsurprising as this is precisely what matching is designed to 
do. The extent to which the difference in the distribution of variables across treatment and 
untreated groups between the full and matched sample is reduced is a reflection of the size 
of the coefficient on the variable in the probit model used to generate the propensity scores. 
For  instance,  employment  is  an  important  determinant  of  treatment  so  has  a  large 
coefficient in a probit model of treatment status. As a result, for all industries, there is a 
large reduction in the difference of the mean of employment across treated and untreated 
group when the matched sample is compared to the full sample. On the other hand, for 
those  variables  which  are  not  such  important  determinants  of  treatment  status,  the 
difference across treated and untreated groups may remain large or even increase in the 182 
 
matched sample. This suggests that the approach adopted of including these variables in 
the outcome regression, rather than simply comparing the mean of the outcome variable 
across treatment and control groups, is the correct one. Failure to do so would not control 
for remaining differences in the distribution of the observed covariates across treatment 
and control group and would therefore lead to biased estimates of the treatment effect. 183 
 
 
8. The Causal Impact of RSA on Survival 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine whether receipt of an RSA grant has a causal impact on plant 
survival. It will do so by estimating a Cox proportional hazards model. In order to control 
for the consequences of self-selection into the treatment group, the model will be estimated 
using a sample created by propensity score matching. 
 
As  discussed  in  chapter  3.3,  the  instrumental  variables  estimator  provides  a  way  of 
obtaining unbiased estimates of the treatment effect when the treatment group is a self-
selected group of the population of plants with unobservable characteristics that differ from 
those of the untreated group. However, implicit in that earlier discussion is the assumption 
that the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable is linear. 
When the relationship is non-linear, as in proportional hazards models, the instrumental 
variable estimator as described in chapter 3.3 cannot be applied. Instrumental variables 
estimators for hazards models are now being developed (see, for example, Bijwaard, 2008) 
but these are not yet available in statistical packages. This is unfortunate as it means that it 
is not possible to estimate a hazard model that allows for unobservable variables that are 
correlated with both the treatment variable and the hazard rate. Therefore, the conditional 
independence assumption discussed in chapter 3.3 must be assumed to hold if the estimates 
below are to be unbiased estimates of the treatment effect. 
 
The only paper that has evaluated the impact of receipt of an RSA grant on the probability 
of survival is by Harris and Robinson (2005). Using a similar dataset and methodology to 
that which will be used below, but with no control for the consequences of self-selection, 
they find that receipt of an RSA grant lowered the probability of closure by 32.1% for 
plants aged one or less and that this rises to nearly 57.1% for plants aged over ten years. 
Harris and Trainor (2007) also employ a Cox proportional hazards model to examine the 
impact of SFA - the Northern Irish equivalent of RSA - on the probability of closure and 
find that SFA recipients had on average a 24.1% lower probability of closure than non-
recipients. Noting the potential existence of self-selection bias in these estimates, they then 
re-estimate the model using the predicted values from a Tobit regression of value of SFA 184 
 
received upon relevant variables instead of the actual values. This method suggests that 
receipt of SFA reduced the probability of closure by 15%. However, it should be borne in 
mind that this approach, which amounts to an instrumental variables approach, is invalid 
because of the non-linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable in the Cox proportional hazards model. Finally, as is done below, Girma, Görg 
and Strobl (2007b) combine propensity score matching with the Cox proportional hazard 
model  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  government  grants  on  closure  probability  in  Irish 
manufacturing plants. Their results also indicate that receiving a government grant lowered 
the probability of closure by a statistically significant amount (these papers are critically 
reviewed in chapter 4.4). 
 
The next section will describe the model that is used to estimate the impact of receiving an 
RSA grant on closure probability; the third section will describe how the matched sample 
was created and how the proportional hazards model was estimated; the fourth section 
gives results and the fifth section concludes. 
 
8.2. Econometric Model 
 
The hazard function is defined as the probability of closure in period t, having survived 
until period t: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ], , | ; t X t T t T P t X t h ³ = =   (8.1)   
where T is the year in which the plant closes and X(t) is a vector of time varying covariates. 
 
A proportional hazards model takes the following form: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), exp 0 b t x t h t h =   (8.2) 
where h0(t) is a non-parametric baseline hazard function – the hazard rate for a plant with 
all  covariates  set  to  zero  –  that  is  shared  by  all  plants  and ( ) ( ) b t x exp is  a  parametric 
function  of  plant  characteristics.  The  proportional  hazards  model  is  therefore  a  semi-
parametric  model.  This  specification  of  the  hazards  function  implies  that  covariates 
multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard as follows: 
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where j i ¹ . This implies that for two plants with different covariate values, the ratio of 
their hazard functions is not a function of time. 185 
 
 
The specification of the explanatory variables in equation (8.2) is: 
  ( ) , it ATT it X D x t x b b b + =   (8.4) 
where Dit is a dummy that takes the value of one from the time at which the plant received 
a grant. xit are a vector of variables included in the hazard model to avoid a biased estimate 
of the ATT due to correlation between observable covariates and the treatment dummy. All 
continuous  variables  are  entered  in  logarithmic  form.  The  following  will  describe  the 
variables  included  in  xit  and  explain  why  they  are  thought  likely  to  determine  the 
probability  of  survival.  Chapter  5.4  provides  more  detail  on  how  the  variables  were 
constructed. 
 
The decision of an enterprise to close a plant depends ultimately on the contribution of the 
plant to the profits of the enterprise. When the difference in the discounted expected profits 
over  future  periods  of  the  enterprise  with  the  plant  and  without  the  plant  exceeds  the 
liquidation value of the plant, then the enterprise will choose not to close the plant. Given 
its role as a key determinant of the contribution of the plant to the profits of the enterprise, 
efficiency is of great importance in this decision (Harris and Li, 2007). As discussed in 
chapter 7.1, TFP is a better measure of efficiency than labour productivity because it is not 
determined by factor input levels. However, because TFP must be estimated in a first stage 
regression, its inclusion in xit would introduce problems of inference with the estimate of 
the hazard rate on the treatment variable (see Wooldridge, 2007 for an introduction to the 
issues that arise when generated regressors are used).  This is because the standard errors 
of all the estimated hazard rates are incorrect when one of the regressors is generated. To 
avoid these problems, labour productivity is used to proxy for efficiency. 
 
The theoretical model of learning and market selection by Jovanovich (1982) motivates the 
inclusion in the model of plant size and age as further proxies for efficiency levels. In this 
model,  efficiency  levels  are  random,  unobserved,  time-invariant  and  differ  across 
enterprises  which  begin  with  identical  prior  beliefs  about  their  efficiency,  believing 
themselves to be a random draw from the distribution of efficiency. On the basis of their 
estimate of their own efficiency, enterprises choose their output levels. Ceteris paribus, a 
higher estimate of the efficiency leads to a higher level of output. Actual production costs 
are  determined  by  both  efficiency  and  a  stochastic  error.  Over  time,  each  enterprise’s 
estimate of its efficiency becomes more precise as they update their estimate on the basis 186 
 
of observed actual production costs. Enterprises close when its estimate of its efficiency 
falls below a threshold. As enterprises with such expectations will not have grown as fast 
as plants with greater efficiency, plant size is negatively associated with closure (Colombo 
and  Delmastro,  2001).  Moreover,  as  the  probability  of  a  change  in  the  estimate  of 
efficiency that leads to closure falls over time due to the increasing precision with which 
‘true  efficiency’  is  estimated,  enterprise  age  is  negatively  associated  with  closure 
probability. The employment and age variables are therefore included, alongside labour 
productivity, in xit to proxy for efficiency levels. 
 
Also included in xit is the capital to labour ratio. As plants with a large capital to labour 
ratio will have a large fixed to variable costs ratio, such plants are more likely to be able to 
avoid closure when costs exceed revenues because they are better able to cover their fixed 
costs (Doms, Dunne and Roberts, 1995). The inclusion of the capital to labour ratio can 
also be justified on the grounds that it acts as a proxy for sunk costs. As such assets cannot 
be profitably employed in other industries, they deter exit (Siegfried and Evans, 1994). 
From  a  different  perspective,  the  model  by  Hopenhayn  (1992)  provides  another 
explanation for why the existence of sunk costs may reduce the probability of exit. Since 
sunk costs deter entry, they insulate incumbents, who do not have to pay the sunk cost, 
from market selection based on productivity levels. Therefore, plants with low productivity 
levels that would otherwise close do not in industries where entrants have to incur sunk 
costs. 
 
Also included among the covariates is the Herfindahl Index (Herfindahl, 1950) calculated 
at  the  four-digit  industry  level.  The  Herfindahl  Index  is  a  measure  of  the  degree  of 
concentration  and  hence  competition  within  an industry.  Lower  values  indicate  greater 
competition.  A  priori  expectations  are  that  large  plants  within  a  highly  concentrated 
industry with little competition will have a lower probability of closure while small plants 
within the same industry will have a higher probability of closure because large plants can 
behave in a retaliatory manner in a bid to preserve their position (Audretsch, 1994). 
 
The proportion of newly opened plants’ output in total industry output is included in xit to 
capture displacement. Displacement occurs when incumbent plants are driven out of the 
market by more aggressive and efficient entrants (see Siegfried and Evans, 1994; Caves 
and Porter, 1976). Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) provide a theoretical model in which 187 
 
prices are chosen noncooperatively and find that the number of firms in the market is 
subject  to  an  upper  bound.  Having  reached  this  upper  bound,  the  entry  of  new  firms 
necessitates the exit of others. 
 
Another variable included in xit is the growth of industry employment. This represents an 
attempt  to  capture  perceptions  of  future  profits.  As  employment  will  generally  rise  as 
perceptions of profits improve, it is expected that the growth of industry employment will 
be negatively related to closure probability. An advantage of using employment rather than 
output is that, given the difficulties of dismissing employees, the growth of employment is 
more likely to indicate an improvement in perceptions of future profits than rises in output 
which do not reflect such a commitment. 
 
A foreign ownership dummy is also included among the covariates. It is difficult to predict 
a priori whether being owned by a multinational will be positively or negatively related to 
survival. If foreign-owned plants have access to superior foreign technologies by virtue of 
its link to the home country of the multinational, this would imply that FDI plants would 
be less likely to close (Harris and Li, 2007). Furthermore, if the multinational itself has 
proprietary  assets  which  it  shares  with  its  subsidiaries,  this  should  also  reduce  the 
probability of closure. It may also be hypothesised that multinationals tend to acquire high 
quality plants and that FDI plants are therefore a selected group of the population of plants 
with  characteristics  that  make  them  less  likely  to  close.  On  the  other  hand,  a  lack  of 
knowledge of operating in the foreign market may impede plants owned by multinationals. 
The acquired plant may also experience difficulties in adjusting to the technologies of the 
multinational.  Furthermore,  multinationals  may  be  more  inclined  to  close  foreign 
subsidiaries than plants at home because home country stakeholders have more influence 
over  company  policy  than  host  country  stakeholders  (Kronborg  and  Thomsen,  2008). 
These  latter  considerations  suggest  that  FDI  plants  may  have  a  higher  probability  of 
closure. 
 
A change in ownership dummy taking the value of one from the point at which ownership 
changed is also included among xit. This is because the acquiring enterprise may be unable 
to purchase only those plants that it wishes to purchase but rather has to buy all the plants 
belonging to the enterprise that is being bought. If some of these plants are not actually 
wanted  by  the  enterprise  they  will  be  closed  if  they  cannot  be  resold  (McGuckin  and 188 
 
Nguyen,  1995).  Another  related  motivation  for  the  inclusion  of  this  dummy  is  that 
restructuring within the acquiring enterprise following the acquisition of a new group of 
plants  may  require  the  closure  of  some  of  the  newly  acquired  plants  (McGuckin  and 
Nguyen, 2001). 
 
Finally,  a  dummy  that  equals  one  when  the  plant  is  not  part  of  a  larger  enterprise  is 
included in xit. Owners of single plant enterprises are expected to have a lower opportunity 
cost of closure than owners of multi-plant establishments and are therefore expected to be 
willing to accept lower rates of return (Audretsch, 1994). This is because closure of a plant 
within a multi-plant enterprise does not mean the closure of the entire enterprise or the 
exiting of the enterprise from the market if production is then transferred to other plants 
within  the  enterprise  (Colombo  and  Delmastro,  2000).  As  a  result,  if  the  multi-plant 
enterprise decided to re-open the plant, it would not incur the same re-entry costs as would 
the single plant enterprise. 
 
The  inclusion  of  variables  in  xit  that  may  be  determined  by  treatment  status  begs  the 
question of whether their coefficients must be taken account of to generate an estimate of 
the impact of the total impact of receipt of an RSA grant on closure probability. Two such 
variables  are  labour  productivity  and  employment.  Consideration  of  the  rationale  for 
including these variables in xit shows that it is not necessary to consider the impact of these 
variables on closure probability to come to an estimate of the total impact of RSA on 
survival probability. This is because both these variables are only included in xit as proxies 
for efficiency and chapter 7 has shown that receipt of an RSA grant has no statistically 
significant impact on TFP, which is a better measure of efficiency. Another variable in xit 
that will be determined by treatment status is the capital to labour ratio which is included to 
proxy for sunk costs. The fact that RSA grant may be spent on sunk costs, which are 
expected  to  be  negatively  associated  with  closure  probability,  is  undeniable  and  the 
coefficient  on  the  capital  to  labour  ratio  should  therefore  be  taken  into  account  when 
estimating the total impact of receipt of an RSA grant. 
 
The inclusion of variables to proxy for efficiency in xit deserves further attention as it casts 
doubt on whether a negative causal relationship between RSA and closure probability is 
desirable. A negative relationship would imply that RSA grants could allow plants with 
low productivity to survive and therefore, in accordance with Schumpeterian notions of 189 
 
‘creative  destruction’,  hinder  the  process  by  which  resources  shift  from  low  to  high 
productivity plants (Schumpeter, 1943). In this situation, the causal impact of RSA on 
aggregate productivity, and therefore income per capita, would be negative. 
 
8.3. Estimation Strategy 
 
This section will describe how equation (8.2) will be estimated. The section is divided into 
two parts: the first describes how the matched sample was created and the second explains 
how the proportional hazards model is estimated. 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
The way in which the matched sample was created is directly analogous to the way in 
which the matched sample was created in chapter 7 where the impact of receipt of an RSA 
grant on TFP was examined. Therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition, the following will 
only set out the way in which the approaches differ which is in the estimation of the probit 
model which contains different variables due to the different variables contained in the 
outcome equations. 
 
The probit model used to estimate the propensity score is: 
  , 3 1 1 it it it it exo end ID e g g + + = -   (8.5) 
where endit is a vector of variables that may be affected by treatment and exoit is a vector 
of variables that are not affected by treatment. Included in endit-1 are the lag of labour 
productivity, employment, the capital to labour ratio and the Herfindahl Index. Included in 
exoit is plant age, displacement, the growth of industry employment, the foreign ownership 
dummy, the ownership change dummy and the single plant dummy. 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
This section will describe how proportional hazards models of the form of equation (8.2) 
can be estimated. It will then describe how the assumption of proportional hazards can be 
tested. 
 190 
 
To estimate equation (8.2), the shape of the baseline hazard can be assumed to take a 
particular form. For instance, the Weibull distribution could be assumed: 
  , ) (
1
0
- =
p pt t h   (8.6) 
where p is a shape parameter. If h0(t) was assumed to take that form, the proportional 
hazards model becomes a parametric model. However, it is difficult to say what form h0(t) 
will take and specifying an incorrect baseline hazard will lead to biased estimates of β. 
Fortunately, Cox (1972) showed that it is not necessary to specify a functional form for 
h0(t) so this problem can be avoided. The cost of not assuming a functional form for the 
baseline hazard is a loss in efficiency but, in situations where the shape of the baseline 
hazard is unknown, this is a cost that must be accepted. 
 
The  parameter  estimates  in  the  Cox  proportional  hazards  model  are  obtained  by 
maximising the following partial likelihood function:
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where Pj is the conditional probability that plant j closes in the period in which it closes 
and k is the number of periods in which plants are observed to close. Equation (8.7) is a 
partial rather than a full likelihood assumption because only those periods in which plants 
are  observed  to  fail  are  used  to  calculate  β.  Given  equation  (8.2),  the  conditional 
probability that plant j closes in the period in which it closes is given by: 
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where tj is the year in which plant j closes and Rj is the number of plants in the risk pool at 
time tj. As can be seen from equation (8.8), the hj(tj) terms cancel which means that it is not 
necessary to specify a baseline hazard function. 
 
Substituting equation (8.8) into equation (8.7) gives: 
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45 The Cox proportional hazards model is performed in STATA 9.2 using the ‘stcox’ command (see Cleves, 
Gould and Gutierrez, 2002 for an introduction to this command). 191 
 
When more than one plant is observed to fail during a particular time period, the issue of 
how  to  handle  tied  failures  arises.  If  different  plants  failed  at  different  times  but  are 
observed to have failed at the same time because of limitations in the precision with which 
failure  times  are  measured,  the  marginal  method  should  be  used.  To  simplify  the 
exposition, define: 
  ( ). exp b i i x r =   (8.10) 
To simplify further, assume that there are only three plants at risk of failure in period 1. 
Suppose that plants 1 and 2 are observed to fail. P12 is the probability that plant 1 fails 
before plant 2 and P21 is the probability that plant 2 fails before plant 1. P12 is given by: 
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To obtain the marginal estimate of β,  21 12 P P + are substituted in equation (8.7) in place of 
P1. 
 
As the marginal method is computationally demanding, the Breslow (1974) method for 
handling tied failures is often used as an approximation. For this reason, and the more 
practical reason that Stata 9.2 does not allow the marginal method to be used when the data 
is weighted, the Breslow approximation is used below. 
 
The difference between the Breslow approximation and the marginal method is that the 
Breslow approximation does not adjust the risk pool for plants that fail after the first failure 
when  calculating  the  conditional  probabilities.  Therefore,  instead  of  representing  the 
probability that plant 1 fails before plant 2 and plant 2 fails before plant 1 as in equation 
(8.11) and (8.12), these conditional probabilities are given by: 
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The contribution to the likelihood function for period 1 is then: 
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Comparison of the contributions to the likelihood function from tied failures when the 
Breslow  approximation  is  employed  rather  than  the  marginal  method  shows  why  the 
former is less computationally demanding. 
 
As discussed above, proportional hazards models assume that all plants share the same 
baseline hazard. In many cases, the assumption of a single baseline hazard for all plants is 
not satisfied. It is then necessary to use a stratified proportional hazards model in which the 
parameters of the model are constrained to be the same for all plants, but different groups 
of plants are allowed to have different baseline hazards. Tests of the proportional hazards 
assumption are based on residuals developed by Schoenfeld (1982). These residuals are 
regressed against time with a statistically significant coefficient on time indicating that the 
proportional hazards assumption does not hold.
46 
 
In a typical regression, one set of residuals is obtained for the entire regression. From the 
Cox proportional hazards model, a different set of Schoenfeld residuals is obtained for 
each covariate. In the absence of tied failures times, the Schoenfeld residual for covariate 
xu is calculated as follows: 
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Equation (8.15) states that εuj is the difference between the value of xu for the plant that 
failed and the weighted average of xu for those plants at risk of failure in that period. The 
weights are determined from the estimated hazard rates in the Cox model with plants that 
are more likely to fail having higher hazard rates. To perform the proportional hazards test, 
we postulate that β is a function of time as follows: 
  ( ) ( ), t g q t j u u + = b b   (8.16) 
where  βu  is  the  coefficient  associated  with  xu  and  g(t)  is  a  function  of  time.  If  the 
proportional hazards assumptions holds, qj should equal zero. The Schoenfeld residuals can 
be scaled so that the following holds (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994): 
  ( ) ( ),
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46 This is done in STATA 9.2 using the stphtest command. 193 
 
where
*
uj e are the rescaled Schoenfeld residuals associated with xu. The test of proportional 
hazards  is  then  performed  by  regressing
*
uj e on  tj  or  g(t).  If  the  coefficient  on  the  time 
variable is statistically significantly different from zero, this indicates that the proportional 
hazards assumption is not appropriate. 
 
8.4. Results 
 
The analysis is performed using the entire sample but also for the same industries as were 
used  in  chapter  7  -  the  food,  textiles,  footwear  and  clothing  and  paper,  printing  and 
publishing industries. Unlike in chapter 7, the model is also estimated using the entire 
sample because there is not such an obvious case against doing so as there is when the 
model is a production function due to the undesirability of imposing a common technology 
across  different  industries.  Nevertheless,  it  is  preferable  to  avoid  imposing  restrictions 
across disparate industries and this is why the model is also estimated using data from the 
four industries. 
 
The survivor function, S(t), is a useful means of examining differences in the probability of 
closure across treatment and untreated groups. It measures the probability of survival past 
time t. The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function is given by (Kaplan and Meier, 
1958): 
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where nj is the number of plants in the risk pool at time tj and dj is the number of plants that 
close at time tj. 
 
Figure 8.1 gives Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function for plants that received 
an RSA grant and for those that did not receive a grant for the full sample containing all 
industries. 
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Figure 8.1: Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function for all industries 
S
ource: SAMIS/ARD 
 
The estimate of the survivor function is higher for RSA recipients than for plants that did 
not receive assistance at all times which shows that RSA recipients always have a higher 
probability of survival after receiving assistance.
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Figure 8.2 provides Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function for the industries that 
will be used for estimating equation (8.2). 
 
                                                 
47 The estimates of both survivor functions are equal to one in the first year because plants that fail in their 
first year are not observed. 195 
 
Figure 8.2: Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function for individual industries 
Food  Textiles 
 
 
Footwear and Clothing  Paper, Printing and Publishing 
 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
For all four industries, plants that have received an RSA grant have a higher survivor 
function than plants that have not received a grant for each period of time. The gap in the 
probability of survival is particularly large for the textiles industry but quite small for the 
footwear and clothing industries. Nevertheless, it is clear that the probability of survival is 
larger for RSA recipients in all four industries. The purpose of the remainder of the chapter 
is to establish whether this difference in survival probabilities is caused by the difference in 
treatment  status  or  whether  it  is  the  consequence  of  other  differences  in  plant 
characteristics between plants that received an RSA grant and plants that did not. 
 
The proportional hazards test revealed that employment, single plant status and age did not 
satisfy the proportional hazards assumption requiring covariates to multiplicatively shift 
the baseline hazard by the same amount through time. The model was therefore stratified 196 
 
by three employment size bands, age and the single plant dummy.
48 As the tables below 
reveal, the null of proportional hazards cannot now be rejected at the 10% level in any of 
the models estimated. 
 
As in chapter 7, the models had to be estimated using weighted data to make the results 
representative of the population of plants because of the stratified sampling frame of the 
ABI. The sampling frame of the ABI and the construction of the weights are discussed in 
detail in chapter 5. 
 
The estimated hazard rates of the Cox proportional hazards model using the full sample are 
displayed in table 8.1. These estimates are obtained using no control for self-selection bias 
and are presented to allow comparison with the results obtained using the matched sample. 
Hazard  rates  are  reported  so  a  value  greater  (less)  than  one  should  be  interpreted  as 
meaning that larger values of the variable are associated with a larger (smaller) probability 
of closure. 
 
                                                 
48 Many studies (see, for example, Disney, Haskel and Heden, 2003b and Harris and Li, 2007) include 
interactions between each variable in xit and the age variable to control for the influence of age. This is not 
necessary here because the influence of age is controlled for by the stratification of the model. 197 
 
Table 8.1: Estimates of Cox Proportional Hazards Model obtained using no control for 
self-selection 
  All 
Industries 
Food  Textiles   Footwear 
and 
Clothing 
Paper, 
Printing and 
Publishing 
RSA  0.878** 
(0.054) 
0.753 
(0.181) 
0.565*** 
(0.110) 
0.713** 
(0.112) 
1.071 
(0.223) 
ln(Labour 
Productivity) 
0.901*** 
(0.011) 
0.816*** 
(0.036) 
0.820*** 
(0.058) 
0.909 
(0.068) 
0.940** 
(0.025) 
ln(Employment)  0.923*** 
(0.012) 
0.976 
(0.038) 
0.937 
(0.058) 
0.771*** 
(0.049) 
0.819*** 
(0.032) 
ln(Capital to 
Labour Ratio) 
1.251*** 
(0.013) 
1.242*** 
(0.038) 
1.196*** 
(0.051) 
1.303*** 
(0.072) 
1.290*** 
(0.049) 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
1.026* 
(0.014) 
0.967 
(0.044) 
1.027 
(0.077) 
0.874* 
(0.063) 
1.047 
(0.036) 
ln(Displacement)  0.984 
(0.014) 
0.998 
(0.039) 
1.007 
(0.055) 
1.075 
(0.112) 
1.091 
(0.076) 
ln(Industry 
Employment 
Growth) 
0.835** 
(0.073) 
1.110 
(0.403) 
0.956 
(0.351) 
1.729 
(0.681) 
0.847 
(0.388) 
Ownership change  1.238*** 
(0.035) 
1.181*** 
(0.070) 
1.460*** 
(0.210) 
1.306 
(0.233) 
1.504*** 
(0.163) 
FDI  0.939** 
(0.026) 
0.762*** 
(0.079) 
0.768* 
(0.111) 
0.731 
(0.140) 
0.989 
(0.107) 
Log 
Pseudolikelihood 
-35220.57  -3380.24                 -711.61  -724.32  -1603.46 
Proportional 
Hazards Test 
35.58  1.55  2.55  1.38  0.95 
Observations  45,617  6,501  2,526  1,771  4,762 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
A full set of 2-digit industry dummies is included but not reported for the ‘all industries’ model 
 
The statistical significance and magnitude of the hazard rates on the xit variables do not 
vary  much  across  the  industries  considered.  Therefore,  it  is  sufficient  to  discuss  the 
coefficients  obtained  using  the  full  sample.  These  show  that  plants  with  higher  labour 
productivity and plants with more employees are less likely to exit. As these variables are 
in the model to proxy for efficiency, this is what would be expected. However, as in Harris 
and  Trainor  (2007),  the  hazard  rate  associated  with  the  capital  per  worker  variable  is 
greater than one. This is surprising as if this variable is a good proxy for sunk costs, it 
should be negatively related to closure probability. As discussed above, because plants 
may use an RSA grant to incur sunk costs, this implies that, through this channel, receipt of 
an RSA grant has a positive impact on closure probability. But, given that this result is 
likely to be the consequence of the capital to labour ratio being an unsatisfactory proxy for 198 
 
sunk costs, this inference is of dubious value. Therefore, we may henceforth focus on the 
hazard rate associated with the RSA dummy as measuring the full impact of receipt of an 
RSA grant on closure probability. 
 
Another strange feature of the results is that the Herfindahl Index is positively associated 
with closure, meaning that plants operating in less competitive industries are more likely to 
close. As discussed in chapter 7.4, the deficiencies of the Herfindahl Index may be the 
cause of this result. Another surprise is that the displacement variable is negatively related 
to closure probability, although the impact is very small. A priori expectations are that 
greater displacement should be positively associated with closure probability. The hazard 
ratio  associated  with  industry  employment  growth  is  less  than  one  which  reflects  this 
variable’s inclusion to capture improving or deteriorating market conditions. Also in line 
with  expectations,  the  ownership  change  variable  is  positively  related  to  closure 
probability. Finally, FDI plants are found to be less likely to close. 
 
Of greatest interest here is the hazard ratio associated with the RSA dummy. For the full 
Scottish  sample,  this  is  less  than  one  and  statistically  significant  at  the  95%  level, 
indicating  that  being  an  RSA  grant  recipient  is  associated  with  a  lower  probability  of 
closure, ceteris paribus. This is also the case for the textiles and the footwear and clothing 
industries. The estimated hazard rate on the RSA dummy is less than one for the food 
industry but not statistically significant. For the paper, printing and publishing industry, the 
estimated hazard rate actually suggests a positive relationship between receipt of an RSA 
grant and closure but is not significantly different from one. 
 
Table 8.2 presents results obtained from estimating the proportional hazards model using a 
matched  sample.  As  all  the  control  variables  were  included  in  the  probit  model,  from 
which the predicted values were taken and used for matching, their variance in the matched 
sample  is  reduced.  As  interest  lies  mainly  in  the  hazard  rate  associated  with  the  RSA 
dummy  rather  than  the  other  variables  included  in  the  model,  this  does  not  present  a 
problem. 
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Table 8.2: Estimates of Cox Proportional Hazards Model obtained using Propensity Score 
Matching 
  All 
Industries 
Food  Textiles   Footwear 
and 
Clothing 
Paper, 
Printing and 
Publishing 
RSA  0.945 
(0.056) 
0.609 
(0.195) 
1.042 
(0.098) 
0.903 
(0.164) 
0.907 
(0.160) 
ln(Labour 
Productivity) 
0.871*** 
(0.017) 
0.911* 
(0.050) 
0.876** 
(0.055) 
0.699 
(0.161) 
0.844 
(0.134) 
ln(Employment)  0.969 
(0.026) 
1.009 
(0.103) 
0.745* 
(0.115) 
0.716* 
(0.130) 
1.128 
(0.122) 
ln(Capital to 
Labour Ratio) 
1.185*** 
(0.021) 
1.081 
(0.077) 
1.477*** 
(0.135) 
1.242 
(0.217) 
1.035 
(0.111) 
ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
1.018 
(0.022) 
1.076 
(0.087) 
1.112 
(0.104) 
0.451** 
(0.146) 
1.003 
(0.102) 
ln(Displacement)  0.958 
(0.026) 
1.079 
(0.067) 
0.980 
(0.064) 
0.355** 
(0.163) 
0.835 
(0.158) 
ln(Industry 
Employment 
Growth) 
0.876 
(0.097) 
0.095** 
(0.090) 
1.663 
(0.605) 
2.892 
(3.775) 
0.410 
(0.508) 
Ownership 
change 
1.125*** 
(0.045) 
1.171 
(0.190) 
1.146 
(1.146) 
1.218 
(0.234) 
1.146 
(0.233) 
FDI  0.883*** 
(0.035) 
0.867 
(0.217) 
0.653** 
(0.111) 
0.731 
(0.266) 
1.011 
(0.182) 
Log 
Pseudolikelihood 
-5566.07  -195.60 
 
-122.10  -59.35  -188.45 
Proportional 
Hazards Test 
8.86  1.26  0.54  1.03  1.93 
Observations  28,501  2,667  2,552  1,551  2,811 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
A full set of 2-digit industry dummies is included but not reported for the ‘all industries’ model 
 
In the matched sample for all industries, the coefficients on labour productivity, the capital 
to labour ratio, the ownership change dummy and the FDI dummy all retain their sign and 
statistical  significance  from  the  full  sample.  The  displacement  variable  remains  not 
statistically  significant  at  the  90%  level.  Employment,  the  Herfindahl  Index  and  the 
industry employment growth variables all lose their statistical significance. Generally, the 
loss of statistical significance in the matched sample compared to the full sample is also 
seen in the individual industries considered. This is the effect of their reduced variance in 
the matched sample. 
 
For the matched sample that includes all industries, the hazard rate on the RSA dummy is 
no longer statistically significant. This suggests that receipt of an RSA grant had no impact 200 
 
on the probability of survival. Compared to the results from using the full sample, the point 
estimate of the hazard ratio is closer to one which implies that misspecification leads to an 
overestimate of the impact of RSA on closure probability. 
 
The same loss of significance is seen when the model is estimated by industry. When the 
matched sample is used, there is no longer any statistically significant reduction in closure 
probability  associated  with  receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  for  the  textiles  and  footwear  and 
clothing  industries.  For  the  paper,  printing  and  publishing  industry,  the  hazard  rate 
associated with the RSA dummy is not statistically significant in the full sample and this 
remains the case in the matched sample. The most curious result comes from the food 
industry in which the hazard rate associated with the RSA dummy is lower in the matched 
than the full sample, implying a larger reduction in closure probability from receiving an 
RSA  grant.  However,  it  remains  not  statistically  significant.  This  shows  that 
misspecification caused by self-selection can lead to both over and under estimates of the 
ATT but, mostly, misspecification leads to an overestimate of the reduction in closure 
probability caused by receipt of an RSA grant. 
 
In order to test the robustness of these results, a number of variations on equation (8.2) 
were estimated. Firstly, the treatment dummy was substituted for a variable measuring the 
total value of RSA grants that the plant had received up to that point in time. This would 
show the impact on closure probability of receipt of an extra pound of RSA. However, in 
neither the matched sample including all industries or the matched samples for individual 
industries was this variable statistically significant. 
 
The next approach was to replace the simple RSA dummy used in the specification above 
with  a  dummy  that  equalled  one  from  the  time  at  which  a  grant  for  safeguarding 
employment was provided and a dummy that equalled one from the time at which a grant 
for  creating  new  employment  was  provided.  Neither  dummy  tended  to  be  statistically 
significant using the matched samples which indicates that the motivation for seeking the 
grant does not lead to differing impacts on survival. 
 
Tests were also run to see if receiving different numbers of RSA grants has a differential 
impact on survival probability. This was done by replacing the RSA dummy employed 
above with a series of dummies that took the value of one if the plant had received a given 201 
 
numbers of grants. Although some of these dummies were statistically significant, there 
was no clear pattern indicating that more grants led to a greater reduction or increase in 
closure probability. The reliability of these results is also dubious given that, particularly 
for  individual  industries,  there  can  be  very  few  plants  that  received  large  numbers  of 
grants. 
 
These robustness tests therefore cast little doubt on the central finding of this chapter that 
receipt of an RSA grant has no statistically significant impact on plant survival when a 
matched sample is used to combat self-selection bias. 
 
8.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to establish the existence of a causal impact of receipt of an RSA 
grant on the probability of survival. In line with the results obtained by Harris and Trainor 
(2007), receiving an RSA grant was found to reduce the probability of closure using an 
unmatched sample containing all industries. This was also the case for the textiles and the 
footwear and clothing industries. No statistically significant effect was found for the food 
and the paper, printing and publishing industries. 
 
When the Cox model was estimated a matched sample of plants from all industries, no 
statistically significant impact of receipt of an RSA grant on closure probability was found. 
This differs from the results obtained by Girma, Görg and Strobl (2007b) in their analysis 
of the impact of government grants on survival in Ireland who found that receipt of a grant 
reduced the probability of closure. The impact of RSA on closure probability was also not 
statistically significant in any of the models estimated for the individual industries. This 
implies that, in general, self-selection, if ignored, leads to an overestimate of the impact of 
receipt of an RSA grant on closure probability. 
 
A8.1 Covariate Balance in the Full and Matched Sample for Survival Analysis 
 
This appendix gives information on the distribution of each variable across treated and 
untreated groups in the full and the matched sample for the datasets used to produce the 
results given in tables 8.1 and 8.2. The mean of each variable is presented and t-tests are 
employed to establish if this difference is statistically significant. Kolmogorov-Smirnov 202 
 
tests are also performed which test the null that the variable in the treated and untreated 
groups are drawn from the same distribution. This information is valuable as it provides an 
indication of the extent to which the balance of the observed covariates across the treated 
and  untreated  groups  is  improved  and  therefore  the  extent  to  which  problems  of 
misspecification caused by self-selection are alleviated by using the matched instead of the 
full sample. 
 
Table A8.1 provides this information for the sample containing all industries. 
 
Table A8.1: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
All Industries for Survival Analysis 
   Full Sample  Matched Sample 
   Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S 
Ln(Labour 
Productivity) 
3.18  2.58  0.60***  0.24***  2.38  2.40  -0.02  0.05*** 
Ln(Employment)  2.73  3.67  -0.94***  0.38***  3.58  3.68  -0.10***  0.09*** 
Ln(Capital to 
Labour Ratio) 
-5.27  -3.70  -1.57***  0.29***  -3.25  -3.18  -0.07***  0.03*** 
Ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-2.59  -2.20  -0.40***  0.16***  -2.04  -2.07  0.03**  0.03*** 
Ln(Age)  2.26  2.27  -0.01  0.14***  2.30  2.31  -0.01  0.05*** 
Ln(Displacement)  -2.57  -2.12  -0.45***  0.17***  -2.03  -1.99  -0.03**  0.02 
Industry 
Employment 
Growth 
0.04  -0.01  0.04***  0.06***  -0.02  -0.02  .00*  0.02** 
Ownership 
Change 
0.32  0.44  -0.12***  0.25***  0.45  0.50  -0.06***  0.10*** 
FDI  0.13  0.21  -0.08***  0.15***  0.15  0.18  -0.03***  0.05*** 
Single  0.24  0.33  -0.09***  0.14***  0.20  0.23  -0.04***  0.05*** 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
In the full sample, the difference in the mean of each variable, with the exception of the 
age  variable,  across  treated  and  untreated  groups  is  statistically  significant  at  the  99% 
level. Moving from the full to the matched sample leads to a reduction in the difference for 
all variables. However, these differences remain statistically significant at the 90% level 
for  all  variables  apart  from  labour  productivity  and  age  in  the  matched  sample.  The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics tell a similar story. The null of the treated and untreated 
groups being drawn from the same distribution is rejected at the 99% level for all variables 
in the full sample. In the matched sample, the null is rejected at this level for all variables 203 
 
apart  from  the  displacement  variable  and  the  industry  employment  growth  variable 
although the size of the test statistic is once more smaller for every variable. This shows 
that  although  propensity  score  matching  improves  the  balance  of  the  covariates  across 
treated  and  untreated  groups,  large  differences  in  distribution  remain  in  the  matched 
sample. 
 
Table A8.2 shows the results for the food industry. 
 
Table A8.2: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Food Industry for Survival Analysis 
   Full Sample  Matched Sample 
   Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S 
Ln(Labour 
Productivity) 
2.67  2.38  0.29***  0.12***  2.22  2.28  -0.07*  0.12*** 
Ln(Employment)  2.60  3.54  -0.94***  0.43***  3.54  3.92  -0.38***  0.24*** 
Ln(Capital to 
Labour Ratio) 
-5.43  -3.74  -1.70***  0.34***  -2.83  -3.10  0.27***  0.21*** 
Ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-2.15  -1.80  -0.36***  0.25***  -1.53  -1.54  0.00  0.06 
Ln(Age)  2.03  2.09  -0.06  0.13***  2.15  2.23  -0.08***  0.14*** 
Ln(Displacement)  -2.47  -2.17  -0.31***  0.10***  -1.87  -2.03  0.16***  0.15*** 
Industry 
Employment 
Growth 
0.03  0.01  0.02  0.05  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.07* 
Ownership  0.25  0.35  -0.10***  0.19***  0.49  0.43  0.06***  0.12*** 
FDI  0.03  0.07  -0.04***  0.06*  0.07  0.16  -0.09***  0.16*** 
Single  0.19  0.36  -0.17***  0.24***  0.12  0.17  -0.05***  0.09** 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
Only the difference in the mean of the age and the industry employment growth variables 
are not statistically significant at the 99% level. In the matched sample, this is true of the 
labour productivity, Herfindahl Index and industry employment growth variables. The size 
of the difference in mean falls between the full and the matched samples for all variables 
apart from the age and FDI variables. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are statistically 
significant for all variables at the 95% level with the exception of the industry employment 
growth  and  FDI  variables  in  the  full  sample  and  the  Herfindahl  Index  and  industry 
employment variables in the matched sample. As is clear from above, it is possible that 
some variables are more poorly balanced in the matched than in the full sample. This 
occurs when well balanced variables in the full sample are correlated with poorly balanced 204 
 
variables. Because the former will have small coefficients in the probit as they have little 
explanatory power for treatment status and the latter will have large coefficients because 
they have large explanatory power for treatment status, matching on the propensity score 
leads to an improvement in the balance of those variables that were poorly balanced in the 
full sample at the expense of those that were well balanced. 
 
Table A8.3 provides the same information for the textiles industry. 
 
Table A8.3: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Textiles Industry for Survival Analysis 
   Full Sample  Matched Sample 
   Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S 
Ln(Labour 
Productivity) 
2.66  2.23  0.43***  0.17***  2.30  2.38  -0.08***  0.10*** 
Ln(Employment)  3.41  3.56  -0.15***  0.13***  3.70  3.58  0.12***  0.14*** 
Ln(Capital to 
Labour Ratio) 
-4.99  -3.79  -1.20***  0.29***  -3.38  -3.40  0.02  0.05 
Ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-2.60  -2.11  -0.49***  0.21  -2.04  -2.06  0.02  0.06 
Ln(Age)  2.50  2.34  0.15***  0.19***  2.52  2.48  0.04  0.08** 
Ln(Displacement)  -2.95  -2.37  -0.57***  0.20***  -2.41  -2.37  -0.04  0.02 
Industry 
Employment 
Growth 
-0.01  0.04  -0.06  0.07*  -0.05  -0.06  0.00  0.06 
Ownership  0.30  0.31  -0.01  0.09***  0.37  0.47  -0.10***  0.16*** 
FDI  0.05  0.07  -0.03**  0.04  0.08  0.10  -0.02  0.04 
Single  0.24  0.24  0.00  0.05  0.25  0.24  0.02  0.07* 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
The difference in mean across treated and untreated groups is statistically significant at the 
95% level for all variables except the industry employment growth, ownership change and 
single  enterprise  plant  variables  in  the  full  sample.  In  the  matched  sample,  only  the 
difference  in  mean  for  the  labour  productivity,  employment  and  ownership  change 
variables is statistically significant. The difference in mean falls for all variables apart from 
the ownership change and single plant variables. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics also 
fall for most variables and are statistically significant at the 95% level for all variables but 
the  Herfindahl  Index,  industry  employment  growth,  FDI  and  single  plant  enterprise 
variables  in  the  full  sample  and  for  the  labour  productivity,  employment,  age  and 
ownership change variables in the matched sample. The covariates are therefore relatively 205 
 
well matched in the matched sample compared to the matched sample for all industries and 
the food industry. 
 
Table A8.4 provides the same statistics for the footwear and clothing industry. 
 
Table A8.4: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Footwear and Clothing Industry for Survival Analysis 
   Full Sample  Matched Sample 
   Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S 
Ln(Labour 
Productivity) 
2.70  2.13  0.56***  0.32***  2.02  1.83  0.19***  0.20*** 
Ln(Employment)  3.18  3.64  -0.46***  0.23***  3.63  3.62  0.01  0.10** 
Ln(Capital to 
Labour Ratio) 
-6.54  -4.36  -2.18***  0.42***  -4.18  -3.66  -0.52***  0.32*** 
Ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-2.63  -2.01  -0.62***  0.34***  -2.05  -1.79  -0.25***  0.19*** 
Ln(Age)  2.24  2.17  0.07  0.20***  2.35  2.16  0.19***  0.28*** 
Ln(Displacement)  -2.14  -1.68  -0.46***  0.25***  -1.70  -1.56  -0.15***  0.14*** 
Industry 
Employment 
Growth 
-0.03  -0.05  0.02  0.05  -0.03  -0.04  0.01  0.07 
Ownership  0.23  0.36  -0.13***  0.24***  0.33  0.35  -0.02  0.16*** 
FDI  0.06  0.14  -0.09***  0.16***  0.02  0.11  -0.10***  0.15*** 
Single  0.31  0.26  0.05*  0.11***  0.26  0.18  0.08***  0.12*** 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
The age, industry employment growth and single plant enterprise variables are the only 
variables for which the difference in the mean across treated and untreated groups is not 
statistically significant in the full sample. The difference in the mean falls between the full 
and the matched sample for every variable apart from the age and the FDI variables. In the 
matched sample, the difference in mean across treated and untreated groups is statistically 
significant for all variables with the exceptions of the employment, industry employment 
growth  and  ownership  change  variables.  The  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  statistics  are 
statistically significant for all variables but the industry employment growth variable in 
both the full and matched samples. The covariates are therefore similarly balanced across 
treated and untreated groups in the matched sample for the footwear and clothing industry 
as in the matched sample for all industries and the food industry but not as well balanced 
as in the matched sample for the textiles industry. 
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Table A8.5 provides the same information for the paper, printing and publishing industry. 
 
Table A8.5: Distribution of Observed Covariates across the Full and Matched Sample for 
the Paper, Printing and Publishing Industry for Survival Analysis 
   Full Sample  Matched Sample 
   Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S  Non-RSA  RSA  Difference  K-S 
Ln(Labour 
Productivity) 
3.14  2.75  0.39***  0.20***  2.41  2.71  -0.30***  0.33*** 
Ln(Employment)  2.67  3.83  -1.16***  0.52***  3.49  3.70  -0.21***  0.19*** 
Ln(Capital to 
Labour Ratio) 
-4.90  -3.75  -1.15***  0.27***  -2.92  -3.14  0.22***  0.22*** 
Ln(Herfindahl 
Index) 
-3.08  -2.84  -0.25***  0.17***  -2.32  -2.70  0.38***  0.19*** 
Ln(Age)  2.39  2.32  0.07  0.20***  2.26  2.48  -0.22***  0.33*** 
Ln(Displacement)  -2.36  -2.29  -0.07  0.13***  -1.91  -2.31  0.39***  0.29*** 
Industry 
Employment 
Growth 
0.00  -0.02  0.02**  0.20***  -0.01  -0.02  0.01*  0.23*** 
Ownership  0.35  0.45  -0.10***  0.25***  0.42  0.52  -0.10***  0.28*** 
FDI  0.12  0.17  -0.05***  0.11***  0.13  0.12  0.01  0.07 
Single  0.22  0.37  -0.15***  0.20***  0.23  0.34  -0.10***  0.18*** 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, *** denotes significance at 
the 99% level 
Source: SAMIS/ARD 
 
In the full sample, the difference in mean across treated and untreated groups is statistically 
significant for all variables apart from the displacement and industry employment growth 
variables at the 95% level. In the matched sample, the difference is statistically significant 
at the 95% level for every variable but the ownership change and industry employment 
growth  variables.  The  difference  is  larger  in  the  matched  than  the  full  sample  for  the 
Herfindahl Index, age and displacement variables and smaller for all other variables. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics indicate rejection of the null that the treated and untreated 
groups are drawn from the same distribution for all variables in the full sample and all 
variables apart from the FDI variables in the matched sample. This is therefore the worst 
balanced matched sample of all those created. 
 
Overall, the extent to which the distribution of the observed covariates across treatment 
and untreated groups are balanced by propensity score matching is similar to that achieved 
in  chapter  7  in  which  the  dependent  variable  was  output  rather  than  the  hazard  rate. 
Although the balance is substantially improved in the matched sample, there remain large 
differences. This therefore implies that estimating a multivariate hazard model rather than 207 
 
simply comparing hazard rates across treatment and control groups in the matched sample 
is  the  correct  approach  because  failure  to  control  for  differences  in  the  distribution  of 
covariates in the matched sample could generate biased estimates of the treatment effect.208 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has investigated the impact of receipt of an RSA grant on plant performance. It 
has done so using a database created by linking a register of recipients of RSA grants into 
the longitudinal ARD which contains the financial information on factor inputs and outputs 
necessary for empirical analysis. The first empirical chapter consisted of a decomposition 
of the growth of labour productivity and TFP in Scottish manufacturing plants between 
1994  and  2004.  The  next  two  empirical  chapters  contained  analyses  of  the  impact  of 
receipt of an RSA grant on TFP and of the impact of receipt of an RSA grant on survival in 
Scottish manufacturing plants between 1984 and 2004. 
 
The next section will describe the contribution to the literature that has been made by this 
thesis. The third section will set out the main  findings from the empirical analyses of 
chapters 6, 7 and 8. The fourth section will make some policy recommendations on the 
basis of these findings. The fifth section will provide some suggestions for future work that 
could be done in this area. The final section concludes. 
 
9.2. Contribution to the Literature 
 
The contribution to the literature has been primarily twofold. Firstly, the dataset that was 
used for the empirical analyses is an improvement on previous datasets created by linking 
SAMIS with the ARD that have been used for estimating the impact of receipt of an RSA 
grant on plant performance. This is because over 91% of the plants that received an RSA 
grant  in  Scotland  have  been  identified  in  the  dataset  as  doing  so.  This  is  a  higher 
proportion than has been achieved in previous studies. This is of crucial importance when 
estimating treatment effects because, assuming that there is some impact of receiving a 
grant,  incorrectly  classifying  a  plant  that  received  treatment  as  not  having  received 
treatment will lead to downward biased estimates of the treatment effect. 
 
The second contribution to the literature was methodological. The chapter that investigated 
the impact of receipt of an RSA grant on TFP used appropriate methods for dealing with 209 
 
both  the  endogeneity  of  factor  inputs  and  the  consequences  of  self-selection  into  the 
treatment group. Previous papers that have analysed the impact of receipt of an RSA grant 
on plant performance have only dealt with one of these sources of bias (see, for example, 
Criscuolo,  Martin,  Overman  and  Van  Reenen,  2007;  Harris  and  Robinson,  2004).  The 
chapter  in  this  thesis  that  examined  the  impact  of  receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  on  the 
probability  of  survival  dealt  with  self-selection  bias  by  using  a  sample  created  using 
propensity score matching. This is the first time that the impact of receipt of an RSA grant 
on the probability of survival has been analysed using any method that deals with the 
consequences of self-selection. 
 
9.3. Main Findings 
 
The first empirical chapter decomposed the growth of aggregate labour productivity and 
TFP between 1994 and 2004. This showed that plants that received an RSA grant in this 
period of time made a positive but small contribution to the growth of both measures of 
productivity. The bulk of this contribution came from plants that existed in both 1994 and 
2004 and, more specifically, through the coincidence of improvements in productivity and 
increases  in  market  shares.  More  concerning  is  the  negative  contribution  to  labour 
productivity growth and the small (but positive) contribution to TFP growth from RSA-
assisted entrants. The contribution from non-assisted entrants to the growth of productivity 
is the largest component in both decompositions which suggests that RSA grants  need to 
be better targeted at entrants. 
 
Chapter 7 revealed that receipt of an RSA grant had no statistically significant impact on 
TFP  for  the  food,  textiles,  footwear  and  clothing  and  paper,  printing  and  publishing 
industries.  Although  there  was  considerable  movement  in  the  point  estimate  of  the 
treatment  effect  across  different  estimators,  this  finding  of  no  statistically  significant 
impact  was  found  for  all  four  industries  when  no  control  for  self-selection  bias  was 
employed, when an instrumental variables estimator was used and when the sample used 
for estimation was created using propensity score matching. It is therefore robust to choice 
of estimators. 
 
Chapter 8 showed that  receipt of  an RSA  grant did not have a statistically  significant 
impact  on  the  probability  of  closure  when  the  Cox  proportional  hazards  model  was 210 
 
estimated  using  a  sample  created  by  propensity  score  matching.  This  was  the  case 
regardless of whether a matched sample containing plants from all industries was used or 
whether individual industries were used. When the full sample was used, a statistically 
significant reduction in  closure probability was  found for the sample  containing plants 
from all industries and for the textiles and footwear and clothing industries. This implies 
that the finding of a statistically significant impact is driven by a misspecification of the 
model. 
 
In sum, the results from the empirical analysis are not generally supportive of the RSA 
scheme in its current form. Although it must be recalled that previous studies have shown 
that receiving an RSA grant leads to increases in employment, investment and therefore 
output (see chapter 1.3) and therefore that the scheme makes a contribution to the growth 
of GDP per capita, Productivity enhancing effects of receiving an RSA grant would clearly 
lead to a larger contribution to the growth of living standards. An increase in TFP caused 
by receipt of an RSA grant would allow the owners of the firm to make larger profits or to 
provide higher wages, both of which would contribute to the growth of GDP per capita. An 
increase in TFP may also induce the firm to increase employment beyond the levels they 
are  obliged  to  employ  as  a  condition  of  receiving  the  grant  if  the  demand  curve  is 
sufficiently elastic. That receipt of an RSA grant does not lead to such an improvement in 
TFP therefore implies that, assuming that they are able to stay open, RSA grant recipients 
are not contributing as much to the growth of living standards as they would if RSA grants 
had productivity enhancing effects. 
 
However, the assumption that RSA grant recipients are able to continue operating is not a 
trivial one, especially if the grant was provided to safeguard employment. It is reasonable 
to assume that plants that require a grant to safeguard employment and are unable to obtain 
the necessary finance for capital investment from elsewhere are at higher risk of closure 
than the average. The finding that receipt of an RSA grant does not lead to a statistically 
significant reduction in closure probability is therefore worrying. The problem is not so 
great for plants that apply for a grant to increase their levels of employment as they are less 
likely to be at risk of closure, even though they must also, according to the rules of the 
scheme, be unable to obtain finance from the private sector. Given that the creation and 
safeguarding of employment is the main aim of the scheme, this finding is concerning as it 
casts doubt upon whether the jobs that are created and safeguarded by RSA grants will 211 
 
endure  and  suggests  that  the  contribution  to  living  standards  from  increases  in 
employment, capital and output occasioned by receiving an RSA grant may be transitory. 
 
9.4. Policy Recommendations 
 
Overall,  these  results  suggest  that  the  RSA  scheme  should  be  geared  more  towards 
improving  the  productivity  of  recipient  plants  rather  than  merely  safeguarding  and 
promoting employment. This would allow plants that receive a grant to make a greater 
contribution to the growth of living standards. As discussed in chapter 2.6, an eligibility 
criterion to focus the English version of the RSA scheme more on improving productivity 
was introduced in 2004. This stipulates that the jobs created or safeguarded by projects 
must be relatively productive as determined by a comparison of GVA per employee with 
the sectoral and national averages. A similar criterion should also be applied to the RSA 
scheme in Scotland. 
 
In order to ensure that projects satisfy this criterion, grants should only be provided to 
support investment in capital which will significantly improve the productivity of the plant. 
This will invariably mean capital which embodies the latest technologies. One example of 
such capital could be information and communications technology, the accumulation of 
which has been shown by some studies to lead to improvements in TFP (see, for example, 
Van Ark, 2001; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2003).  
 
If the RSA scheme cannot be changed so that grants have a strong productivity enhancing 
impact, it is arguable from a Schumpeterian perspective that grants should no longer be 
provided for projects that seek to safeguard employment. As firms that apply for grants to 
safeguard  employment  must  be  unable  to  maintain  their  current  levels  of  employment 
without a grant, they are likely to have lower productivity levels than those that apply for a 
grant  to  increase  employment.  Successfully  safeguarding  low  productivity  jobs  will 
impede the process of creative destruction and lead to a lower rate of productivity growth 
and living standards.
49 
 
                                                 
49 Note that the results from chapter 8 cast doubt upon whether grants provided to safeguard employment are 
successful in achieving this aim. 212 
 
9.5. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
The  size  of  the  theoretical  literature  review  relative  to  the  empirical  literature  review 
suggests that there is considerable scope for additional work on the impacts of schemes 
such as RSA using general equilibrium models of the economy. Such studies would be 
useful  in  providing  a  greater  understanding  of  the  impact  of  such  schemes  at  the 
macroeconomic level. In particular, dynamic models in the mould of Samaniego (2006) 
that allow for the productivity levels of the firm to vary over time assist in providing an 
understanding  of  how  such  schemes  enhance  or  impede  growth  in  the  economy.  Of 
particular relevance to schemes that provide grants in specific areas of the country such as 
RSA would be economic geography models that take explicit account of the significance 
of geography to firm performance. 
 
Although it is clear that the failure to identify every plant that received an RSA grant in the 
ARD will, assuming the treatment effect is positive, lead to underestimates of the impact of 
receipt of a grant, it would be helpful to have some guidance on the extent to which the 
estimated treatment effect will be biased. Such guidance could be provided by simulation. 
The impact of failing to find difference percentages of plants that receive grants in the 
dataset could be analysed using different sizes of treated and untreated groups and different 
magnitudes of treatment effects. This information could then be used to develop standard 
errors for treatment effects that take account of the fact that the sample contains some 
plants that are erroneously classified as untreated. Given the large number of studies that 
depend on matched datasets, such a study would be useful to many researchers (see Harris 
and Trainor, 2005; Girma, Görg and Strobl, 2007b for examples of papers that have used 
linked data). 
 
Simulation work would also be useful in order to establish the magnitude of bias in the 
estimate  of  the  treatment  effect  that  arises  due  to  misspecification  of  the  observable 
covariates when observations in the treatment group are self-selected. In chapter 8, moving 
from the full to the matched sample removed the statistical significance of the estimate of 
the  treatment  effect  for  some  industries.  This  shows  that  the  balance  of  the  observed 
covariates across treatment and untreated groups is an important issue. Simulation work 
that  showed,  for  differences  in  the  extent  to  which  the  covariates  are  balanced  across 
treated and untreated groups, the size of the bias for different specifications of the ‘real’ 213 
 
outcome  equation  would  be  helpful  in  allowing  the  researcher  to  understand  whether 
creating a matched sample is necessary. 
 
Further empirical work could be done to analyse the impact of receipt of an RSA grant on 
other dimensions of plant performance. In particular, it would be possible to analyse the 
impact  of  receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  on  R&D  expenditure  and  innovativeness  using  a 
database created by linking SAMIS into the Community Innovation Survey (see Harris and 
Robinson, 2001a for information on the Community Innovation Survey). Such work would 
be of considerable interest in Scotland as the poor innovation performance of Scottish 
firms is a source of major concern (see Scottish Government, 2009c for information on the 
state of innovation in Scotland). The impact of receipt of an RSA grant on exporting could 
also be analysed by linking SAMIS into the Global Connections Survey (see Harris and 
Reid, 2009 for information on the Global Connections Survey). This would be of interest 
because  of  the  benefits  to  both  individual  firms  and  the  host  country  associated  with 
exporting  (see  Harris  and  Reid,  2009  for  a  summary  of  the  benefits  associated  with 
exporting). 
 
9.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter is a conclusion to the thesis. It began by setting out the contribution made by 
this thesis to the literature. This was in the use of a superior dataset to those which have 
been  used  previously  to  analyse  the  impact  of  receipt  of  an  RSA  grant  on  plant 
performance and in the use of a superior econometric methodology which deals with both 
self-selection into the treatment group and other sources of endogeneity. 
 
It  then  described  the  main  findings  from  the  empirical  chapters.  The  decomposition 
showed that plants that received a RSA grant made a small but positive contribution to the 
growth of both labour productivity and TFP. Chapter 7 and 8 showed that receipt of an 
RSA grant had no statistically significant impact on TFP or the probability of survival. 
 
On  the  basis  of  these  findings,  some  policy  recommendations  were  made.  These  were 
mainly that the RSA scheme should become more focused on improving the productivity 
of recipient plants by offering support for the acquisition of only the most technologically 214 
 
advanced capital. This would help to ensure that the jobs created or safeguarded by receipt 
of an RSA grant endure. 
 
Finally, some suggestions for future work were made. Firstly, more general equilibrium 
models that look at the impact of grant schemes such as RSA at the macroeconomic level 
are required as there are currently very few of such papers. Secondly, simulation work that 
quantifies the implications of incorrectly classifying plants that received a grant as not 
having received a grant would be beneficial to the applied researcher as many empirical 
studies that estimate treatment effects rely on linking two datasets. Simulation work that 
provides a guide to the magnitude of bias caused by misspecification of the observable 
covariates when they are not perfectly balanced across the treated and untreated group 
would also be useful to the applied researcher. Finally, it was suggested that the impact of 
receipt of an RSA grant on R&D spend, innovativeness and exporting could be analysed 
by linking SAMIS with other available databases. 215 
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